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Introduction
This dissertation consists of three independent essays in household economics. The
essays offer novel empirical perspectives in the domains of decision-making power, do-
mestic violence, and educational achievement of siblings respectively. What all essays
have in common is their aim to advance our knowledge of household economics in gen-
eral and our understanding of intra-household dynamics in specific. They are written
with the aspiration to provide insights of relevance to policy-makers and academics
alike.
Understanding the economics of the household is important. How household members
cope with their limited resources and divergent interests moderates many important
life outcomes, for example in the spheres of labor force participation, individual health,
and educational achievement. As a subfield of economics, household economics is con-
cerned with the determinants, dynamics, and consequences of household decisions and
behavior. The subfield’s theoretical underpinning has benefitted from a paradigm
shift away from the unitary household model to the cooperative bargaining approach
that also informs this dissertation (McElroy and Horney, 1981; Lundberg and Pollak,
1996, 1994). The subfield has also made very valuable empirical contributions. It is
thanks to household economics that we can better explain changes in fertility patterns
(Ashraf, Field, and Lee, 2014), household consumption (Duflo and Udry, 2004; Duflo,
2000), gender norms (Jensen and Oster, 2009), domestic violence (Aizer, 2011), and
divorce rates (Gray, 1998). This dissertation’s three essays build on this legacy.
The first essay is joint work with Panu Poutvaara. We explore the methodological
and empirical implications of spousal discordance over female decision-making power.
There is great academic and public interest in understanding the causes and con-
sequences of female decision-making power in households. However, as true power
remains unobserved, studies rely on proxies. Surveys are widely considered to be the
most unequivocal proxy for female decision-making power, and a growing number of
publications relies on them. So far, little attention has been paid to the systematic dif-
ferences between males’ and females’ responses to such surveys. Our analyses are based
on data from the last three waves of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS). In our
first analysis, we survey whether discordance can be considered random or whether
it is related to couple attributes. On average, the share of discordant, non-matching
responses varies from 33 to 51 percent across decision domains. We find the prevalence
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of specific types of discordance to vary with the female income share and other proxies
of female power. We confirm that discordance is not random, but systematically re-
lated to real power. In our second analysis, we find that female labor supply and rates
of contraceptive use are higher where both partners perceive female power, relative to
cases of strong discordance about the female role and relative to concordant reports on
the husband as the sole decision-maker. We propose that predictions of these outcomes
can be improved by taking both spouses’ perceptions of female power into considera-
tion. In our third analysis, we explore changes in relative female economic resources.
When female economic resources change, both spouses’ shifts in their perception of fe-
male decision-making power are in the same order of magnitude. The essay is the first
study to use an exogenous income shock to address concerns of potential endogeneity.
Summarizing, results suggest that at the population level, one-sided surveys provide a
good proxy for shifts in male and female perception of female decision-making power
in reaction to a change in female economic resources. However, cross-section estimates
suggest that females’ outcomes will differ in those families where both spouses’ reac-
tions correlate vs. those where only one spouse changes its perception of female power.
The second essay contributes to an emerging strand of literature, that documents
the association of disasters and domestic violence, by employing novel panel data
from Indonesia. The increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters and their
significant impact on affected populations make them subject to extensive research.
However, the range of documented outcomes in longitudinal studies has been compa-
rably narrow, and the majority of publications relies on post-disaster data only. This
is why many scholars have articulated the need for more (longitudinal) evidence on
how disasters affect populations. The second essay is the first study to provide pre-
and post-treatment family-level data on the impact of volcano eruptions on domestic
violence. Besides, it offers evidence for the channels by which natural disasters might
cause domestic violence. I use survey and observational data from 2,024 families in In-
donesia, of which a subset has been exposed to two volcano eruptions in late 2013 and
early 2014. I estimate the impact of the two eruptions on rates of domestic violence and
four alternative outcomes with a difference-in-differences approach. Previous evidence
shows that natural disasters cause mental distress in affected populations via various
channels. Suffering from mental distress, individuals can develop feelings of aggression
and outward, violent interpersonal behavior. I confirm a significant increase in domes-
tic violence in all observed households in the treatment group. Affected communities
suffer from lower average household expenditures which are expected to increase dis-
tress. Further, increased rates of alcohol/drug abuse and lowered emotional well-being
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in affected populations point to increased levels of mental distress. A subsample of
families, who have been displaced in a previous eruption, displays substantially higher
risk of displaying domestic violence after the volcanoes’ eruptions. It is argued that
this risk is founded on their previous loss of livelihood, lack of a social network and
augmented feelings of a threat of disaster recurrence. Policymakers and emergency re-
sponse organizations should consider the multi-fold non-economic outcomes of natural
disasters when designing interventions.
The third essay is concerned with birth order effects and educational achievement in
low- and middle-income countries. A rich body of research recommends that firstborns
score better across a range of life outcomes, including educational achievement. While
the general existence of birth order effects in high-income countries is widely acknowl-
edged, there is substantial debate over why birth order effects exist, and what might
explain the heterogeneity in findings in low- and middle-income countries. To address
these questions, I use a novel dataset covering 26,898 observations of 4,362 biologi-
cally related siblings living in long-term alternative care families in 54 countries. Data
are provided by SOS Children’s Villages. This study is the first one to provide evi-
dence from a broad set of low- and middle-income countries across multiple continents.
Results indicate that birth order effects in low- and middle-income countries are con-
sistent with those in high-income countries. Additionally, this study offers insight into
three sources of heterogeneity in birth order effects. First, findings advise that sibships
that have suffered extreme economic or emotional hardship (for instance sexual abuse,
domestic violence) show attenuated birth order effects compared to other sibships.
Secondly, gender-specific effects are identified for Asia, where the firstborn advantage
is significantly smaller for girls, compared to boys, suggesting parental gender prefer-
ences. Individual hardship within a society seems to be as relevant as differences in
development between societies. This is compatible with previous evidence indicating
effect diminishment and reversal for households of low socioeconomic status in high-
income countries and reversed birth order effects in low- and middle-income countries.
Thirdly, intra-family comparisons of biologically unrelated children of the same bio-
logical birth order suggest the existence of tutoring effects between unrelated siblings
in their alternative care families. This evidence is only suggestive as large standard
errors prevent statements on statistically significant differences between children of the
same biological birth order. Holding biological birth order constant, I find superior
outcomes for older children ranked higher in their alternative care family. I propose
more tutoring opportunities as a potential explanation. The finding is consistent with
the confluence model – one possible explanation for birth order effects. The conflu-
4 Introduction
ence model attributes birth order effects to changing dynamics of social interaction
within the family; of which tutoring between children is one element. These findings
advance the debates on determinants of educational achievement and the formation
of human capital in low- and middle-income countries. They also suggest reasons for
how and when intra-family differences in human capital emerge. Larger (alternative
care) families could particularly benefit from exploring tutoring as a measure to let
children grow personally and intellectually. The results can inform policy making and
development interventions by helping to prioritize individuals in highest need.
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1.1. Introduction
There is great academic and public interest in understanding the causes and conse-
quences of female decision-making power in households. This interest is driven by
both concerns about female empowerment and the notion that shifts in bargaining
power from men to women are associated with desirable changes in household behav-
ior.2 However, as true power remains unobserved, studies rely on proxies. Surveys
are widely considered to be the most unequivocal proxy for female decision-making
power (Majlesi, 2016; Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender, 2002). Accordingly, a growing
number of publications in economics and related fields relies on decision-making sur-
veys.3 Surprisingly, the vast majority of scholars does not account for the possibility of
divergent spousal responses. This is striking as power is rarely exerted in a social vac-
uum. Studies that consider both spouses’ perspectives find high rates of discordance
about female decision-making power (We will refer to divergent spousal responses as
discordant statements. Matching spousal responses will be referred to as concordant).
This paper explores spousal discordance in statements on female decision-making
power. We contribute to existing literature in three ways. First, we confirm that
discordance is a phenomenon that is common and non-random: specific types of dis-
cordance are systematically related to female power proxies such as the female share
in the household’s income. Additionally, we show that prediction of outcomes can be
improved if both spouses’ perspectives are taken into account. This study is the first
to provide a detailed account of the relationship between specific types of discordance
and females’ labor market outcomes. Thirdly, we evaluate the elasticity of male and fe-
male perception of female decision-making power if relative female economic resources
change. We show that spouses’ changes in their perceptions are not statistically singi-
ficantly different from each other. This is the first study to use an exogenous income
shock to address concerns of potential endogeneity.
Our contribution to existing literature is thereby both empirical and methodological.
Only a few previous studies consider both spouses’ responses. They find discordance
to occur frequently and in a non-random manner. Even fewer studies associate spe-
cific types of discordant statements with outcomes. So far only a limited number
2. For example, Duflo and Udry (2004) exploit variation in crop yield to show that increases in
relative female income cause increased food and educational expenditure.
3. For a review see Donald et al. (2017). For examples see Anderson and Eswaran (2009), Bruins
(2017), Jensen and Oster (2009), and Majlesi (2016).
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of outcomes has been related to discordant statements (Ambler et al., 2017; Becker,
Fonseca-Becker, and Schenck-Yglesias, 2006; Jejeebhoy, 2002).4 This study benefits
from an uncommon breadth and depth of information on households, reaching from
household decision-making to labor outcomes and contraceptive use. It is based on
data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), a panel survey administered
to Indonesian households since 1993. A particular merit of the IFLS is a household
decision-making module that provides both partners’ perceptions of who makes deci-
sions across 13 different household domains, for instance, on children’s health or saving
decisions.
In our first analysis, we survey whether discordance can be considered random or
whether it is related to couple attributes. On average, the share of discordant, non-
matching responses varies from 33 to 51 percent across decision domains. We find
the prevalence of specific types of discordance to vary with female income share and
other proxies for female power. Findings suggest, that discordance is not random, but
systematically related to real power.
Secondly, we relate discordance to two proxies for female power, female labor force
participation and contraceptive use. We find that female labor supply and rates of
contraceptive use are higher when both partners perceive female power, relative to
cases of strong discordance about the female role and relative to concordant reports
on the husband as the sole decision maker. We also find that predictions of these
outcomes can be improved by taking both spouses’ perceptions of female power into
consideration. This is based on additional analysis, in which we hold the wife’s per-
ception constant and observe outcomes for all possible responses by the husband.
Thirdly, we explore the association of variation in female economic resources and the
perception of female decision-making power from both spouses’ perspectives. This
allows us to predict the potential bias in studies that evaluate the impact of economic
interventions on female empowerment and that use one-sided surveys to do so. First,
we run a fixed effects model without exogenous variation of income. In the second
model, we use a cross-section setting with an exogenous variation of spousal income
shares. In both models, we associate changes in relative female economic resources
with the male and female perception of female decision-making power. We find that
4. Becker, Fonseca-Becker, and Schenck-Yglesias (2006) and Jejeebhoy (2002) study health out-
comes while Ambler et al. (2017) proxy female well-being across multiple dimensions, including labor
supply. Compared to this paper, this account of labor supply is less detailed and is limited to a binary
variable, indicating whether the wife works more or less than 10.5 hours per day.
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both spouses’ changes in perception are in the same order of magnitude. This sug-
gests that one-sided surveys will provide a good proxy if one is interested in the average
adaptation of perception following an economic shock.
In summary, results suggest that at the population level, one-sided surveys provide a
good proxy for shifts in male and female perception of female decision-making power
in reaction to a change in female economic resources. However, cross-section estimates
suggest that females’ outcomes will differ in those families where both spouses’ reac-
tions correlate vs. those where only one spouse changes its perception of female power.
We conclude that in the context of households, both spouses’ perspectives should be
taken into account.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 1.2, we present an
overview of empirical studies that employ one- and two-sided surveys to proxy decision-
making power. Our focus will be on studies that explicitly describe discordance in
response patterns between husbands and their wives. In section 1.3, we will describe
the data. In section 1.4, we will introduce the typology we use to classify spousal
statement combinations and prevalence rates of specific types. Then, we will present
our main results. In section 1.5, we will survey couple attributes which are associated
with different types of con- and discordance. In section 1.6, we will study outcomes
of different types of concordant and discordant couples. A particular focus will be
on the merit of considering both spouses’ perspectives. In section 1.7, we will assess
the relationship between variations in female economic and decision-making power. In
section 1.8, we will run different robustness checks. We will conclude in section 1.9 by
discussing the implications and limitations of our findings.
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1.2. Discordance in previous literature
The following account of the previous literature is divided into three subsections. In
subsection 1.2.1, we will motivate this study by documenting the wide use of decision-
making surveys in economics and related literature. In subsection 1.2.2, we will present
previous evidence on discordance in such surveys. In the final subsection 1.2.3, we will
discuss potential moderators of discordance.
1.2.1. Measuring female decision-making power
This study is concerned with female decision-making power in the household. Fol-
lowing Kabeer (1999), we understand female decision-making power as one dimension
of female agency and female agency as one dimension of female empowerment.5 Our
study thereby relates to the wider empowerment literature (see Duflo (2012) for a
review) and the agency literature in specific (see Donald et al. (2017) for a review).
There is great academic and public interest in understanding the causes and conse-
quences of female decision-making power in households. This interest is driven by both
concerns about female empowerment and the notion that shifts in bargaining power
from men to women are associated with desirable changes in household behavior (Bru-
ins, 2017; Duflo and Udry, 2004; Jensen, 2012; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales, 1997;
Majlesi, 2016; Bandiera et al., 2018).6
Due to the high interest in female empowerment, many scholars are concerned with
how to best measure it. Majlesi (2016) posits that asking household members about
their decision-making power is the most unequivocal way to capture it. Accordingly,
many empirical studies rely on surveys to determine decision-making power in the
household – in economics (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2015; Bruins,
2017; Jensen and Oster, 2009; Majlesi, 2016) as well as in related disciplines such
as demography and sociology (Ebot, 2014; Hayes and Boyd, 2017; Kabeer, Mahmud,
5. Kabeer (1999) defines empowerment as command over resources, agency, and achievements. See
Malhotra and Schuler (2005) and Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender (2002) for a discussion of female
empowerment concepts in international development.
6. For example, Majlesi (2016) documents a positive association between female labor market
conditions, female decision-making power, and child health. Duflo and Udry (2004) use gender-
specific specialization in crops and weather-induced variation of crop-specific income. Holding total
family income constant, higher yields for female crops cause higher relative spending on food. Along
the same lines, Wang (2014) finds a reduced consumption of male favored goods such as cigarettes
following a re-allocation of property rights in China. For Bangladesh, Heath (2014) finds that women
report being more confident to assert their own decision-making power towards their husbands if they
earn a salary.
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and Tasneem, 2011; Mboane and Bhatta, 2015; Rahman and Rao, 2004). Malhotra,
Schuler, and Boender (2002, p. 26) show that decision-making indicators are some of
the “most frequently used indicators” in literature to measure empowerment. Donald et
al. (2017) second this view based on their comprehensive account of studies employing
household decision-making surveys. The authors confirm the (wide and increasing) use
of surveys in literature and discuss their methodological shortcomings. Furthermore,
surveys on female decision-making power are now part of the widely used Demographic
and Health Surveys (DHS). This will likely encourage frequent use of decision-making
surveys in the future (Donald et al., 2017).
1.2.2. Discordance of spousal statements
Despite the popularity of intra-household decision-making questionnaires, studies em-
ploying data from both partners challenge the notion that survey data from only
one household member is sufficient to describe power dynamics within the household.
Studies that do consider both males’ and females’ perspectives report substantial and
systematic differences in power assessments made by men and women respectively
(Allendorf, 2007; Ambler et al., 2017; Granbois and Willett, 1970; Story and Bur-
gard, 2012; Twyman, Useche, and Deere, 2015; Uddin, Habibullah, and Sabah, 2016).
The subset of studies that focuses on discordance observes variation in discordance
between different groups and decision domains (Becker, Fonseca-Becker, and Schenck-
Yglesias, 2006; Ghuman, Lee, and Smith, 2006; Jejeebhoy, 2002; Quarm, 2018; Lupri
and Brinkerhoff, 1978; Twyman, Useche, and Deere, 2015). However, only a few pre-
vious studies link discordant statements to outcomes.
The study with the highest relevance to this one is that of Ambler et al. (2017). Am-
bler et al. (2017) link discordance to female well-being using data from Bangladesh.7
Compared to couples in which both partners agree on the husband as the sole owner of
the family’s assets and primary decision maker, outcomes for women are better if the
couple agrees on joint asset ownership and decision-making. Compared to the baseline
scenario, female outcomes are also better in discordant couples in which the wife posits
female asset ownership and decision-making power with her husband disagreeing.
A small number of previous studies has documented the relationship between dis-
cordant reports and health outcomes (Allendorf, 2007; Becker, Fonseca-Becker, and
Schenck-Yglesias, 2006; Gasca and Becker, 2017; Jejeebhoy, 2002). Becker, Fonseca-
7. Female well-being is proxied by various measures such as working hours, BMI and use of birth
control.
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Becker, and Schenck-Yglesias (2006) document female under-reporting of their own
decision-making power relative to their husbands as well as a (weak) association of
female decision-making power and health behavior in Western Guatemala. Becker,
Fonseca-Becker, and Schenck-Yglesias (2006) confirm a positive relationship between
female education and concordant statements on joint decision-making. The authors
find variation as to whether the male or the female’s opinion on female autonomy
was the better predictor of preventive health-related behaviors, such as the use of the
contraceptive pill. They conclude that studies should elicit both husbands’ and wives’
perspectives on decision-making power. In Uttar Pradesh, a region characterized by
low gender-equity, Jejeebhoy (2002) find men’s perspective on female autonomy to
be more predictive of outcomes than women’s. In contrast, in Tamil Nadu, a region
with higher reported female autonomy, women’s perspectives are more indicative of
contraception-related health outcomes.8 Allendorf (2007) finds high rates of discor-
dant responses in Nepal. The author finds higher rates of health care utilization in
couples that give a concordant report on female decision-making power, compared to
couples in which only one partner perceives female decision-making power, while the
other does not.
1.2.3. Moderators of discordance
Discordance might arise from multiple causes, a selection of which will be discussed
in the following. Moffitt et al. (1997) argue that measurement error will induce state-
ment discordance that might be falsely interpreted as a reflection of disagreement.
The authors posit that aggregating responses across questions can reduce this error.
Specifically, Safilios-Rothschild (1970) warns that broad and unspecific decision do-
main might lead to gender differences in understanding of the matter. Ghuman, Lee,
and Smith (2006, p. 3) show for five Asian countries that “cognitive and/or semantic
meanings” of questions vary between demographic and cultural contexts and between
female and male respondents, thereby limiting the generalizability of such compar-
isons.9 Anderson, Reynolds, and Gugerty (2017) find higher rates of concordance in
couples in Tanzania with higher educated women.
Discordance can also be caused by respondent’s intention to paint a socially desirable
picture (Allendorf, 2007; Jejeebhoy, 2002). For example, Jejeebhoy (2002) finds that
8. The authors consider the following outcomes: contraceptive use, unfulfilled need for contracep-
tion, recent pregnancy, and spousal conversation about contraception.
9. The five countries are India, Pakistan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand.
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husbands attribute more power to their wives than wives attribute to themselves in
rural India. Accordingly, discordance is particularly high in regions with greater gen-
der inequality. However, if questioned in depth during focus group interviews, men
tend to correct previous statements and provide socially less desirable answers. Norms
might also provide a focal point to the potentially ambiguous question of power. Al-
lendorf (2007) finds that concordance is higher whenever there are clear gender norms
on responsibility.
Surveys on interpersonal violence (IPV) face similar methodological challenges. Mof-
fitt et al. (1997) suggest that social desirability, salience, and self-justification might
moderate over- and under-reporting of IPV, among other things. Hayes and Boyd
(2017) observe that the husband’s presence during the wife’s interview led to a re-
duced stated female acceptance of IPV. Conversely, the presence of another female
induced higher stated acceptance of IPV.
1.2.4. Cultural context: female power in Indonesia
Discordance needs to be understood in its cultural context. The following section
provides a brief overview of this study’s context. The country is characterized by eco-
nomic dynamism, the predominance of Islam as religion and high ethnic diversity with
more than 300 ethnic groups (Blackburn, 2004b). The country is the world’s fourth
most populous country, tenth largest economy by purchasing power and the largest
economy in Southeast Asia (The World Bank Group, 2018). Society is characterized
by a high degree of cultural, religious and ethnic heterogeneity. However, as Black-
burn (2004b) points out, the fall of the Suharto regime, which emphasized strong role
division between men and women, heralded a new era, symbolized by the election of
Indonesia’s first female president in 2001 (This is not to say, that the cultural echoes
of the Suharto period do not prevail in many households and through norms today).
Under reference to the United Nations Development Program, Schaner and Das (2016)
describe Indonesia as more gender equal than Pakistan and India but less equal than
China. The female to male wage ratio increased from 57 percent in 1990 to 84 percent
in 2011.10 Still, male and female labor force participation rates differ significantly and,
compared to men, women tend to work more often as unpaid family workers (Schaner
and Das, 2016). Schaner and Das (2016) find that younger female cohorts are more
likely to enter the formal sector of employment earlier on in their lives, compared to
older female cohorts who often started their careers in informal employment. Total
10. Defined as the relative median hourly wage of women compared to men.
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female labor force participation has been at a level of around 60 percent in the most
recent past.
Particularly relevant to this study is the work by Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) and
their account of measuring power in the context of Indonesian households. Franken-
berg and Thomas (2001) acknowledge gifts to family members as one decision domain
with particularly high rates of discordance. They find that Indonesian household deci-
sions are subject to the country’s diverse norms that vary by region and ethnicity. The
authors find that the main decision maker strongly varies between decision domains.
They suggest food and routine purchase expenditures as female domains, while larger
expenditures appear to be a male domain.11 Focus group interviews of Frankenberg
and Thomas (2001) reveal that group dynamics influence response behavior. Sum-
marizing, Indonesia’s changing and diverse society make the country a relevant and
interesting subject for a study of gender relationships.
1.3. Data
We employ data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), a widely used longitu-
dinal household survey dataset. The first and last of five rounds of surveys have been
conducted in 1993 and 2014 respectively. We are using the third (Strauss, Witoe-
lar, and Sikoki, 2016), fourth (Strauss et al., 2009), and fifth wave (Strauss et al.,
2004). The surveys are administered by the RAND corporation which cooperates with
partners and scholars to ensure a continuing high standard of conceptualization and
execution. The survey’s initial design was set to be representative for 83 percent of
the Indonesian population, thereby aiming to cover 7,000 households in 13 provinces
(Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith, 2001). Statistical weights are provided to adjust
for changes in population composition. Interviewers did follow up with the original
set of households as well as with their split-offs.12
The survey is based on multiple books. Each book consists of wide-ranging ques-
tions, from education to labor market participation. Some books are administered
11. Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) base their analysis on an earlier wave (IFLS 2) of the same
panel and document slightly lower rates of discordance at about 25 percent.
12. This has led to an expansion in the number of households over time. By using sophisticated
follow-up designs and tracking, the survey team has been able to achieve very low rates of attrition.
For the second survey wave in 1997, the authors were able to reinterview 94 percent of households
(Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith, 2001). Further information on the survey design can be found in
Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) and Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith (2001).
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to a subset of household members only.13 At the core of this study is the household
decision-making module in book 3A and the fertility module of book 4. Book 3A is ad-
ministered to individuals who are currently married or cohabitate and whose spouses
live in the same household or lived in the same household in the past six months.14
Book 4 is administered to ever-married women who are between 15 and 49 years old.
The book focuses on marital history, children and fertility. For each book, the in-
terviewer also collects information on who responded and whether other people were
present during the interview.
We only use heterosexual couples and refer to husbands, men, male spouses and wife,
women, female spouses interchangeably. We omit all individuals who are not married
or cohabitate, with missing age data or missing spouse data. We exclude all individuals
who are neither the head of household or spouse of the head of household. This omits
grandparents or married children still living in their parents’ home. We do not include
all individuals who neither live with their spouses nor lived with them in the six months
prior to the survey. We exclude all individuals with a missing personal identifier and
duplicate observations. We also only consider couples that remain complete following
the application of these restrictions. The application of all restrictions leads to a
significant reduction in sample size, the largest share of which is attributable to the
exclusion of non-household heads and incomplete couples. For 2000, 2007 and 2014 a
total of 21,736, 22,193 and 24,892 observations are available. Application of exclusion
restrictions reduces the sample to the number of observations listed in table 1.1.
Table 1.1.: Number of observations
after application of exclusion restrictions
Number of Observations
2000 2007 2014 Total
Men 6,532 8,070 8,662 23,264
Women 6,532 8,070 8,662 23,264
Observations 13,064 16,140 17,324 46,528
Notes: For the majority of later analyses, couples are treated as
one observation. The number of observations increases over time
as the survey tracks and includes spin-off households.
13. Our main analysis is based on the household roster book K, book 3A and book 4. The household
roster book K is only administered to the household head or a household member that is knowledgeable
about the questions. The household roster book contains questions on all household members’ income,
their age and their relationship to the household head, inter alia. Book 3A is only administered to
respondents who are at least of age 15.
14. See book 3A of IFLS 5 wave, questions PK00a and PK00b.
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After application of exclusion restrictions, the sample carries the attributes presented
in table 1.2. In most of our analyses, we treat one couple as one observation. We assign
the male attributes as additional variables to women. We mark the husbands’ values
with the prefix "Spouse (Sp.)". Compared to women, men are older, are slightly better
educated, earn a larger share of the household income and report almost twice as many
worked hours. Very few men are unpaid family workers while 95 percent worked in
the past twelve months.15 One quarter of all women have unpaid family worker status
while only 61 percent of them worked in the past twelve months. Household attributes
are by definition the same for both sexes since we consider complete couples only.
15. The question asked is "Did [...] work in the last 12 months? (> 5 years)".
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1.4. Typology and prevalence of discordance
1.4.1. Typology of statement combinations
We structure concordance and discordance along a typology of statement combinations
that has been developed by Ambler et al. (2017). The focus is on whether the wife
has decision-making power or not and on whether the couple agrees with that.16
The typology reflects all possible statement combinations that can arise from the re-
sponse options available to each spouse. The lead question for every domain is "In
your household, who makes decisions about: [domain]". The question is asked for
13 domains, eg savings or routine purchases. Appendix table A.1 presents the list of
decision domains. In response, individuals can circle letters representing single house-
hold members, such as A for the respondent, B for the spouse, and so forth. Thus,
each spouse can either respond that he/she makes the decision by themselves, by their
spouse or that they engage in joint decision-making. Additional household members
or individuals not living in the household that can be named as decision makers are
identified as out of scope. If spouses do not that either of the spouses makes the deci-
sion, the couple will be assigned to a residual category as described in the following.
The typology of possible statement combinations is exhaustive: We sort all possible
combinations in one (and only one) category of the typology. We omit couples in
which either spouse’s statement is missing. All others are included in this typology.
Table 1.3 provides a description of each category. The first four categories (CM, CF,
CB and CN) describe concordance whereas the last four (DFM, DMF, DOBOF and
DONOM) describe discordance with respect to whether the wife has decision-making
power. Couples of category CM give a concordant response of the husband as the
sole decision maker. In couples of type CF, both spouses perceive the wife as the sole
decision maker. In couples of type CB, both spouses perceive joint decision-making.
Finally, couples of category CN give a concordant response that neither of the two
spouses makes the decision.
The discordance categories are divided into strong and weak discordance and a resid-
ual category. The first two discordance types (DFM, DMF) describe cases in which
spouses fundamentally disagree about the wife’s role, two cases which we coin strong
16. We use this wife-focused typology since most related studies focus on the wife’s decision-making
power.
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discordance. One partner perceives female decision-making power while the other
does not. The third case DOBOF (weak discordance) depicts the case in which both
partners fundamentally perceive female decision-making power but do not agree on
whether the husband also has a say. The last, residual category DONOM comprises
all cases in which either spouse says that the decision is made by a third person while
the other spouse perceives the husband as the sole decision maker.
The typology applies to all domains but the contraceptive use decision domain. When
asked for decisions on "whether you and your spouse use contraception", respondents
were offered an additional "never consider the use of contraception" response option.
We will refer to this option as no use in the following. We exclude all spousal state-
ment combinations in which either spouse replies no use. We do so because the no
use response can describe an outcome and decision at the same time. This would
challenge interpretation, which is why we decide not to consider these couples. We
also exclude a small group of individuals who respond that someone else in the house-
hold or someone not living in the household makes the decision (coined as "none").
Both exclusion restrictions reduce our sample size by around 34 percent for analyses
in the contraception use domain. The full contraception typology including the no use
response can be found in appendix table A.2.
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Table 1.3.: Typology of responses of all decision domains except decisions on
contraceptive use
Code Combination of husband’s and wife’s statement
Concordance
CM Wife and Husb: (m) Both partners perceive husband as the sole decisionmaker
CF Wife and Husb: (f) Both partners perceive wife as the sole decisionmaker
CB Wife and Husb: (mf) Both partners perceive joint decision-making
CN Wife and Husb: (none) Both partners perceive that neither of them makesdecision
Discordance
DFM Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);Husb: (m) ∨ (none)
Strong discordance: Wife perceives female decision-
making power (individually or jointly),
husband does not
DMF Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);Wife: (m) ∨ (none)
Strong discordance: Husband perceives female
decision-making power (individually or jointly),
wife does not
DOBOF One Spouse: (mf);Other Spouse: (f)
Weak discordance: Both spouses perceive female
decision-making power, one of them perceives wife
as sole decision maker, the other joint
decision-making
DONOM One Spouse: (none);Other Spouse: (m)
One of the spouses perceives that neither spouse
makes the decision, the other spouse perceives the
husband as the sole decision maker
20 1. Diverging perceptions of female decision-making power
1.4.2. Prevalence
We first analzye the general difference between male and female perception of male
and female decision-making power. In figure 1.1, we show the overall decision-making
power share of each partner from each perspective. This overall share is coded as 1
(= 100 percent) if an individual is perceived to have a say (individually or jointly)
in all 13 decision domains. It is coded as 0 if an individual is perceived to not have
a say in any domain. The upper histogram displays the distribution of the male
and the female perception of female decision-making power. The lower histogram
displays the distribution of the male and the female perception of male decision-making
power. Women report a higher average female decision-making share value than their
husbands. The same holds vice versa. Women perceive less male decision-making
power than husbands perceive themselves. Appendix section A.6.4 offers an overview
of the relationship between spousal presence and stated decision power.
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Figure 1.1.: Histograms of perceived female (upper graph) and male (lower graph)
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Note: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple;
Graph: two histograms on male and female perception of male and female decision-making
power. Grey area: husband’s perception. Black lined bars: wife’s perception. Scale: upper
(lower) graph: decision-making power is captured as number of household decision domains
the wife (husband) is involved in over total number of household decision domains; Value
1 on x-axis indicates that wife (husband) has a say in all household decisions.
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We present the prevalence of discordance per domain in tables 1.4 and 1.5 (A full
list of the actual decision-making domains including the wording can be found in the
appendix table A.1). Between 49 and 67 percent of couples agree on who makes
the decision in any decision domain (see line Sum concordance in the tables). The
highest concordance exists with respect to routine purchases (67 percent). The lowest
concordance rates are found in the domains of "Time the wife spends socializing" and
"Money for monthly savings". We find that across twelve out of 13 domains, the case
(DFM) occurs more or at least as often as the opposite case (DMF). This implies
that it happens more often that the wife perceives female decision-making power while
the husband does not than that the opposite case occurs (the opposite case is that
the husband perceives female decision-making power, while the wife does not). This is
insofar reasonable as women perceive higher overall female decision-making power than
men do. In general, the case of weak discordance (DOBOF) occurs more often than
either of the strong discordance cases (DFM, DMF) alone. Decisions on contraceptive
use are excluded from the following tables, as they offer additional potential responses.
Detailed statistics on contraceptive use responses can be found in appendix table A.21.
We find that 50 percent of couples give concordant responses. 13 percent show strong
discordance and 23 percent weak discordance. 14 percent give discordant responses
that include one partner reporting no use.
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1.5. Discordance and couple attributes
In this section we study whether discordance is random or whether it is systematically
related to couple attributes. We do so in two steps in sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2. First, we
study the prevalence of discordance types with respect to the female income share.17
Secondly, we relate discordance types to overall couple attributes and further prox-
ies for female power. The observed relationship suggests that concordance is indeed
related to actual female power.
1.5.1. Prevalence of discordance and female income share
Approach. In figure 1.6, we relate the wife’s income share to the prevalence of spe-
cific types of con- or discordance in the labor supply decision domain.18 We create one
graph for each of the six types of potential statement combinations. Each graph re-
lates the prevalence of the specific response type as the share of all responses (vertical
axis) to female income share (horizontal axis).19 We use cross-sectional data, based
on the IFLS-5 (2014). This is a merely correlative, descriptive way of assessing the
relationship. Since the figures display cross-sectional data only, they do not allow to
infer any causal statements.
Results. The upper two graphs and the center-left graph in figure 1.6 confirm a
positive relationship between female income and decision-making power. The share
of couples that agree on the husband as the sole decision maker (type CM) stands
in a negative relationship with the female contribution to household income (upper
left graph). The opposite holds true for the (small) share of couples in which both
partners perceive the wife as the sole decision maker (CF, upper right graph). The
center-left graph shows the share of couples in which both partners agree on joint
decision-making (CB). Their share among all couples is positively associated with the
female contribution to household labor income.
The remaining graphs (center right and bottom row) present prevalence rates of dis-
cordant couples. The center-right graph of figure 1.6 shows the association between the
17. Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015) shows for the United States, a considerable more pro-
gressive country than Indonesia with respect to gender roles, that the wife’s income share carries an
important normative meaning. The wife’s contribution to household income not only identifies her
own role in society but also her relationship to the husband.
18. The question asked in this domain is "In your household, who makes decisions about: whether
you/your spouse works".
19. For a definition of female income share, please refer to section 1.7.1.
26 1. Diverging perceptions of female decision-making power
share of couples in which the wife perceives female decision-making power, while the
husband does not (DFM) and the female income share. The bottom left graph shows
the share of couples in which the wife does not perceive female decision-making power
while the husband does (DMF) as a function of the female share in household labor
income. They suggest that strong discordance is negatively associated with the female
share of household income. The opposite holds true for weak discordance, displayed in
the bottom right graph: The share of weakly discordant couples that fundamentally
agree on a female role in decision-making but disagree on the husband’s role (DOBOF)
is positively associated with female income. One possible explanation is that a more
pronounced female income share allows for less ambiguity that could, in turn, result
in strong discordance.
1.5.2. Attributes of discordant couples
Approach. We divide the full sample into six subsamples based on the main six
possible statement combinations in response to the question "In your household, who
makes decisions about: whether you/your spouse works”. Couples, whose attributes
are presented in columns one through three, have given a concordant statement com-
bination. They agree on the husband as the sole decision maker, the wife as the sole
decision maker or joint decision-making respectively. The remaining columns present
the attributes of couples that have given a discordant statement combination. Columns
four and five present attributes of couples in which either the wife perceives female
decision-making power (individually or jointly) while the husband does not (column
four) or vice versa (column five). In column six, we present the means for couples that
agree on female decision-making power but do not agree on whether the husband also
has decision-making power. We use cross-sectional data, based on the IFLS-5 (2014).
Each observation is one couple. If a variable is not specified, it shows the wife’s value.
The husband’s attributes are referred to by the prefix spouse (abbreviated by Sp:).
Results. The descriptive statistics in table 1.7 suggest that specific types of concor-
dance and discordance are related to actual differences in female power. This conclu-
sion is based on the between-subsample variation in variables that are associated with
female power. The subsamples differ with respect to the wife’s income share, female
age, female education, and also the overall female decision-making share. Table 1.7
presents subsample averages. Appendix table A.7 provides T-Tests on the statistical
significance of subsample differences.
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Table 1.6.: Quadratic linear prediction of prevalence of statement combinations
with female income share
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision making
domain: "Whether you/your spouse works"; Vertical axis: frequency of single statement combination;
Horizontal axis: relative contribution of the wife to household labor income (husband and wife only).
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One key finding is that female income shares are substantially lower in couples with
strong discordance (columns 4 and 5) compared to weak discordance (column 6).20 The
weakly discordant (DOBOF) group’s females are also older than those in the strongly
discordant groups (DFM, DMF). Within the concordant groups, the average female
income share is lowest in those couples in which both partners agree on the husband
as the sole decision maker (column 1) and highest in couples that agree on the wife as
the sole decision maker (column 2).
The overall decision share across all domains corresponds to the statement combina-
tions in the labor supply domain. The wife’s self-assessed decision share (Wife: own
decision share) is higher for couples that respond with DFM and DOBOF than it is for
the couples responding DMF. The same holds vice versa for men. The decision share
attributed by men to women (Husb: wife’s decision share) is higher in the cases DMF
and DOBOF than for couples responding DFM. In appendix table A.7, we compare
whether the aforementioned differences in income shares and overall female decision
shares are statistically significant at the five percent level. We find this to be the case.
We conclude that specific types of discordance do not appear to be a random artifact
in our data but appear to be systematically associated with real female power. In a
next step, we use cross-sectional regression to learn which single outcomes have the
greatest association with specific types of discordance.
20. The latter category of weak discordance implies that both spouses essentially perceive female
decision-making power, but diverge for the husband’s role.
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1.6. Discordance and outcomes
Results in section 1.5 suggest that a shared perception of female power is associated
with higher actual female decision-making power. Accordingly, we also hypothesize
that labor and fertility outcomes correspond to this pattern. The endogenous re-
lationship between power and outcomes prevents any form of causal interpretation.
However, the strength of the relationship is of interest as the outcomes allow to proxy
the degree of female power in a couple, assuming that labor supply and contraceptive
use are indicative of female power. A strong relationship between couples’ statement
combinations and outcomes will inform our idea of female power in couples of a specific
statement combination type. Further, outcome prediction is a goal on its own and any
insight gained will be informative in this regard.
The first three subsections of this section relate specific outcomes, for example, labor
supply, to a couples’ perception of female power as expressed in their statement combi-
nations. We group statement combinations along the previous typology to learn about
outcome differences between the groups captured in the typology. In the fourth sub-
section, we slightly change our focus to study the merit of incorporating both spouses’
perspectives. We do so by holding the female perception constant and varying the
husband’s one.
1.6.1. Female labor supply
Female labor supply is both a determinant and consequence of female decision-making
power.21 The following analysis is built on this assumption of a bi-directional rela-
tionship between perceived female decision-making power and labor outcomes. Based
on previous evidence, we hypothesize that labor supply is higher where female power
is higher. Variation between different typology groups will inform our idea of female
power within these groups.
Approach. We estimate a standard OLS model. We use cross-sectional data, based
on the IFLS-5 (2014). We estimate three labor outcomes in three distinct models. All
outcomes are captured in the vector LABOROUTCOMES. The three outcomes are
employment status, hours worked and status as an unpaid family worker. Employment
status is an indicator variable, coded as 1 if a woman has worked in the past twelve
21. Goldin (2006, p. 1) argue that the nature of female decision-making "horizons" are linked to
expectations about future female labor participation. Accordingly, Basu (2006) document the bi-
directional relationship between decision-making and economic power.
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months and zero if not (This includes any work in- and outside of the household,
except work classified as unpaid family work). Working hours per annum are coded
as the product of hours worked per week and weeks worked per year. Results are only
estimated for individuals reporting less than 5.840 working hours per year, a condition
which applies to 99.25 percent of the sample.22 Unpaid family worker status is coded
as an indicator variable. It takes on the value one if an individual is considered an
unpaid family worker and zero if not.23
LABOROUTCOMESi = β0 + β1SCLh + β2INDIV IDUALi
+ β3HOUSEHOLDh + ρ1PROVi + εi (1.1)
The vector SCLh contains indicator variables for all possible types of spousal state-
ment combinations to the question: "In your household, who makes decisions about:
whether you/your spouse works”. We omit the indicator variable for the group which
gives a concordant report on the husband as the sole decision maker (CM). Thus, the
vector consists of 7 indicator variables for the seven statement combination by the
couple as listed in table 1.3, except for case CM.
The level of observation is that of a household. The vector INDIV IDUALi contains
attributes of the household’s individuals while HOUSEHOLDh contains household
attributes. The included individual attributes comprise the individual’s educational
level24 and age for both husband and wife. Male values are indicated by "Sp:" for the
spouse. The household variables of vector HOUSEHOLDi capture the number of
members of the household (number of all adult members and number of all children),
the log of household income and a migration variable indicating whether the household
moved since the last time it was surveyed. PROVi is a vector of province dummies and
εi is an idiosyncratic error term. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at level of the region.
22. Respondents can provide information on two main jobs in Book 3A of the survey. We use
combined statements for the first job on hours (tk22a) and weeks (tk23a) as well as for the second
job (tk23b, tk22b respectively) and calculate the sum.
23. There are two opportunities in the survey at which an individual can be classified as an unpaid
family worker. We only consider someone to be an unpaid family worker if he or she are classified as
such in the family roster (Within survey book K of IFLS wave 5, this is asked as question AR15b:
"What were the total earnings of [...] in the last 12 months?" Response options are the salary, "Unpaid
Family Worker" and "Don’t Know").
24. Each individual is assigned based on the highest educational level that they attended. We cluster
all levels into the four groups of a) no education, b) elementary education c) secondary education
and 3) tertiary education. Please refer to appendix table A.3 for the distribution and a further
specification of the grouping.
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Results. Table 1.8 presents the estimates for the relationship between spousal (dis-)
agreement and female labor force participation in a cross-sectional OLS estimate using
2014 data. The likelihood of female employment is highest in couples in which both
partners perceive female decision-making power, whether con- or discordant regarding
the men’s role (see coefficients CF, CB, DOBOF in column one).25 Female labor force
participation is lowest in couples in which the husband makes decisions alone (omitted,
baseline result) or in which the partners are strongly discordant (see coefficients DFM,
DMF). This pattern also holds true for annual worked hours (column 2). Compared
to the baseline group, the likelihood of the wife working as an unpaid family worker
is lower in all other groups. The point estimates suggest that female unpaid family
workers are particularly unlikely to be found in families with both partners agreeing
on the wife as the sole decision maker. Point estimates further suggest a (statistically
insignificant) difference between the strong and weak discordance categories (DFM,
DMF and DOBOF respectively).
It is important to acknowledge that female decision-making power cannot be considered
to be an explanatory variable. Looking at the different degrees of correlation with
various form of discordant statements is still informative. Our preliminary conclusion is
that female decision-making power is higher in couples in which both partners perceive
female decision-making power, relative to cases of strong discordance about the female
role and relative to concordant reports on the husband as the sole decision-maker.
1.6.2. Use of contraception and covert contraception methods
Previous evidence has shown that women and men tend to differ in their desired
number of offspring. In societies with strong traditional norms, husbands tend to
report higher overall fertility preferences than their wives (Rasul, 2008b; Mbaye and
Wagner, 2017; Westoff, 2010). Accordingly, we hypothesize that contraceptive use
is an expression of female power. Furthermore, women choose different strategies to
realize their preferences. One of them is covert contraceptive use (Gasca and Becker,
2017). The first model of this section estimates the relationship between couples’
statement combinations and contraceptive use. In its second model, we estimate the
relationship between couples’ statement combinations and covert contraceptive use.
25. At this point we do not focus on those who reply "none" (One of the spouses perceives that
neither spouse makes the decision, the other spouse perceives male decision maker) as we consider
this to be an exception of little overall relevance. We observe 43 cases in total in all three surveys
(with 23,111 total observations).
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Table 1.8.: Types of concordance and discordance and their association
with labor outcomes
Dependent variables:
(1) (2) (3)
Wife
working
(Yes = 1/
No = 0)
Hours
worked
(in h worked pa)
Unpaid
family
worker
(Yes = 1/
No = 0)
Concordance:
CF: Wife and Husb: (f) 0.519∗∗∗ 965.459∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(0.026) (151.455) (0.043)
CB: Wife and Husb: (mf) 0.483∗∗∗ 1046.775∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗
(0.021) (51.719) (0.027)
CN: Wife and Husb: (none) 0.603∗∗∗ 1513.335∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(0.033) (85.707) (0.037)
Discordance:
DFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb: (m) ∨ (none) 0.278
∗∗∗ 540.927∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
(0.014) (50.530) (0.021)
DMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife: (m) ∨ (none) 0.199
∗∗∗ 375.575∗∗∗ -0.039∗
(0.025) (59.270) (0.023)
DOBOF: One spouse: (f);
Other spouse: (mf) 0.448
∗∗∗ 1008.506∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗
(0.024) (94.345) (0.027)
DONOM: One spouse: (none);
Other spouse: (m) 0.014 371.200 -0.307
∗∗∗
(0.109) (335.884) (0.104)
Household attributes:
Log HH income 0.041∗∗∗ 221.281∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗
(0.008) (25.779) (0.014)
Constant -0.332∗∗ -3.4e+03∗∗∗ 1.408∗∗∗
(0.119) (392.423) (0.191)
Control for (spousal) age and education X X X
Control for N HH adults, N HH children, migration X X X
Region dummies X X X
Observations 7,562 7,562 4,802
R2 0.22 0.16 0.14
Clusters 19 19 19
Robust standard
errors clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: employment status of wife (binary), re-
ported hours worked per year (weekly hours multiplied with weeks worked) and status as unpaid
family worker (binary); Baseline group: concordant couples, perceiving husband as the decision
maker; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s
attributes; Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Deci-
sion making domain: "Whether you/your spouse works"; Typology: CM: concordant report of
husband as sole decision maker, CF: concordant report of wife as sole decision maker, CB: concor-
dant report of joint decision making; CN: concordant report of neither partner as decision maker,
DFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not, DMF: husband perceives
female decision making power, wife does not, DOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision mak-
ing power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making,
DONOM: one of the spouses perceives that neither spouse makes the decision, the other spouse
perceives male decision maker; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at regional level;
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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This is built on the hypothesis that women of lower power need to resort to covert
methods. We hypothesize that higher female power will manifest itself in higher rates
of contraceptive use and lower rates of covert method use.
Use of contraception
Approach. We estimate the relationship between perceived female decision-making
power and contraceptive use. We estimate a standard OLS model. We use cross-
sectional data, based on the IFLS-5 (2014). The main dependent variable of interest is
ContraceptiveUsei, an indicator variable, which takes on the value 1 if the wife reports
using contraception, and zero if she reports not using contraception. Contraceptive
use is reported by women in a dedicated interview book. Appendix table A.40 shows
that rates of reported contraceptive use are not different at a five percent level of
significance for women whose partners were present during that dedicated interview
compared to those with absent partners.
ContraceptiveUsei = β0 + β1SCCh + β2INDIV IDUALi
+ β3HOUSEHOLDh + ρ1PROVi + εi (1.2)
We introduce a vector SCCh that contains indicator variables for all possible state-
ment combinations to the question on "In your household, who makes decisions about:
whether you and your spouse use contraception". The vector consists of one indicator
variable for each possible statement combination by the couple as listed in table A.2,
except for the statement combination cCF. Diverging from our previous labor supply
model, we omit the indicator variable for the group which gives a concordant report
on the wife as the sole decision maker (cCF). We use this reference group because our
previous reference group (sole male decision maker) is a rare exception in response to
this question, with only a small share of couples (N = 119) giving this response. The
vectors INDIV IDUALi, HOUSEHOLDh, PROVi and εi are modeled the same way
as in the previous model. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at level
of the region.
Results. Results are presented in figure 1.2. The regression table can be found in
appendix table A.8, column two.26 We estimate the highest likelihood of contraceptive
use for our baseline category: couples that agree on a sole female decision maker. The
26. In table A.8, we run five specifications. The first specification (column 1) runs the baseline
model without controls, the second column presents the baseline model. The other three specifications
exclude subgroups of women. Please refer to the robustness section 1.8 for further comments.
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lowest likelihood of contraceptive use is estimated for couples that agree on the husband
as the sole decision maker (cCM). It is significantly higher for couples that agree on
joint decision-making (cCB). Compared to the baseline category, contraceptive use
is expected to be lower for the two strongly discordant groups (cDFM, cMDF). The
estimated rate of contraceptive use in weakly discordant couples (cDOBOF) is not
statistically different from the baseline group. We conclude that outcomes differ based
on whether or not couples show discordant opinions. The second analysis in section
1.6.3 permits to learn more about the value of taking both spouses’ perspectives into
account.
Figure 1.2.: Contraceptive use across statement combinations:
coefficient estimates
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m)
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf)
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf); Husb: (m)
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf); Wife: (m)
cDOBOF:  One spouse: (f); Other spouse: (mf)
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Note: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: contraceptive use (Yes = 1/No = 0); Baseline group:
concordant couples, perceiving wife as the sole decision maker; Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data,
one observation is one couple; Decision making domain: “whether you and your spouse use contraception”;
Typology: cCM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, cCB: concordant report of joint decision
making, cDFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not, cDMF: husband perceives female
decision making power, wife does not, cDOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision making power, one of them
perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making; Robust standard errors are clustered at
regional level; Ticks indicate 95 percent confidence interval.
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Use of covert contraception methods
Approach. We estimate the relationship between perceived female decision-making
power and covert contraceptive use conditional on contraceptive use. For this, we dis-
tinguish between non-covert and covert contraception methods. The main underlying
assumption is that women of higher power do not need to conceal their contraceptive
use by using covert methods. We define covert methods as those methods that tend to
allow women to use contraceptives more discretely.27 One example of a method that
is very difficult to conceal is condom use. Contrastingly, injections are easier to use
covertly. Mere use does not imply that they use them covertly.28 Appendix table A.20
presents a list of all methods and their recorded prevalence. The appendix section A.4
also presents the classification into covert and non-covert. We rely mostly on other
literature to identify each of the reported methods as either covert or not covert. See
table A.4 for an explanation for the classification. We run a robustness check on an
alternative classification.
We use cross-sectional data, based on the IFLS-5 (2014). We follow the specific ty-
pology described in the previous section. We only use couples in which no partner
reports no use. The dependent variable is CovertMethodh. All methods are coded as
either covert (value of CovertMethodh = 1) or non-covert (value of CovertMethodh
= 0). In the appendix, we provide alternative specifications for our classification of
covert methods as a robustness check.29
CovertMethodh = β0 + β1SCCh + β2INDIV IDUALi
+ β3HOUSEHOLDh + ρ1PROVi + εi (1.3)
Results. Results are presented in figure 1.3 and the regression table is presented in
appendix table A.9. We find that all discordant couples have estimated higher rates of
covert contraceptive use compared to baseline couples that agree on the wife as the sole
decision maker, although only two out of three are statistically different from zero. We
find slightly higher rates of covert method use in couples that agree on joint decision-
making compared to the omitted group of couples that agree on the wife as the sole
27. Gasca and Becker (2017, p. 4) define contraceptive methods as "The contraceptive methods
most likely used covertly are those that can be easily hidden from a spouse, have few side-effects and
can be easily utilized."
28. Biddlecom and Fapohunda (1998) show that women use methods both covertly and openly that
are easier and harder to conceal.
29. Table A.26 presents results for the same estimation if users of the pill are excluded from the
analysis. Table A.27 presents results for the same estimation if the pill is coded as a covert method.
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decision maker. As will be discussed later, this result is not robust to classifying the
pill as a covert method, as is observable in appendix tables A.26 and A.27.
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Figure 1.3.: Covert method use across statement combinations
conditional on contraceptive use: coefficient estimates
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m)
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf)
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf); Husb: (m)
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf); Wife: (m)
cDOBOF:  One Spouse: (f); Other Spouse: (mf)
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Note: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: covert contraceptive use (Yes = 1/No = 0) conditional on
contraceptive use; Baseline group: concordant couples, perceiving wife as the sole decision maker; Data: IFLS-5
wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision making domain: “whether you and your
spouse use contraception”; Typology: cCM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, cCB: concordant
report of joint decision making, cDFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not, cDMF:
husband perceives female decision making power, wife does not, cDOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision
making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making; Robust standard
errors are clustered at regional level; Ticks indicate 95 percent confidence interval.
1.6.3. Prediction of outcomes with both spouses’ perspectives
By default, most previous studies use the wife’s perspective only. The previous part
of this section established that outcomes vary by type of con- and discordance. In this
section, we explicitly test whether the prediction of outcomes can be improved if the
husband’s perspective is taken into account.
Approach. We estimate all previous baseline models for labor and contraceptive use
outcomes again with a new, alternative typology. Before, we used a typology that
sorts couples by their perception of female decision-making power.
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Now, we first sort couples by the wife’s response. We limit our analysis to three poten-
tial responses: perception of a sole male decision maker, a sole female decision maker
and joint decision-making. We omit couples in which the wife responded that neither
partner makes the decision.30 Within the female response groups, we create three new-
subgroups for each possible response by the husband. Again, we limit our analysis to
the three responses stated previously. The combination of three female responses and
three male responses yields nine possible statement combinations.
We introduce one indicator variable for each possible combination. We use this indi-
cator vector instead of the previous vectors (SCL and SCC) in the baseline model
equations 1.1 and 1.2. All other baseline specifications remain the same. We omit the
same groups as before. For the estimation of labor outcomes, we omit the indicator
for the couples in which both spouses perceive a sole male decision maker. For contra-
ceptive and covert contraceptive use outcomes, we omit the indicator for concordant
couples that perceive a sole female decision maker.
Results. In figure 1.4, we find that including the husband’s perspective can improve
the prediction of outcomes. Outcomes often vary by type of male response, holding the
female response constant. For labor outcomes, the baseline group is that of concordant
couples, in which both spouses perceive a sole male decision maker. Within all three
subgroups (2,3 and 4,5,6 and 7,8,9), female labor force participation is higher if the
husband states that decisions are made jointly as opposed to by himself as the sole
decision maker. The male perspective hence allows predicting outcomes more precisely.
Results on working hours confirm this. These results are substantial. The estimated
difference between groups 4 and 6 is around 700 annual working hours. The only
within-group difference in the unpaid family worker column is found for groups 4 and
5. For contraceptive use, we also confirm that in some cases, the male perspective will
improve our predictions. If the wife perceives a sole male decision maker and if her
husband concurs, the likelihood of her using contraceptives is significantly lower than
if her husband reports that she is the sole decision maker. With respect to covert use,
we observe that rates of covert use are higher in the cases 4 and 6 compared to the
omitted group number 5.
30. For the response to the question "whether you/your spouse works", we thereby exclude less
than 1 percent of the total sample. For the contraception analysis, we exclude around 34 percent of
all observations, because we also exclude all couples that report no use. We do so as inclusion would
challenge interpretation. The no use response describes an outcome as well as a decision.
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Figure 1.4.: Prediction of outcomes with both spouses’ perspectives: coefficient
estimates
2) ...sole female decision maker
3) ...joint decision making
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Note: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variables listed on top of subgraphs; Upper three graphs: Baseline
group: concordant couples, perceiving husband as the decision maker; Decision making domain: "Whether
you/your spouse works"; Lower two graphs: Baseline group: concordant couples, perceiving wife as the sole
decision maker; Decision making domain: “whether you and your spouse use contraception”; Data: IFLS-5 wave
(2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Robust standard errors are clustered at regional level;
Ticks indicate 95 percent confidence interval.
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1.7. Changes in female economic resources and
decision-making power
We established that female outcomes vary between groups that differ in their percep-
tion of female power. In this section, we study how male and female perception diverge
if female economic power changes. The goal is to learn about (potential) bias that
could arise in studies that are based on one-sided surveys. In order to achieve this,
we pursue two approaches: one based on a fixed effects model and one based on an
instrumental variable model.
1.7.1. Fixed effects model
We study the relationship between changes in female income share and changes in
female decision-making power from both spouses’ perspectives. We are interested
in whether the association between either spouse’s perception is more responsive to
changes in female income contribution. We employ a fixed effects model to account
for unobserved heterogeneity and to study changes in female economic resources and
decision power over time. The fixed effects approach can control for unobserved het-
erogeneity between couples. However, it cannot account for the dynamic, bi-directional
interaction of income and power over time. That is, we cannot determine in which
way economic resources and decision-making power influence each other. We argue,
however, that the general strength of relationship is of informational value.
Approach. We run two fixed effects models per decision domain, one to reflect the
husband’s perception and one to reflect the wife’s perception. The main dependent
variable of interest is whether the wife (husband) perceives the wife to have decision-
making power in a given domain. Our dependent variable takes on the value 1 if the
wife (husband) perceives female decision-making power in a domain, and zero if not.
Accordingly, we run 26 models: two for each of the 13 domains. We use panel data,
based on IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5. The vector of all 26 outcome variables is denoted
FemDecSharew,d,i,t. PFDMP expresses the perceived female decision-making power
(PFDMP) of wife w in decision domain d as perceived by wife or husband i in period
t.
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The predicting variable of interest is the female’s income share FemIncShareh,t. The
income share is the wife’s contribution to household labor income divided by the sum
of wife’s and husband’s income.31 We use individual income as stated by the household
head. We set income to zero if a subject has "not worked in past 12 months". We do
not exclude unpaid family workers. We do so because economic inactivity is relevant
to define a baseline of power. The income share is then calculated as the female income
over the sum of male and female income. The data offer estimates of income based on
unfolding brackets for individuals who did not report their income. We disregard those,
as including them would require making many assumptions. The remaining variables
are analogous to previous models. Time-invariant variables, such as educational level,
are excluded. The model is specified as follows.
FemDecSharew,d,i,t = β1FemIncShareh,t + β2INDIV IDUALi,t
+ β3HOUSEHOLDh,t + ρ1PROVi,t + γt + αi + εi,t (1.4)
Results. We can confirm the association between female economic and decision-
making power. The results are presented in figure 1.9. The figure presents the co-
efficients of female income share across all 26 models. Detailed estimates are to be
found in the appendix section A.3.3. A positive increase in female income share over
time is associated with a perceived female decision-making power increase. This holds
true for both perspectives. From the husband’s perspective, female income share is
positively associated with female decision power in the domains of children’s education
and the husband’s time spent socializing. Women tend to perceive their own decision-
making power in the domains of routine purchases, monthly Arisan (lottery), and gifts
for weddings/parties when their income share increases. Both women and men tend
to perceive more female power over food expenditure, large, expensive purchases and
labor market decisions when the female income share increases. The within-domain
estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other between men and
women. One-sided surveys might draw different conclusions within specific domains,
dependent on whether they take the husband’s or the wife’s perspective into considera-
tion. That is, because some effects are statistically significantly different from zero for
women (men), while they are not for men (women). However, there is no statistically
significant within-domain difference at the five percent level in the elasticity of the
male and female perception of female power with respect to changes in female income.
31. By design, a gain in relative female income share implies a loss in male income share as the
function is 1− FemaleIncomeShare = MaleIncomeShare.
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Table 1.9.: Association of female income and decision-making power across
domains: summary of coefficients
Food expenditure: Wife:
Husb:
Routine purchases: Wife: 
Husb:
Children's education: Wife: 
Husb: 
Children's health: Wife:
Husb: 
Large expensive purchases: Wife:
Husb:
Money to wife's family: Wife:
Husb:
Money to husband's family: Wife:
Husb:
Gifts for weddings/parties: Wife:
Husb:
Monthly Arisan (lottery): Wife:
Husb:
Monthly savings: Wife:
Husb:
Time husband spends social.: Wife:
Husb:
Time wife spends social.: Wife:
Husb:
Labor market decisions: Wife:
Husb:
D
o
m
a
in
s
 o
f 
fe
m
a
le
 d
e
c
is
io
n
 m
a
k
in
g
 p
o
w
e
r
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Coefficient of female income share on
outcome that wife / husband 
 perceives female decision making power
Note: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision-making power in
specific domain; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one observation is one couple; Ticks indicate
95 percent confidence interval; Please see appendix section A.3.3 for numeric estimation results.
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1.7.2. Instrumental variable model
Approach. For this model, we exploit natural disasters and crop loss as a shock
to household income shares to study the relationship between female economic and
decision-making power. For the first stage, we regress the female share in labor income
on the instrument vector SHOCKi. In order to code SHOCKi, we use information
in IFLS-3 wave (2000) data on exposure to two possible events (natural disasters and
crop loss) and six possible household labor supply reactions. For example, one possible
reaction is that a household member started working for pay. All recorded events are
listed in appendix table A.5 and the possible household reactions are listed in appendix
table A.6
There is one indicator variable for each of the six reactions to each of the two events.
Thus, the vector comprises twelve indicator variables in total. The default coding of
each indicator variable is 0. If a household has been exposed to an event and reacted
to the event, the respective indicator variable is coded as 1. For example, the indicator
variable for event e1 and reaction r1 is coded 1 if and only if the household responds
that it was affected by disaster e1 and reacted in way r1. If it did neither show reac-
tions r2,3,4,5,6 to event e1 nor experienced e2, all other eleven variables will also take on
the value zero.
The household does not report whether it was the wife or husband or another household
member who adjusted their labor supply. However, first stage estimates in appendix
table A.19 suggest that crop losses reduce the female income share, on average. This
is in line with previous findings.32 Following natural disasters, the picture is more
nuanced: If a household member changed or quit their job, the female income share
tends to increase. If a family member takes on an additional job, the female income
share tends to decrease (This appears sensible given that the average wife does not
work. The average additional job is thus expected to be taken on by the husband.)
As crop loss and the severity of exposure to natural disasters are associated with
ownership of land, we estimate two models. One for the subsample of landowners and
one for the full sample, controlling for land ownership. The vectors INDIV IDUALi,
HOUSEHOLDh, PROVi and εi are modeled in the same way as in the previous
section. The resulting first stage equation is as follows.
32. Kochar (1999) find for India that men tend to adjust their labor supply in order to account for
crop loss. Cameron and Worswick (2003) use IFLS 1990 data and find that the average household
response to crop loss is a shift from unproductive farm work to more productive work outside of the
household.
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FemIncShareh = β0 + β1SHOCKi + β2INDIV IDUALi
+ β3HOUSEHOLDh + ρ1PROVi + εi (1.5)
The reduced form equation estimates the effect of instrumented changes in female in-
come share on perceived female decision-making power. Female decision-making share
is measured as decision share over all domains (FemDecSharei). We estimate it for
husband and wife separately. For example, if a couple reports on 13 domains and
the wife perceives female decision-making power in twelve out of these domains, the
variable would take on the value .92. The husband’s assessment might differ, taking
on any value between 0 and 1. A perfectly concordant egalitarian couple would be
assigned the value one for both spouses.
FemDecSharei = β0 + β1FemIncShareh + β2INDIV IDUALi
+ β3HOUSEHOLDh + ρ1PROVi + εi (1.6)
Results. If the female income share changes, women adjust their perception of their
own power slightly more than men adjust their perception of female power. However,
this difference is not statistically significant. Table 1.10 presents the reduced form
results. Appendix table A.19 provides the first stage estimates. One-sided surveys
will yield similar conclusions, irrespective of whether they use the husband’s or the
wife’s perspective. In appendix table A.17, we use a fixed effects approach to estimate
the relationship between the wife’s income share and her overall decision share. The
analysis yields results similar to this estimation, supporting the robustness of the IV
approach.33
33. This robustness check is itself robust to exclusion of the labor supply decision domain as a part
of the overall decision share. The female and male perspective is still similar but the overall effect
size is smaller. The estimate is reported in appendix table A.18.
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Table 1.10.: IV Model reduced form results: instrumented female income share’s
effect on wife’s and husband’s perception of female power
Dependent variable: overall
female decision-making share
from the perspective of
the...
(1) (2) (3) (4)
...wife
(Land-
owners
only)
...husband
(Land-
owners
only)
...wife
(Full
sample)
...husband
(Full
sample)
Female income share 0.561∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗ 0.489∗∗
(0.210) (0.200) (0.214) (0.198)
Any land 0.034∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
Constant 0.561∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.104) (0.091) (0.088)
Control for (spousal) age
and education X X X X
Control for HH income,
N HH adults, N HH children,
migration
X X X X
Observations 2,276 2,276 6,053 6,053
Underid. F-Statistic 20.8 20.8 18.5 18.5
Underid. P-val. 0.0228 0.0228 0.0468 0.0468
Weak id. F-Statistic 13.49 13.49 14.45 14.45
Overid. F-Statistic 7.625 13.45 10.15 20.50
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form IV results; Dependent variable: female share in household decision-making
across all decision domains; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse (Sp:)
refers to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS-3 wave (2000), cross-sectional data, one observation is one
couple; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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1.8. Robustness checks
In order to verify the robustness of our results, we have conducted six checks. First, we
run the cross-sectional models on alternative data. We use alternative data from the
IFLS-4 Survey (2007).34 Results are presented in appendix section A.5.1. Except for
one bar, the histogram results are of similar shape. Additionally, the labor outcomes
analysis supports previous conclusions. The contraception results are statistically in-
significant at the five percent level, however. This deviant finding might be driven by
two factors. Due to survey design, new and young couples enter the survey from 2007
through 2014. Relatedly, we observe a change in contraception method mix over time
(see appendix table A.20). A longitudinal survey design with a focus on contraception
might shed light on the question how and why contraceptive use changed over time.
Secondly, we use an alternative covert method specification in appendix section A.5.2.
We first exclude all pill users and then classify the pill as covert.35 The findings are not
robust to this specification. Effects are reversed. However, we still observe differences
between discordant groups. Further, we test whether our results are robust to the
exclusion of specific groups of women, who might not intend to prevent pregnancy.
This assessment can be found in appendix table A.8 for the contraception analysis
and in appendix table A.9 for the covert method use analysis. Results are robust to
their exclusion. We find that our assessment in its general conclusions is robust to the
exclusion of women that a) do state that they wish to have another child36 and b) state
that they are not fertile at the moment, for instance, due to menopause. However,
exclusion restriction a) (in column 3 of appendix table A.8) reduces the statistical
significance of the estimates. Same holds true for a third specification that excludes
both groups, a and b.
Thirdly, one might suspect that discordance is a phenomenon that is mainly driven
by a subsample that is consistently discordant while other couples are consistently
concordant. To check this, we study the within-household covariance of discordance
across domains (results not reported in this paper). We cannot confirm that it is a sin-
34. Our cross-section estimates on the association between spousal statements and labor outcomes
and contraceptive use outcomes are based on cross-section data from IFLS-5 wave (2014).
35. The pill can be concealed and taken without the husband’s knowledge. However, this might
prove more difficult than using other methods covertly, such as injections. Chikovore et al. (2002,
p. 329) discuss for a sample in Zimbabwe how contraceptive pills cause a "hide-and-seek game" at
home.
36. The question does not specify the time at which women would like to receive another child.
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gle group of individuals displaying consistent inconsistency. The average discordance
rate is 37 percent, and only 10 percent of all couples show now discordance at all.
Appendix table A.36 cross-tabulates statement combinations in the labor supply and
contraceptive decision domains. While there is some correlation between statements,
it is not possible to predict one with the other. Remarkably though, 49.3 percent of
couples that agree on joint decision-making on labor supply also do so on contraception.
Fourthly, we check whether our model is robust to alternative specifications of house-
hold income shares. In our main specifications, we assign zero income to individuals
whose spouses report income and who have not worked in the past twelve months. We
do so, as we do consider this to be a better reflection of true average female economic
power than dropping all observations of economically inactive women. For example,
unpaid family workers are disproportionately often women and usually do not report
income. The fact that they do not have command over disposable income is an im-
portant empirical insight. However, one might be afraid of this biasing our results,
in particular, if non-reporting is associated with power. We provide an alternative
specification in appendix section A.5.3. We code non-reported income as missing (in-
come is for example not reported if an individual did not work in the past 12 months)
and omit the full couple for the analysis. Our findings are robust to this alternative
specification, but standard errors grow, as one would expect. Results for the fixed
effects analysis also do not differ, if one limits the analysis to couples in which the
wife’s share decreases (increases).
Fifthly, we check the validity of our instrumental variable approach to address the
concern that a subset of regions was particularly exposed to shocks. If these regions
also differed in other unobservable ways from the other regions, this might induce bias.
Appendix section A.4.2 shows that all but one regions have been subject to at least
one of the shocks we instrument for. We also provide an alternative coding of our
instrument in section A.5.4. This is based on the inclusion of additional instruments.
This model does not pass identification tests. It yields estimates of a similar order of
magnitude as our main results.
Sixthly, we check whether our main OLS results are robust to probit estimation. We
use OLS to ease interpretation and because we are interested in sample average esti-
mates. Some dependent variables (eg labor market participation, contraceptive use)
are binary, suggesting probit estimation. The marginal probit estimates for labor and
contraceptive outcomes offer the same conclusions as OLS estimates do.
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1.9. Discussion
This study’s overall discordance levels are in line with previous publications. In a re-
view Allendorf (2007) document average discordance rates from 50 to 75 percent across
various previous studies and their own. Further, we document higher self-perceived
power by females compared to males’ perceptions. Ambler et al. (2017) review the
previous literature and find a mixed picture in this regard.
Results are in general agreement with the literature on discordance and health and well-
being outcomes (Allendorf, 2007; Ambler et al., 2017). However, analyses of Ambler
et al. (2017) propose differences between groups that we classify as strongly discordant
– groups in which the husband or the wife does not perceive female decision-making
power, while the other spouse does. We cannot confirm fundamental differences be-
tween these groups (Results are similar for women, who perceive their own power,
without their spouses concurring and for those women who do not perceive any female
decision-making power while their spouses do). In general, our observations suggest
that future research will benefit from taking into account both spouses’ perceptions
when assessing female decision-making power. The covert contraceptive use analysis
provides new insight on decision-making power and types of contraceptive use. These
findings are also supported by previous literature that documented different fertility
preferences by men and women (Rasul, 2008a). However, the results are sensitive to
the chosen classification of methods into covert and non-covert. In-depth focus group
interviews could be one way to understand contraceptive use and gendered perception
of power better. Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) suggest that focus groups are help-
ful in order to learn about decision-making power in the household, as husbands, in
particular, provide more truthful answers.
The findings on changing perceptions of female economic resources and decision-
making power are also closely related to literature that evaluates changes in the per-
ception of female power in general. For example, Beaman et al. (2009) document
that exposure to powerful women can shift the perceptions of gender roles of men and
women. Future work should elaborate on interventions that shift the perception of
either or both sexes.
So far, there is no comprehensive framework for the reasons why partners can be dis-
cordant. Supportingly, Ambler et al. (2017) posit that there is no household model
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that permits the inclusion of diverging spousal preferences. Future work should aspire
to develop a theory in order to conceptualize these and related empirical findings.
In this regard, the appendix offers some additional discussion of potential modera-
tors of discordance and power. Section A.6.1 provides descriptive information on the
association of relative female and male education and female power. Holding male
education constant, higher female education is associated with higher female power.
Section A.6.2 estimates the relationship between potential sources of female power
and the husband’s and wife’s perception of female power. We find that from the wife’s
perspective, female business ownership is positively associated with female decision-
making power, while it is not from the husband’s perspective. From both perspectives,
female education is positively associated with female decision-making power as is the
overall household income. In appendix section A.6.4 we present outcomes for the four
possible combinations of spousal presence at interviews. We find that the average rates
of total discordance across all dimensions are highest where neither spouse was present
during the other spouse’s interview.
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1.10. Conclusion
We observe high rates of discordance and find them to be associated with female in-
come shares as well as labor and contraceptive outcomes. We conclude that taking
the husband’s perspective into account can improve prediction accuracy. We use two
different approaches to test the sensitivity of both husbands’ and wives’ perceptions of
female decision-making power to changes in female income shares. Summarizing, the
results suggest that at the population level, one-sided surveys provide a good proxy
for the reaction of either gender to economic shocks. However, cross-section estimates
suggest that females’ outcomes will vary in those families where both spouses’ reac-
tions correlate vs. those where only one spouse changes its perception of female power.
Female empowerment is one of the central topics in international development, which
is reflected in its relevance in policy-making and academia. In international develop-
ment, many interventions aim at increasing female decision-making power in order to
improve the outcomes of women and children. This study suggests that female power
is relevant for female outcomes but it also shows that female power is not an objective
measure that is independent of subjective evaluation. Rather, it is the interplay of
spouses’ perceptions that predicts female well-being.
This study motivates a paradigm shift in development economics, moving away from
a strong focus on women and taking the husband into the picture to promote female
empowerment with the help of both partners.
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2.1. Introduction
Natural disasters threaten the well-being of affected individuals and communities.1
Global warming is expected to augment this threat by increasing the frequency and
severity of extreme weather conditions (Van Aalst, 2006; Watson and Albritton, 2001;
Cavallo and Noy, 2010). The increasing prevalence of natural disasters and their signif-
icant impact make them subject to extensive research. So far, the range of documented
outcomes in longitudinal studies has been comparably narrow, and the majority of
publications rely on post-disaster data. This is why many scholars have articulated
the need for more (longitudinal) evidence on how disasters affect populations (Reza-
eian, 2013; Sety, James, and Breckenridge, 2014; Cavallo and Noy, 2010; Parkinson
and Zara, 2013; World Health Organization (WHO), 2002; Rosborough, Chan, and
Parmar, 2009; Schumacher et al., 2010).
This study contributes to this emerging strand of the literature that documents the
association of disasters and violence with novel panel data from Indonesia. It is the
first one to provide pre- and post-treatment family-level data on the impact of volcano
eruptions on domestic violence. In addition, it offers evidence for the channels by
which natural disasters might cause domestic violence.
The causal chain from the occurrence of natural disasters to domestic violence is de-
tailed hereafter. Previous evidence shows that natural disasters cause mental distress
in affected populations (Neria, Nandi, and Galea, 2008). The causes of disaster-related
distress are multi-fold. They can be psychological (eg existential fear), social (eg loss of
social network) or economic (eg loss of livelihood) (see Rezaeian (2013) and Overstreet
et al. (2011) for frameworks). Victims’ distress symptoms can range from feelings of
helplessness to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).2 The anticipation or experience
of recurrent disasters, such as volcano eruptions, can amplify distress (Overstreet et
al., 2011). Suffering from mental distress, individuals can develop feelings of aggres-
sion and outward, interpersonal violent behavior (Berkowitz, 1993; Curtis, Miller, and
Berry, 2000; Denlay and Shrader, 2000). The likelihood of violent behavior is increased
1. Geophysical disasters caused economic damage of USD 763 billion between 1995 and 2015.
Asia experienced 37 percent of the global economic loss between 1994 and 2015. Volcanic activity
accounted for eight percent of all natural disasters globally during this period (Wahlstrom and Guha-
Sapir, 2015).
2. For examples of studies documenting increases in symptoms of mental distress, eg PTSD, after
natural disasters, see Fernandez et al. (2017), Goenjian et al. (2000), Neria, Nandi, and Galea (2008),
Paxson et al. (2012), Rezaeian (2013), Rhodes et al. (2010), Rubonis and Bickman (1991), and Warsini
et al. (2014).
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by multiple factors, for example, worsened living conditions or a lack of social networks
and social control (Curtis, Miller, and Berry, 2000; Rezaeian, 2013). Rezaeian (2013)
provides a framework and reviews previous literature that links disaster experience to
(interpersonal) violence.
In this study, the impact of two eruptions on rates of domestic violence and four
alternative outcomes is estimated with a difference-in-differences approach. On a de-
scriptive level, I confirm an increase in domestic violence in the treatment group.
The affected communities suffer from lower average household expenditure which is
expected to increase distress. Further, increased rates of alcohol/drug abuse and low-
ered emotional well-being in affected populations point to increased levels of mental
distress (alcohol abuse is also associated with IPV).3 A synthetic control approach al-
lows the verification of these results. A subsample of families with internally displaced
people (IDP) status displays substantially higher levels of domestic violence after the
volcanoes’ eruptions. This subsample has previously suffered from natural disasters
and proves to be particularly vulnerable to repeated disaster exposure. These families
suffer from a loss of livelihood, lack of a social network and augmented feelings of a
threat of disaster recurrence. The treatment coefficient estimate suggests an increase
of nine percentage points.
Data are provided by an NGO that serves rural and urban communities across In-
donesia. I use survey and observational data from 2,024 families. The families receive
support based on their vulnerability to family breakdown. In late 2013 and early 2014,
some of the families have suffered from the eruption of the two volcanoes Mount Kelud
and Mount Merapi. The volcanoes’ eruptions caused ashfall, evacuations, and deaths
across multiple hundreds of kilometers on Java, Indonesia’s main island.
This study’s results suggest an increase in domestic violence after natural disasters.
It further points at the roles of economic conditions, IDP status and social networks
of affected communities. Policymakers and emergency response organizations should
consider the causes of multi-fold non-economic outcomes of natural disasters when
designing interventions.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. First, I will review related studies
3. McFarlane (1998) reviews studies on the association of alcohol abuse and PTSD. Sonne et
al. (2009) present evidence on the sequence of the onset of PTSD and alcohol abuse respectively.
Bueno and Henderson (2017) explore the association of IPV with alcohol abuse. Bech et al. (2003)
discuss the relationship between mental distress and well-being.
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that survey the impact of natural disasters and domestic violence separately. I will
then discuss how both strains of literature are linked. I will provide an overview of the
Indonesian cultural context. Secondly, I will present my empirical strategy and discuss
alternative specifications. Afterwards, I will present the results that are accompanied
by robustness checks. I will conclude by discussing the implications of the findings.
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2.2. The relationship between natural disasters and
domestic violence
In the following section, I will first present previous work that surveys the consequences
of natural disasters on affected populations. I will then present evidence on the deter-
minants and consequences of domestic violence and its local context in Indonesia. I
will conclude by discussing literature linking natural disasters with domestic violence.
2.2.1. Natural disasters
Natural disasters such as hurricanes, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, and cyclones
threaten the well-being of affected communities. Global warming is expected to aug-
ment this threat via an increase in the frequency and severity of those disasters that are
weather-linked (Cavallo and Noy, 2010; Van Aalst, 2006; Watson and Albritton, 2001).
The strain of studies in economics dedicated to evaluating the impact of natural disas-
ters is comparably novel. Evidence regarding the overall impact on long-term economic
growth remains mixed (Loayza et al., 2012). Gignoux and Menéndez (2016) identified
public investment in response to natural disasters as a critical moderator that can
turn short-run losses in long-term gains. In their study on the welfare impact of earth-
quakes in rural Indonesia, they found that public investment can lead to local welfare
gains within six to twelve years following an earthquake. Arouri, Nguyen, and Youssef
(2015) document adverse income effects in rural Vietnam following storms, floods, and
droughts while Deryugina, Kawano, and Levitt (2018) find income increases for some
communities affected by Katrina.4 For short-run outcomes, Noy (2009) found that
disasters can lead to slowdowns in production and that these are expected to be worse
in developing countries. Accordingly, Strobl (2012) estimate an average output drop
of .83 percentage points following hurricane strikes in Central America and Caribbean
regions.
Apart from macroeconomic evaluations, micro-level assessments have been conducted
with respect to human capital accumulation (Caruso, 2017; Baez, Fuente, and Santos,
2010; Janvry et al., 2006; Ferreira and Schady, 2009; Gitter and Barham, 2007), income
and expenditure (Arouri, Nguyen, and Youssef, 2015; Deryugina, Kawano, and Levitt,
2018), as well as health and physical growth (Caruso, 2017; Hoddinott and Kinsey,
4. In the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, Deryugina, Kawano, and Levitt (2018) find that the
incomes of affected individuals outgrow those of unaffected individuals in control communities.
58 2. Domestic violence in Indonesia following two volcano eruptions
2001; Maccini and Yang, 2009). Caruso (2017) find that the health of young children is
particularly susceptible to natural disasters, while Ferreira and Schady (2009) observe
lower investment in children in developing countries after droughts.
Despite this wealth of previous publications, few studies address natural disasters as a
cause of domestic violence. To my knowledge, there are no longitudinal studies using
family level data to observe changes in domestic violence following a natural disaster.5
2.2.2. Domestic violence
Domestic violence as a peril to public health
IPV poses a major peril to public health. In line with previous literature, IPV is
defined in the following as violence between intimate partners. Domestic violence is
defined as general violence in the household, including IPV as well as violence against
children and other household members.6 IPV can result in stress, fear and physical as
well as psychological trauma, and incur the sentiment of loss of control (García-Moreno
et al., 2013). Moreover, domestic violence is found to negatively affect children born
to mothers exposed to violence during pregnancy (Aizer, 2011). Domestic violence
towards children can affect their development and might result in trauma and lower
ability, among other things (Reading, 2008). According to estimates by the WHO, 30
percent of ever-partnered women experience intimate partner violence (IPV) in their
lifetime. In South East Asia, prevalence rates of IPV are even higher than the global
average, at an average rate of 37.7 percent (García-Moreno et al., 2013).
Multiple individual and structural risk factors have been associated with domestic
violence in general and IPV in specific. A perpetrator’s record of violence in the recent
past, drug and alcohol abuse, threatening behavior, previous psychological issues, are
some traits that are found disproportionately often in offenders (Dutton and Kropp,
2000).7 Circumstantial moderators of domestic violence include but are not limited to
gender-specific labor market conditions (Aizer, 2010; Anderberg et al., 2015), social
welfare transfers (Bobonis, González-Brenes, and Castro, 2013; Hidrobo, Peterman,
and Heise, 2016) and adverse emotional cues (Card and Dahl, 2011). Two competing
5. An exception is research using rainfall shocks. While one can consider rainfall shocks a natural
disaster, their consequences are commonly different from volcano eruptions or earthquakes. They
usually pose a non-existential threat, particularly if not accompanied by flooding.
6. For a general discussion of definitions of IPV and domestic violence, please refer to Reading
(2008).
7. Both Dutton and Kropp (2000) and Jewkes (2002) provide excellent overviews of this literature
and discuss appropriate assessment methods of domestic violence risk.
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theories exist on how changes in relative female economic power might change the
prevalence of domestic violence. Women might expect to leverage higher economic
power to negotiate better outcomes in household bargaining. By contrast, one might
expect (violent) male backlash as an adverse reaction to a decrease in relative male
status (Bueno and Henderson, 2017). In a Sub-Saharan context, Cools and Kotsadam
(2017) propose that economic inequality both at the level of the household and at
the community is associated with higher IPV rates. With new data from Africa,
Alesina, Brioschi, and La Ferrara (2016) argue that ancient cultural norms and current
economic conditions interact in a non-trivial way. Empirically, Bueno and Henderson
(2017) find that household bargaining based approaches are more predictive of general
IPV whereas male backlash theories are so for sexual IPV. The authors also point to
the relationship between excessive alcohol consumption and IPV.
Domestic violence in the Indonesian context
There is no systematic, continuous tracking of IPV prevalence on a national level in
Indonesia.8 Both the World Health Organization and the United Nations base their
estimates on a SUSENAS (National Census Survey) survey from 2006. In this, 3.07
percent of women reported any lifetime experience of either IPV, non-partner violence
or both (UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empow-
erment of Women), 2011; World Health Organization (WHO), 2008). The WHO
documents that 66 percent of all reported violence cases are classified as psychologi-
cal (World Health Organization (WHO), 2008). In contrast, 22 percent of Javanese
women of reproductive age that have been part of a pregnancy preparation program
reported a “lifetime exposure to sexual and physical violence” (Hayati et al., 2011,
p. 1). All numbers deserve cautious interpretation since local norms might lead to
biased and possibly understated reporting of IPV.
IPV needs to be understood in the context of norms. For example, in an African con-
text, Alesina, Brioschi, and La Ferrara (2016) show that interaction of ancient norms
and female economic power can explain current rates of domestic violence. In In-
donesia, IPV has traditionally been considered a personal, private issue that deserves
private intervention. This notion prevails until today and might be reinforced by the
norm of harmony (njaga praja) (Hayati et al., 2013). The norm stresses the protection
of the husband’s honor towards non-family members. This is likely to result in fewer
8. It was not until the mid-1990s that international organizations started raising awareness for the
topic, and initial public reactions ranged from surprise to denial (Blackburn, 2004a). Reported figures
vary greatly depending on time, region and source.
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reports of IPV incidences. Fewer and potentially biased reports create an unclear em-
pirical picture and a selective public focus on out-of-home violence such as non-marital
rape and trafficking. Moreover, victims refrain from reporting as they are typically
not convinced that things will change in their favor if they come forward (Blackburn,
2004a). In their study, Nilan et al. (2014) found Indonesian men to be reluctant to
talk about violence against women. Men tended to engage in victim indictment and
overall refutation of the phenomenon of IPV.
Acceptance of IPV is high in Indonesia despite political progress.9 Opposed to global
trends, rates of rejection of IPV amongst Indonesian women stayed relatively stable
over the recent past (Pierotti, 2013). In the most recent IDHS study, 27 percent of
Indonesian women considered wife-beating to be a justified reaction to maternal child
neglect (Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik - BPS) National Population and
Family Planning Board (BKKBN) Kementerian Kesehatan (Kemenkes—MOH) and
ICF International, 2012). Similarly, 24 percent of women considered male violence
justified in cases in which women left home without giving notice to their husbands.
Both numbers are higher for younger age groups. Compared to women, men report
lower levels of acceptance of wife-beating (Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statis-
tik - BPS) National Population and Family Planning Board (BKKBN) Kementerian
Kesehatan (Kemenkes—MOH) and ICF International, 2012) – a finding potentially
driven by social desirability.
In the Indonesian context, Hayati et al. (2013) found that female economic inde-
pendence and conservative values are associated with higher rates of IPV. Hayati et
al. (2011) show for this study’s treatment area, that female main breadwinners were
at particular risk of violence experience yet were particularly unwilling to accept help.
Nilan et al. (2014) use interviews and find that one self-reported cause of violence in
Indonesia is the (perceived) male inability to satisfy female expectations. In partic-
ular, financial difficulties seemed to be predictive of intimate partner violence in the
context of Indonesia.10 In the study, 48 interviewed men, all of whom were considered
community leaders, expressed a discordance between idealistic, partially religiously
informed expectations towards men and a more egalitarian reality resulting in men
feeling challenged about their identity (Hayati, 2013).
9. In the recent past, the country progressed, for example, by introducing a National Commission
on Violence Against Women in 1998 and passing of the Domestic Violence Act in 2004 (Hayati et al.,
2011).
10. A more detailed account of the concepts of masculinity in Indonesia and female coping strategies
in response to IPV can be found in Hayati (2013).
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In summary, previous evidence confirms that domestic violence poses a significant
threat to public health in Indonesia. Precise measurement of prevalence is compli-
cated by social norms. Household economics and female economic dependence and
independence have both been presented as potential risk factors.
2.2.3. Stress and domestic violence in consequence of natural
disasters
This study’s findings propose that natural disasters lead to an increase in domestic
violence. It thereby relies on previous studies that propose channels through which
this happens. Rezaeian (2013) suggests that the psychological, social and economic
consequences of natural disasters cause mental distress which in turn causes domestic
violence. The following section presents previous evidence on this hypothesis.
The first strand of literature shows how natural disasters cause stress in established
populations. A comprehensive account of disaster psychiatry can be found in Usano
et al. (2017). Rubonis and Bickman (1991) review 52 empirical studies and find a small
but consistently positive association of disasters and a subsequent increase in indicators
of psychopathology. Goenjian et al. (2000) document higher levels of posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) in populations affected by severe earthquakes compared to
those exposed to milder trauma. Effects persist without major improvement within
1.5 and 4.5 years following a disaster and that decreases in living conditions, and
livelihood can amplify stress. Pre-event conditions such as mental illness predict the
later severity of PTSD levels.11 The recurrent threat of natural disasters, whether
anticipated or actual, is expected to augment mental distress further (Overstreet et
al., 2011). Two studies have surveyed the impact of Mount Merapi’s 2010 eruption
on mental health and confirm previous findings for this study’s context. Warsini et
al. (2014) report higher rates of distress in survivor communities located close to the
peak of Mount Merapi for early 2013. Victims attributed distress to volcanic dust
on roads and mining and construction following the events. The same authors also
record higher levels of PTSD in affected areas, in particular among women, individuals
of young and middle age and homeowners (Warsini et al., 2014). Further, general ev-
11. Fernandez et al. (2017) show for a sample in Chile that pre-disaster attributes in patients (such
as panic disorders) predict the likelihood of post-disaster PTSD. Rhodes et al. (2010) find a doubling
of mental illness prevalence amongst disadvantaged communities post the Katrina Hurricane and
estimate PTSD rates at close to fifty percent. In the same context, Paxson et al. (2012) confirm the
long-term consequences of natural disasters by finding that rates of post-traumatic stress symptoms
did not return to pre-Katrina levels even 43 to 54 months after the event.
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idence suggests that stress is one driver of domestic violence (see for example Runyan
et al. (2002) and Bardi and Borgognini-Tarli (2001) for reviews). In this realm, stress
can be moderated by both, primary and secondary stressors. Primary stressors are
immediate consequences of the disaster such as a felt or actual threat to life. Secondary
stressors are stressors that have been caused by the disaster, such as the loss of one’s
job (Overstreet et al., 2011).
The second strand of literature links stress to domestic violence in the context of
natural disasters. Rezaeian (2013) offers a systematic review of the literature that
documents the link between mental distress and domestic violence. The author finds
that most studies document an increase in interpersonal violence after natural disas-
ters. Indeed, outward, interpersonal violence and aggression are often found reactions
of humans exposed to mental distress and feelings of helplessness (Berkowitz, 1993;
Curtis, Miller, and Berry, 2000; Denlay and Shrader, 2000). For example, Denlay and
Shrader (2000) link violence and aggression as one stress-coping mechanism chosen by
men, based on a study conducted in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras
and Nicaragua. Rezaeian (2013) proposes a model for the relationship between natural
disasters and violence that includes the multi-fold psychological, social and economic
ways by which disasters affect individuals.12 Worsened living conditions and lack of
social networks and social control have been put forward as important moderators of
domestic violence (Curtis, Miller, and Berry, 2000; Rezaeian, 2013). Curtis, Miller,
and Berry (2000) argue that the social control of antisocial behavior is reduced in
the aftermath of disasters permitting increased rates of violence as an otherwise sanc-
tioned behavior. This is supported by evidence on individuals who have lost their
social network. Anastario, Shebab, and Lawry (2009) document high rates of gender-
based violence in populations who have been internally displaced following Hurricane
Katrina.
The third strand of literature links natural disasters to domestic violence. Previous
empirical research on the relationship between natural disasters and domestic violence
has mostly relied on cross-section data and post-event surveys or police/administrative
data. Adams and Adams (1984) were first to empirically link disaster experience on
the one and domestic violence on the other hand. The authors argue that stress result-
ing from disaster manifests in physiological and psychological responses, among them
12. Rezaeian (2013, p. 1104) proposes that natural disasters lead to "personal threats to life, loss
of loved ones, propertyloss [sic]", "interruption and failure of social systems & services", "collapse of
social cohesion & harmony" and "massive destruction, Population [sic] displacement".
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domestic violence. Based on police reports, they document an increase in domestic
violence in the aftermath of the eruption of Mount Saint Helens, a volcano located
in the United States of America. Sety, James, and Breckenridge (2014) suggest sig-
nificant increases in domestic violence after disasters in high-income countries. Based
on a post-tsunami survey in Sri Lanka, Fisher (2010) propose that disasters amplify
pre-event violence patterns. This is confirmed by research on Hurricane Katrina. In a
survey during the aftermath of Katrina, Picardo, Burton, and Naponick (2010) found
an increase in existing and new abuse of displaced women. Schumacher et al. (2010)
confirm this for individuals who lived in affected areas at the time of Katrina’s impact.
The authors argue that their study is the first one that assesses pre- and post-disaster
IPV prevalence but also remark that this information stems from post-event surveys
making it subject to potential recall and reporting biases. Curtis, Miller, and Berry
(2000) use public reports on child abuse for periods before and after three natural
disasters to survey the link between abuse and disasters. They report increased child
abuse rates in two of the three observed samples. Parkinson (2017) interviewed women
after bushfires and documents an increase in domestic violence.
The only micro-level panel evidence about the impact of natural disasters on domestic
violence is on rainfall shocks.13 While one can consider rainfall shocks a natural disas-
ter, their consequences are commonly different from volcano eruptions or earthquakes.
They usually pose a non-existential threat, particularly if not accompanied by flooding.
So far, the range of documented outcomes in longitudinal studies has been comparably
narrow, and most publications rely on post-disaster data. Buttell and Carney (2009)
point at multiple challenges in measuring changes in gender-based violence. One of
them is the lack of baseline information. This is why many scholars have articulated the
need for more (longitudinal) evidence on how disasters affect populations (Cavallo and
Noy, 2010; Parkinson and Zara, 2013; Rezaeian, 2013; Rosborough, Chan, and Parmar,
2009; Schumacher et al., 2010; Sety, James, and Breckenridge, 2014; World Health
Organization (WHO), 2002). The unique panel dataset on individuals employed in
this study allows learning about domestic violence and potential risk factors following
a disaster.
13. Sekhri and Storeygard (2014) find a relationship between rainfall shocks and dowry deaths in
India. Chin (2011) associate changing power dynamics following rainfall shocks and spousal violence
in the same context. Miguel (2005) identifies extreme rainfall as a reason for economically motivated
witch murders in Tanzania in which relatives murder elderly women during times of economic scarcity.
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2.3. Context
2.3.1. Volcano eruptions on Java in 2013 and 2014
Volcano eruptions on Java. With 130 active volcanoes and its location on the pa-
cific ring of fire, Indonesia is a country with one of the world’s highest rates of seismic
activity. In late 2013 and early 2014, it has witnessed two major volcanic eruptions:
Mount Kelud and Mount Merapi erupted on its main island Java. The increase in
domestic violence in affected areas and its potential causes are subject of this study.
Concerning total evacuations and death toll, Mount Kelud’s eruption has been far
more severe. However, Mount Merapi’s eruption is likely to have been a significant
source of stress to surrounding populations. Its eruption in November 2013 caused
reminiscence of its last, catastrophic eruption in 2010, which took the lives of 353
individuals. 2013 also marked the end of a three year period in which the volcano dis-
played a very low level of observable activity.14 It showed first activity on November
18, 2013, resulting in a 2 km high plume of ash (Wunderman, 2014b). This eruption
has been the first significant one, after its 2010 outburst. Following this first inci-
dent, Mount Merapi erupted again on multiple occasions in March 2014; creating a
9.8 km high plume on March 27th and affecting neighboring regions and communi-
ties in Kemalang and Klaten regency (Wunderman, 2014b). Besides and after one
and a half months of increased seismic activity, Mount Kelud erupted on the 13th
of February 2014, causing the evacuation of 100,000 people, killing 7 and destroying
around 11 thousand buildings in the surrounding communities (Wunderman, 2014a). I
observe effects in communities that have not been evacuated but still struck by ashfall.
Assignment to treatment and control groups. Figure 2.1 maps the location and
assignment of treatment and control communities. Treatment communities are marked
with a yellow triangle. Communities on Java that are outside the treatment area are
selected as the control group and marked with a blue square. Communities outside
Java, marked with a green circle, will serve as a control group for a synthetic control
robustness check but are not considered for the main analyses. The primary treatment
group is identified based on the latest assessment of the International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (see appendix figure B.2). This group of districts
is named Treatment Kelud on the map’s legend. I add two additional treatment areas.
The first area, named Additional Ashfall Mount Merapi on the map’s legend, is added
14. Mount Merapi is an active stratovolcano with a continuous level of activity over time.
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based on Wunderman (2014b) and has been exposed to ashfall by Mount Merapi in
2014. This area does not contain any communities in this sample and hence does not
affect estimates. A second sub-district named Kabupaten Gunungkidul15 is included
based on the combination of two factors. First, it has been exposed to light ashfall
right after Mount Kelud’s eruption (The United Nations Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2014). However, it has been excluded from the final
assessment of affected areas that have been used for the overall treatment identification
(see International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2014) and map
in appendix figure B.2). Secondly, and more importantly, the area Daerah Istimewa
Yogyakarta (marked as Additional Treatment Mount Merapi) is closely linked to the
primary treatment area and is thereby expected to be exposed to the consequences of
the treatment shock. Kabupaten Gunungkidul is part of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta
which is home to all treatment communities. The used regency level economic data
are the same for treatment area and this area. Moreover, a social center located in
the treatment area administers its support. The light exposure combined with the
economic and social dependency on the treatment area recommend its inclusion as
opposed to assigning it to a control area or dropping it. Appendix table B.4.3 runs a
robustness check on how exclusion informed results. More detailed information on the
eruption is offered by the Red Cross (International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, 2014).
15. Also referred to by Gunung Kidul Regency
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2.3.2. Increase in domestic violence following the eruptions
Table 2.2 displays the increase in domestic violence that is at the center of this study.
Beginning with the first eruption of Mount Merapi in November 2013, a trend of
increasing rates of domestic violence is observable. The main eruption of the two
volcanoes occurred in February and March of 2014. The trend of increasing domestic
violence continues until late 2014 – a point at which it reached a plateau of around 4
percent of all households in affected regions. Mount Merapi is geographically closer to
the sample communities, but its next outbreak in 2014 has not been as impactful as
the 2014 outbreak of Mount Kelud. However, it might still have induced significant
stress in communities that have been displaced in its last major outbreak in 2010. It
is expected that both volcanoes contribute to the increase in domestic violence.
Figure 2.2.: Domestic violence over time by treatment status
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2.3.3. Macro-level decrease of average per capita household
expenditure following the eruptions
Nationally, Indonesia’s economy grew significantly over the past decades. Despite a
recession in the late 1990s, its total GDP has more than tripled between 1995 and
2014. In 2014, it reached a level of 888 billion US Dollar16 More recently, the country’s
growth rates have been decreasing: from 8.2 percent in 1995 to 5.0 percent in 2014
(OECD, 2015). 2014, the year of interest to this study, does not mark an exceptional
year as such but fits the larger trend of decline in economic growth rates.
Regionally, Indonesia is divided into 34 provinces, which are divided into regencies
(Kabupaten) and cities (Kota).17 Regencies and cities are divided into subdistricts.
In figure 2.3 the average household expenditure of treatment and control groups are
compared. The data are provided by the World Bank Group. Importantly, the data
are sometimes provided at regency-level (for example for West Java) and sometimes
at city-level (for example for the city of Yogyakarta). The regency-/city-level data are
then assigned to the individual. The average values depicted in the figure 2.3 are thus
weighted by the number of observations in each regency and city respectively.
The treatment region exhibits moderate household expenditure growth previous to the
eruptions and then slows down thereafter. Exact growth figures are found in appendix
table B.1. The net effect of positive growth in urban areas and negative growth in rural
areas results in mildly positive but below average net growth figures for the treatment
group.
2.3.4. Micro-level development of living conditions and
interventions following the eruptions
Figure 2.4 reports the development of living conditions at micro-level. These data are
collected by the NGO and are based on the sample used in this study. The observed
pattern differs from the macro-level observation of figure 2.3. Two reasons might drive
this. First, universal health care (UHC/JKN) has been formally introduced on first
of January of 2014 which might have influenced statements on living conditions and
explain the slight uptick observed between 2013 and 2014. Secondly, interventions
might have moderated the living conditions of the sample.
16. Measured in then-current US Dollar terms.
17. Some regency-sized areas are listed at the level of provinces, eg the Special Region of Yogyakarta
or the Special Capital Region of Jakarta.
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Figure 2.3.: Weighted regency-/city-level data: development of household
expenditure per capita over time (in IDR)
700,000
800,000
900,000
1,000,000
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 h
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 e
x
p
e
n
d
it
u
re
 p
e
r 
c
a
p
it
a
 i
n
 I
D
R
 
(w
e
ig
h
te
d
) 
EOY
2010
EOY
2011
EOY
2012
 
 
First
Erupt.
EOY
2013
 
 
Main
Erupt.
EOY
2014
EOY
 2015
Time
(End of Year (EOY) Values)
Treatment
Java Control
Notes: Data: Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER), World Bank Group; Total
household expenditure per capita over time in IDR. EOY = End of year. Data for 2015 is not yet available. Assigning
of regencies/cities to Java and Non-Java and treatment and control according to table B.1, based on geographical
location; First eruption: the first eruption of Mount Merapi, Main eruptions: eruptions of Mount Merapi and Mount
Kelud.
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To mitigate the adverse effects of natural disasters, Indonesia has created the National
Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB). It orchestrates response activities and all
relevant stakeholders in the case of a natural disaster-induced emergency (Jati, 2015).
Following Mount Kelud’s eruption, the BNPB supported the District’s Disaster Man-
agement Agency (BPBD) in coordinating all relief efforts (International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2014). While all construction-related activities
were in the hands of the military, economic and non-economic interventions were car-
ried out by a cluster network of governmental and non-governmental agents such as
the Red Cross, the World Food Program, Plan International, World Vision, Catholic
Relief Services and the Yakkum Emergency Unit. Inter alia, interventions addressed
the psycho-social, economic and nutritional well-being of affected communities (Inter-
national Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2014). The sample’s
treatment and control groups received interventions by the NGO, which also provided
the data for this study. Unfortunately, there is no exact record of disaster-specific
intervention. Going forward, it is hypothesized that these interventions attenuated
the severity of the eruptions’ ramifications. All negative changes in livelihood out-
comes should hence be understood as an upper bound estimation of outcomes in the
counterfactual case of a non-intervention and vice versa for positive changes. How this
might affect this study’s external validity is discussed in the section on identification
concerns, section 2.6.18
18. A second concern that will be addressed later on is the multidirectional impact that disaster
aid might have on the likelihood of domestic violence. It will also be discussed in the section on
identification concerns, section 2.6.
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Figure 2.4.: Development of living conditions over time
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Notes: Black squares: treatment; White circles: no treatment. Y-axis-scale: 4 on the scale equals "Family lives in
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2.4. Empirical strategy
2.4.1. Data
Data are provided by a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), SOS Children’s Vil-
lages (SOS). The data have been collected on a quarterly basis by social workers via
a standardized questionnaire. The social workers are employed by SOS. The unit of
analysis is that of a family. I use an unbalanced quarterly panel of 2,029 families in
Indonesia from the first quarter of 2013 to the second quarter of 2016 (The number of
observations can be found in appendix table B.4. The lowest number of observations
is given for the last quarter, with 6.1 of all observations, the highest number of obser-
vations is given in the third quarter with 2029 observations.) The maximum number
of observations is 14. For the average family, I use 13.3 quarters of data.
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The families are part of the on-going support program by SOS. They are selected
on the basis of their likelihood of family breakdown. The support program aims at
preventing this family breakdown. Interventions comprehend economic, psycho-social,
health and legal support. I only consider families that have been admitted to the
support program before 2013 and for which reports are given until at least 2015. All
observations of families that do not fulfill these prerequisites are dropped. The data
are collected by social workers who are interviewing the families on a monthly basis
with a structured questionnaire.
Data on domestic violence are collected by a child protection team. The child protec-
tion team collects data from two main sources. The first source is community leaders.
These are heads of different local administrative levels (Head of Dukuh, Head of Rukun
Warga/Rukun Tetangga) or religious leaders. There is a general awareness that in-
cidences of domestic violence should be reported. The second source is the extended
family or the nearest party of the victim. Sometimes, there are self-reports of female
victims.
For the difference-in-differences approach, I use a subsample of the full Indonesian
sample. I limit the sample for the difference-in-differences analysis to communities lo-
cated on Java. This is done in order as the Java communities (control and treatment)
show similar trends prior to the eruptions and hence comply with the common trend
assumption.
The main descriptive statistics are summarized in table 2.1 for the pre- and post-
treatment period. The treatment group is younger and better educated than the
control group. Reported household expenditure and living conditions are higher in
the control group than in the treatment group during the pre-treatment period. The
gap between the two groups widens over time. Pre-treatment, domestic violence and
reported alcohol abuse rates are low and below one percent in both control and treat-
ment. For the pre-treatment period, the treatment group’s average well-being score is
2.6 whereas the control group’s score is 3.1 on a scale where four is good, and one is
bad (Please refer to the appendix for a description of scales).
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The share of biological children is comparably high in both the control and treatment
group at rates of 100 percent and 98 percent respectively. There is a shrinking but
statistically significant difference between the two groups in this respect. The average
family has been part of the program for around six years. The treatment group receives
more interventions and has been part of the program for a shorter duration of time
than the control group. However, both groups receive a similar level of psychosocial
and childcare support. Levels of received support do not increase significantly over
time.
The descriptive statistics in table 2.1 show that pre- and post-treatment levels of
key variables are different. This does not violate the assumptions of a difference-in-
differences estimation per se. However, one might question whether these groups, that
are different from each other, really would have developed in the same way if it was not
for the treatment. To check the robustness, we conduct a synthetic control analysis.
We will also use communities outside of Java for this analysis as described in section
2.6.
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2.4.2. Difference-in-differences identification strategy
I employ a difference-in-differences estimation. The method is frequently employed
to study the ramifications of natural disasters (Caruso, 2017; Gignoux and Menéndez,
2016; Jensen, 2000; Shah and Steinberg, 2017). Specifically, and following Gignoux and
Menéndez (2016), I am using a fixed effects model to account for unobserved between-
family variation. I estimate the model for five outcomes. The main outcome variable
is domestic violence. The four alternative outcomes are average household expenditure
(based on macro-level data), household living conditions (based on micro-level data),
emotional well-being and alcohol/drug abuse.19
Domestic violence
I estimate the following equation to identify the effect of two volcano eruptions on
domestic violence prevalence.
yj,t = αj + βt + γTj,t + +δ
′Xj,t + j,t (2.1)
, where yj,t describes a binary outcome variable for household j at time t that is one
if domestic violence is reported and zero otherwise. αj is a fixed effect accounting for
time-invariant household attributes (A non-reported Hausman test supports the fixed
effects approach). βt is a time dummy-vector with dummies for all quarters to capture
general time trends. Tj,t is a dummy that is 1 for all affected areas post-treatment
and 0 otherwise. γ is the coefficient of interest and measures the increase in domestic
violence attributable to the event.
Xj,t is a vector of family attributes that are determined in the pre-treatment period
but time-variant. It includes the following variables: age-group of primary caregiver20,
number of children in the household as well as time since program admission and
a binary indicator for whether a family received support.  is an idiosyncratic, time-
varying error term. Standard errors are clustered at a regional level (Results are robust
to clustering at family level).
To describe the treatment effect over time, I report a series of dummies by interacting
a binary living in a treatment region indicator with time fixed effects. The coefficients
19. Alcohol/drug abuse is reported at low rates, which might be either due to underreporting or low
rates or both. Irrespective of this, the models will provide suggestive evidence towards the plausibility
of the proposed channel – stress as a cause of domestic violence.
20. Age groups are created based on the decade of parental birth: 2000-10, 1990-99, 1980-1989, etc.
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of this indicator vector capture the increased likelihood of development of domestic
violence for individuals living in treated regions compared to individuals living in
control regions. This also allows testing the common trend assumption. It shows that
there is no pretreatment difference between control and treatment groups with regard
to the dependent variable.
Alternative outcomes
For the alternative outcomes, I estimate the previously specified difference-in-differences
equation 2.1 and replace outcome yj,t by the respective alternative outcome variable.
I will estimate the baseline equation of the previous specification. Opposed to the
previous specification, I employ a random-effects model as suggested by Hausman test
results.
I estimate four outcomes. The first two are economic outcomes. A threat to livelihood
would be expected to increase mental distress and act as a secondary stressor (Over-
street et al., 2011). The latter two outcomes are emotional well-being and alcohol/drug
abuse. Emotional well-being is considered a proxy for the state of mental well-being of
the sample. Previous research has documented the comorbidity of alcohol abuse and
PTSD.21
The first outcome is household expenditure per capita in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) as
reported by the Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research.22 This value
does not vary by household but by region. The data per region can be found in ap-
pendix tables B.1 and B.2.
The second outcome is living conditions. Living conditions of a household are mea-
sured on a scale from one to four, with four indicating a positive outcome. The survey
defines value four as "Family lives in conditions that are adequate, as per local stan-
dards (defined on community level in consultation with key stakeholders)", while the
definition for value one is "Family lives in conditions that are below local standards,
and are compromising the personal well-being of individual (and/or family)". The full
scale is to be found in appendix section B.1.
21. McFarlane (1998) reviews studies on the association of alcohol abuse and PTSD. Sonne et
al. (2009) present evidence on the sequence of the onset of PTSD and alcohol abuse respectively.
Bueno and Henderson (2017) explore the association of IPV with alcohol abuse.
22. See Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER) by the World
Bank Group.
2.4 Empirical strategy 77
The third outcome is emotional well-being. This variable takes on values from one to
four, with four being good. The survey defines value four as "Care-giver is pro-active in
addressing the situation of her/his family, and is emotionally stable, with a generally
positive outlook". The definition for value one is "Care-giver is passive (not taking
any action to address the situation of her/his family) and/or is emotionally unstable
(showing signs of anger, irritability, aggression or depression)". Appendix section B.1
provides the full scale. One potential issue with this outcome is that the reporting care-
giver sometimes changes over time. The threat to identification will be discussed later.
The fourth outcome is alcohol/drug abuse. Social workers report whether alcohol
and/or drug use affect the family in a negative way. If either one of the two caregivers
abuses alcohol or drugs, it is coded as 1, if none of the two abuse alcohol or drugs, it
is coded as 0.
2.4.3. Heterogeneity analysis
Based on conversations with experts of the local situation and previous literature
(Anastario, Shebab, and Lawry, 2009), I hypothesize that households with IDP status
(internally displaced people) are particularly likely to develop domestic violence after
the eruption. Households with IDP status had to resettle in the past due to natural
disasters. These households were forced to migrate and often suffer on multiple dimen-
sions in their new environment. In the setting of the sample, many families from the
Huntap community had to move due to the 2010 major outbreak of Mount Merapi. A
family is classified with IDP status if the family has IDP status at any given point in
time during the observational period.
It is hypothesized that they will develop higher rates of domestic violence for three
reasons. First, they are likely to suffer from a reduced livelihood even before treat-
ment. This is because their previous sources of income have either been destroyed
or the displacement forced them to create a new livelihood (While some studies on
Katrina show that this might be beneficial for some, local experts suggest that over-
all living conditions suffer from displacement). These families are thereby likely to
suffer from reduced income, reduced home size and a loss of their previous environ-
ment. Secondly, individuals with IDP status are expected to suffer from a loss of
their social network and thereby social control. Thirdly, the volcano eruptions could
act as traumatic reminders. Although I am not able to show this, I hypothesize that
a re-eruption of Mount Merapi will cause significant trauma to this subpopulation.
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Overstreet et al. (2011) summarizes literature that shows that even anticipation of a
recurrent disaster threat can induce distress. I, therefore, estimate the baseline spec-
ification for both individuals with IDP and without IDP status in two separate models.
2.4.4. Proposed channel of causality
As outlined in the introduction and literature review sections, previous studies found
that the psychological, social and economic consequences of natural disasters cause
mental distress in affected populations. Outward, interpersonal violence and aggres-
sion are one type of reaction of humans exposed to distress. Worsened living conditions
and lack of social networks and thereby social control act as important moderators.
This study follows this proposed causal chain. To test these predictions, I first estimate
the impact of treatment on domestic violence. I then survey four alternative outcomes.
I estimate the treatment effect on two economic outcomes. This is to test whether the
affected population also suffers from economic loss. Secondly, I estimate the treat-
ment effect on alcohol/drug abuse and emotional well-being. I argue that both are
associated with mental distress (Alcohol abuse has also been associated with IPV).23
A heterogeneity analysis with a subsample of individuals with IDP status estimates
the treatment effect of people that lack a social network.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Change in domestic violence prevalence
I estimate the change in the prevalence of domestic violence with a difference-in-
differences model using fixed effects estimates (A Hausman test rejects the equivalence
of random effects). Column 1 of table 2.2 presents the results of a fixed effects model
without controls. Column two shows fixed effects estimates with a minimum set of
controls, including quarter and village as well as caregiver age group dummies. Column
three shows estimates from a fixed effects model with full controls, adding an indication
of received types of NGO support, time since admission to SOS and number of children
living in the household. Treatment is defined as living in an exposed community during
and post the first volcano eruption. Results suggest an increase of approximately 2.2
23. Bech et al. (2003) discuss the relationship between mental distress and well-being. Bueno and
Henderson (2017) explore the association of IPV with alcohol abuse.
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percentage points in domestic violence after the event of an earthquake. Compared
to the low baseline level, this is a very meaningful increase. The effect size does vary
slightly between estimation approaches and is found in random effects as well as fixed
effects models. Figure 2.5 shows treatment coefficients over time.
Table 2.2.: Baseline model: effect of volcano eruptions experience on domestic
violence
Dependent variable:
domestic violence
(1) (2) (3)
No
controls
Minimum
controls
Full
controls
(Baseline
model)
Treatment 0.030∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.002∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.017) (0.026)
Time dummies X X
Programme dummies X X
Age group dummies X X
Support dummies X
Time since
admission and
no. of children
X
Observations 12,169 12,128 12,128
Adj.R2 0.016 0.058 0.067
Clusters 4 4 4
Family level
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Standard erros
clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Difference-in-differences estimate with family fixed-effects; Depen-
dent variable: domestic violence (yes = 1/no = 0); Robust standard er-
rors are clustered at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
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Figure 2.5.: Baseline model:
effect of volcano eruptions experience on domestic violence over time
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Difference-in-differences estimate with family fixed-effects; Dependent variable: domestic vio-
lence in treated vs. non-treated regions. Estimated coefficient: interaction of treatment and time.
Controls: caregiver age group, regional control, number of children, support, time since admission;
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at regional level; First Eruption: marking the
first eruption of Mount Merapi; Main Eruption: main eruptions of Mount Merapi and Mount
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2.5.2. Change in alternative outcomes
Changes in the four alternative outcomes support the hypothesis that the volcano
eruptions lead to a decrease in material and emotional well-being. I find an adverse
effect of treatment on average household expenditure while the individual living con-
ditions do not change. The latter result might also be influenced by the fact that the
sample receives economic interventions (See discussion in section 2.6). Importantly,
the first outcome variable is measured on macro-level, while the latter is measured on
household level. The treatment coefficient is negative for emotional well-being. It is
positive and significant for alcohol/drug abuse negatively affecting families. The small
effect of the latter outcome has to be interpreted in light of the overall low rates of
alcohol/drug abuse in the overall sample.
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Table 2.3.: Alternative outcomes: effect of volcano eruptions experience on
alternative outcomes
Alternative outcomes:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household
expenditure
Household
living
conditions
Emotional
well-being
Alcohol/
drug
abuse
Treatment -0.054∗∗∗ -0.059 -0.067∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.053) (0.017) (0.000)
Time s. Prog. Adm. -0.002 0.010 0.004 0.001
(0.001) (0.013) (0.019) (0.001)
Constant 13.553∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.006
(0.020) (.) (.) (0.011)
Time dummies X X X X
Programme dummies X X X X
Age group dummies X X X X
No. of children X X X X
Observations 7,207 11,134 11,583 12,128
Adj.R2
Clusters 4 4 4 4
Family level
random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard erros
clustered
at regional Level
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Difference-in-differences estimate with family random-effects; Dependent variable: column
1: log of household expenditure in IDR (measured at regency-/city-level), column 2: living conditions
(measured at micro level, scale of 1 to 4, where 4 is good), column 3: emotional well-being (scale of
1 to 4, where 4 is good), column 4: alcohol/drug abuse affects family (yes = 1/no = 0) respectively,
see appendix section B.1 for exact scales and definitions of variables; Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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2.5.3. Heterogeneity analysis: domestic violence prevalence
among internally displaced people (IDP)
I find that households that are classified as internally displaced people (IDP) have a
significantly larger chance of displaying domestic violence. The estimated effect size is
roughly four to five times that of non-IDP households. This suggests that IDP families
are at more substantial risk of developing domestic violence. Unobserved pretreatment
heterogeneity of IDP vs. Non-IDP households is accounted for by fixed effects.
2.6. Identification concerns and robustness checks
Multiple concerns potentially threaten the validity of correct identification of the treat-
ment effect. In the following section, I will discuss them and several robustness checks
to address the concerns where possible.
Sample selection and attrition. The sample is particularly vulnerable to fam-
ily breakdown compared to the general population. Its selection into a programme
by SOS Children’s Villages happens based on its assessed risk of family breakdown.
While this renders the sample not representative of the Indonesian population, it is of
particular relevance for policymakers. Due to its vulnerability, the sample is often the
primary target group for emergency programs. Reactions of this group hence remain
relevant for policy design. We only use individuals that have been present for the core
of the observational period. Selective attrition from the program can upward bias the
estimates. However, only 5.3 percent of all observations are omitted because they left
the program before the end of the observational period. This indicates that selective
attrition is not responsible for the observed effects. The remaining number of observa-
tions is comparably stable over time (see appendix table B.4). Throughout the years
2013 and 2014 the number of families remains at around 900 and gradually decreases
thereafter.
Interviewer behavior. By definition, a natural disaster is a visible event. This
event might affect interviewer behavior as well. The thoroughness by which interviews
were conducted and the attention of social workers to signs of violence might have
been influenced. This would upward bias reporting of domestic violence as discussed
in Sekhri and Storeygard (2014). I cannot entirely reject this hypothesis. However,
two arguments increase the likelihood that the results are not entirely driven by ob-
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Table 2.4.: Heterogeneity analysis: effect of volcano eruptions experience on
domestic violence prevalence by internally displaced people (IDP) status
Dependent variable:
domestic violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No IDP status
no
controls
IDP status
no
controls
No IDP status
full
controls
IDP status
full
controls
Treatment 0.020∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.018)
Constant 0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.119)
Quarter dummies X X
Programme dummies X X
Age group dummies X X
Support dummies X X
Time since
admission and
no. of children
X X
Observations 10,763 1,084 10,740 1,066
Adj.R2 0.0091 0.062 0.042 0.23
Clusters 4 3 4 3
Family fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard erros
clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Difference-in-differences estimate with family fixed-effects; Dependent variable: domestic violence
(yes/no); sample split by previous IDP experience; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at re-
gional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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servational sensitivity. First, the identified results in domestic violence fit the overall
development of related variables. In addition to domestic violence, I also find increases
in alcohol/drug abuse prevalence rates and reductions in emotional well-being. Fur-
thermore, the full sample is restricted to families who have been admitted previously
to the event. This implies that the same questionnaire has been filled for on average
5 to 6 years before the eruption happened. I expect that this long-term exposure to
the organization and interviewers will increase the likelihood of accurate, trust-based
reporting and detection of domestic violence.
Related to this is a concern associated with the main outcome variable. Domestic
violence is indicated by a simple binary variable reflecting the overall presence of do-
mestic violence within a family. This issue limits the overall depth of insight that can
be gained from this study, apart from potential backlash identification issues. How-
ever, as Reading (2008) point out, there is a high correlation between different forms
of domestic violence. From a humanitarian point of view, it is also relevant to detect
and prevent violence in general, irrespective of the actor and victim.
Caregiver attributes. Most variables of interest are collected at the household
level (for instance domestic violence, alcohol/drug abuse, living conditions). However,
variables like caregiver age and emotional well-being are collected at the level of the
caregiver. In some cases, the primary caregiver changes. It is hypothesized that this
occurs (mostly) not due to death or divorce but dependent on which parent has been
interviewed. To test the relevance of switching caregivers, the baseline model is only
estimated for households that report a male primary caregiver (This does neither im-
ply, that excluded households are led by female singles, nor that the primary male
caregivers are single). I find a positive treatment effect suggesting an increase in do-
mestic violence. This effect is smaller compared to the one found when using the full
sample. See appendix table B.8 for the model.
Simultaneous treatment (eruption and support). A related concern is associ-
ated with the disaster and regular support programs that the sample has received.
Interventions might bias outcomes. While other opinions exist, Cavallo et al. (2013)
posit that post-disaster aid commonly covers only a minor share of real damages in
affected communities. Nonetheless, the data on living conditions might be upward
biased. That is, compared to other vulnerable groups, due to sample selection, the
sample might benefit from more (disaster) support than otherwise equally vulnerable
groups that do not receive support. It is not observed how families behaved that re-
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ceived no support at all. It is also not possible to distinguish between disaster and
regular support. However, even these outcomes are informative. It is of interest what
happens in light of intervention, as scenarios with intervention are more common in
most countries than non-intervention. Yet, this study cannot comment on whether this
specific set of interventions increased domestic violence due to male backlash. Observ-
ing overall economic and family-level data suggests that domestic violence is associated
with worsening economic conditions. However, the data do not provide information on
relative income shares within families and the association between relative economic
power and domestic violence.
Assignment to treatment group. Assignment to treatment is identified via maps
provided by disaster aid organizations and additional reasoning. I do not have GPS lo-
cation information on single households but identify via the location of the community
the household is assigned to. The communities are then located as single points on the
map and matched to disaster data. Certain villagers might live further away outside of
the treatment area and thereby experience less treatment. This could downward bias
the results. To check the robustness of the results to the exclusion of mildly affected
treatment areas, the communities located in Kabupaten Gunungkidul are excluded.
Results are robust to limiting the treatment sample to the resulting smaller sample
size (see appendix table B.10).
Pre-treatment differences of control and treatment group. As argued, com-
pared to the control group, the treatment group is on average less educated and suffers
from lower living conditions, inter alia (see table 2.1). While overall household expen-
diture per capita is at a similar level (see figure 2.3), the variation in observables
might cast doubt on the adequacy of the comparison of treatment and control group.
As pointed out earlier, pre-treatment differences would only threaten difference-in-
differences identification if they lead to a violation of the common trend assumption.
I run a synthetic control approach to test whether the post-treatment trends are rooted
in the worse socioeconomic position of the treatment group compared to the control
group. The approach has been pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) to evaluate the effects of policy interven-
tions and civil conflict. Cavallo et al. (2013) were first to employ it for the identification
of natural disaster effects. It creates a weighted average of control units to create a new
synthetic control group, which then parallels the treatment group in its pretreatment
features.
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The results suggest that the negative post-treatment development of the treatment
region is not founded on pretreatment differences of control and treatment groups.
The synthesized control groups that have been created based on the pre-treatment
trends of the treatment group develop more positively than the treatment group in all
cases. Results are reported in the in appendix figure B.1.
2.7. Discussion
This study does not allow to comment on whether male backlash theories or bargain-
ing models provide a better explanation for violence in the aftermath. However, a
net increase in violence is observed. The overall rates of observed violence are in line
with the previous literature. Domestic violence does not level off over time. This is
in accordance with previous reviews that have shown a mixed picture with respect to
the persistence of PTSD in the aftermath of disasters (Neria, Nandi, and Galea, 2008).
The overall results tie in with previous research that suggests an increase in PTSD
following disasters and propose violence as one channel of how individuals react to
existential stress and a challenged livelihood (Rezaeian, 2013). The four alternative
outcomes support this theory. Previous hypotheses by Nilan et al. (2014) who point
out the association between violence and the (self-perceived) male inability to satisfy
female (economic) expectations are supported as well.
Families who have been displaced in the past are facing a particular risk of develop-
ing domestic violence. This longitudinal observation confirms previous post-disaster
cross-sectional observations in a hurricane-related IDP context (Anastario, Shebab,
and Lawry, 2009). It also alludes to the findings by Berkowitz (1993) who propose
that a lack of social control will lead to higher rates of domestic violence (Curtis,
Miller, and Berry (2000) discuss this in the specific context of natural disasters). Indi-
viduals with IDP status live outside of their previous social environment and are hence
subject to less social control. The findings also confirm with Warsini et al. (2014), who
documented higher rates of distress in survivor communities around Mount Merapi,
which are the communities that individuals with IDP status come from. The high
rates of domestic violence suggest that individuals with IDP status should be tracked
closely following their displacement.
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Appendix table B.6 supports the previous findings. The table offers a comparison of
families in the treatment region by their domestic violence status. Families that show
domestic violence in the aftermath of the disaster also report below average emotional
well-being. We also find significantly higher rates of documented alcohol/drug abuse
at a rate of 15 percent. These differences within the treatment group hint at the va-
lidity of the previously proposed channels.
2.8. Conclusion
This study’s results suggest an association between natural disasters and domestic
violence. In the aftermath of two volcano eruptions, I find an increase in domestic
violence, a reduction in emotional well-being and a strong relationship between do-
mestic violence and IDP status. A synthetic control approach supports the robustness
of findings. The unique data thereby offer a longitudinal perspective on a particularly
vulnerable group. As such, it is the first family level panel dataset from a developing
country. Causal identification might suffer from multiple shortcomings in the data.
While there is no final causal certainty that domestic violence has been caused by the
stress induced by volcano eruptions, I argue that one has good reason to investigate the
relationship further and act preemptively from a policy perspective. This could also
result in providing (further) special assistance to families with IDP status. Findings
should encourage the collection of more evidence and a potential increase in sensitivity
of disaster aid workers for a prevalence of domestic violence in post-disaster areas.
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3.1. Introduction
The importance of education for individual prosperity (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1998;
Rosenzweig, 1995) and economic growth (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2015; Mankiw,
Romer, and Weil, 1992) is undisputed. However, what determines educational achieve-
ment itself? There has been ongoing debate on the influence of individual determi-
nants of educational achievement, such as individual aptitude (Rowe, Vesterdal, and
Rodgers, 1998), parental attributes (Desforges and Abouchaar, 2003; Harris, 2008),
teacher quality (Darling-Hammond, 2000), and their collective dynamics (Belley and
Lochner, 2007; Cameron and Heckman, 2001; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006).
Part of this debate centers around the impact of birth order effects. A rich body of
research documents that firstborns in high-income countries tend to fare better across
a range of life outcomes, like IQ, height, and all-cause mortality. Studies show that
the same holds true for educational achievement. For example, Black, Devereux, and
Salvanes (2005) find that secondborns receive on average four months less of education
than their first-born siblings.
While the general existence of birth order effects in high-income countries is widely
acknowledged, there is substantial debate over why birth order effects exist (Barclay
and Myrskylä, 2014; Kristensen and Bjerkedal, 2007), and what might explain hetero-
geneity in findings in low- and middle-income countries (De Haan, Plug, and Rosero,
2014). Some studies with data from low- and middle-income countries demonstrate re-
versed birth order effects, that is better outcomes for later-born children. For example,
evidence from South America (De Haan, Plug, and Rosero, 2014; Emerson and Souza,
2008; Lafortune and Lee, 2014) and Asia (Ejrnæs and Portner, 2004) proposes positive
birth order effects, implying better educational outcomes for later-born children. As
De Haan, Plug, and Rosero (2014) point out, there is a need for more evidence from
low- and middle-income countries.
This study addresses these gaps in the literature by employing novel and unique data.
It is the first one to provide evidence from a broad set of low- and middle-income
countries across multiple continents. Overall results indicate that birth order effects
in low- and middle-income countries are consistent with those in high-income coun-
tries. Higher educational achievement for firstborns is identified when estimating the
relationship for the full sample. A second analysis of heterogeneity suggests reasons
for why previous studies might have found contradictory results. Three sources of het-
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erogeneity are surveyed. Extreme hardship, parental gender preferences, and tutoring
between siblings are identified as moderators of birth order effects.
I use a novel dataset covering 26,898 observations of 4,362 biologically related siblings
living in long-term alternative care families in 54 countries. The data are provided
by a global childcare NGO which places children and young adults in alternative care
families. In these families, children live together with their biological siblings, one
non-biological mother and up to eight non-biological siblings.1 Individuals living in
these families have parents who passed away or who are no longer able to take care of
them. This dataset is particularly valuable as it spans across several continents and
permits the observation of family structures where biological and social birth order
coexist.
Findings suggest that sibships that have suffered extreme economic or emotional hard-
ship (for instance sexual abuse, domestic violence) show attenuated birth order effects
compared to other sibships. This is compatible with previous evidence indicating effect
diminishment and reversal for households of low socioeconomic status in high-income
countries and reversed birth order effects in low- and middle-income countries. Indi-
vidual hardship within a society seems to be as relevant as differences in development
between societies. Gender-specific effects are identified for Asia, where the firstborn
advantage is significantly smaller for girls, compared to boys, suggesting parental gen-
der preferences. These effects are mainly driven by data from India, a country with a
widespread preference for male offspring.
Intra-family comparisons of biologically unrelated children of the same biological birth
order provide suggestive evidence that supports the existence of tutoring effects be-
tween unrelated siblings. Holding biological birth order constant, I find superior out-
comes for older children ranked higher in their alternative care family. I propose more
tutoring opportunities as a potential explanation. This evidence is only suggestive
as large standard errors prevent statements on statistically significant differences be-
tween children of the same biological birth order. The finding is consistent with the
confluence model – one possible explanation for birth order effects. The confluence
model attributes birth order effects to changing dynamics of social interaction within
the family; of which tutoring between children is one element.
1. The NGO takes full custody of the children admitted into villages on a long-term basis. The
family-like care approach is one type of alternative care. It can be thought of as a hybrid of a foster
model and adoption. It emulates a family environment. It will be referred to by the general term of
alternative care.
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These findings advance the debates on determinants of educational achievement and
the formation of human capital in low- and middle-income countries. They also sug-
gest reasons for how and when intra-family differences emerge. Some evidence points
to the possible existence of tutoring effects. Larger (alternative care) families could
particularly benefit from exploring tutoring as a way to let children grow personally
and intellectually. The results can inform policy making and development interven-
tions by helping to prioritize individuals in highest need.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. First, I will provide an
overview of the related literature. I focus on existing theories to explain birth order
effects and summarize previous empirical evidence, with a particular focus on low- and
middle-income countries. I will then describe the data and the estimation strategy.
Subsequently, I will present the results on classic birth order effects between biological
siblings for the full sample. I will then split the sample by experience of hardship and
estimate this relationship again. This will be followed by an analysis on the interaction
of gender and firstborn status with a regional split. Subsequently, I will show the
results of an analysis comparing biologically unrelated siblings of the same biological
birth order. I will conclude by relating results to previous literature, discussing their
external as well as internal validity and deriving policy implications.
3.2. Theory and empirical evidence on birth order
effects
This section presents theories to explain birth order effects (section 3.2.1), empirical
evidence in general (section 3.2.2) and findings from low- and middle-income countries
in specific (section 3.2.2). An emphasis will be on studies that used samples similar to
this one. Critics have challenged the existence of birth order effects and the methods
employed to analyze them. A selection of their objections will be covered as well.
I will conclude that first approaches to elucidate the mixed evidence in low- and middle-
income countries exist. A lack of multi-country studies and the ambiguous empirical
evidence call for studies that allow to further compare outcomes across countries and
elaborate on the direction of birth order effects in low- and middle-income countries
(De Haan, Plug, and Rosero, 2014).
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3.2.1. Theories to explain birth order effects
This section presents three main theories that explain why birth order effects surface:
(i) resource dilution theory, (ii) confluence theory, and (iii) immunoreactive theory.
(i) Resource dilution theory attributes superior outcomes for earlier-born children to
the gradual dilution of parental resources with every additional child being born into
the family. (ii) Confluence theory posits that within-family social dynamics are an
important factor to explain birth order effects. Throughout their lives, firstborns are
exposed to an environment of higher average intellectual maturity, compared to later-
borns. (iii) Immunoreactive theory attributes these effects to biological causes, namely
mothers’ biological reactions to the male fetus. It is important to note that these three
theories could hold true in parallel: the verification of one will not falsify the other.
(i) Resource dilution theory. Resource dilution theory is based on the assump-
tion that parents’ resources, such as attention and financial means, are divided among
children living in a household. Hence, they dilute with every additional child.2 The
firstborn will benefit from access to the highest average amount of resources (Blake,
1981; Downey, 2001). This effect is amplified by the fact that investments during
early childhood are expected to be more productive than investments later on in life
(Cunha and Heckman, 2009). Based on American Time Use Survey data, Price (2008)
finds that first-born children experience 20 to 30 minutes of average additional quality
time per day compared to secondborns at the same age in similar families due to an
equal split of parental time amongst siblings. Also, active discrimination by parents
can augment birth order effects (Findings will be presented in the empirical litera-
ture review, section 3.2.2). Downey (2001) propose that a strong argument in favor
of resource dilution theory is the low likelihood of the null hypothesis being true. It
appears unlikely that neither parental resources nor the number of siblings in a house-
hold carries any impact on a child’s development.
(ii) Confluence theory. The confluence model is based on the conceptualization of
the family as an intellectual environment that follows complex dynamics. It has been
first described by Zajonc and Markus (1975). The model is based on the assumption
that the child’s intellectual development is partly driven by the dynamics of its social
environment’s average intellectual maturity. The authors argue that firstborns bene-
2. This alludes to Becker and Lewis (1973), who described the quality vs. quantity trade-off that
parents are facing regarding their offspring.
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fit, all other things equal, from a household age which is on average higher compared
to that of younger siblings. Siblings are understood as important peers, and child
development is analyzed on the grounds of this peer structure and changes thereof.
Moreover, older siblings are expected to benefit from a tutoring effect, namely by re-
inforcing their skills via teaching them to younger siblings. An important aspect is
that this firstborn advantage is dynamic and not a linear function of birth order. As
such, it depends on the individual’s and their siblings’ age. The model suggests a
positive association between birth order and achievement from a crossover age of 11
+/-2 onwards (Zajonc and Mullally, 1997; Zajonc and Sulloway, 2007). The crossover
age describes the age at which earlier-born siblings start to particularly benefit from
tutoring their later-born siblings, resulting in more pronounced negative birth order
effects. The authors propose that this also explains conflicting findings in other studies
dependent on the respective sample’s average age. An additional dimension associated
with variation in effect sizes is that of age spacing between siblings (Zajonc, 1976).
Confluence theory has received substantial criticism. Galbraith (1982) point out that
the model is unable to explain observed birth order effects in French data. For conflu-
ence theory to explain birth order effects, spacing would be required to be substantially
longer than it is in reality. Furthermore, Galbraith (1982) posit that the model is not
able to explain the finding that in France, positive birth order effects (improved out-
comes for later siblings) occur in conjunction with negative family size effects (worse
outcomes for larger families). Retherford and Sewell (1991) show that the confluence
model provides a poor fit if within-family data is used (as opposed to between-family
estimation) – a finding seconded by others (Rodgers, 1984; Wichman, Rodgers, and
Maccallum, 2006).3
(iii) Immunoreactive theory. The final and third type of explanation for birth
order effects is based on immunoreactive theory (IMRT) (Gualtieri and Hicks, 1985).
Immunoreactive theory hypothesizes that maternal antibody reactions grow stronger
with increasing birth order. The authors argue that the male fetus with its particular,
male genetic attributes causes maternal antibody attacks on the fetal brain. These,
in turn, affect male fitness negatively. The reactions are expected to grow stronger for
later-born male children with the female body learning from the first male fetus and
developing stronger anti-body attacks over time. Findings of Kristensen and Bjerkedal
(2007) and Barclay (2015) cast doubt on whether biological explanations in general
and IMRT-based approaches in specific help to explain birth order effects. In their
3. Retherford and Sewell (1991) are also not able to replicate the findings with a between-family
estimation and a representative sample for the United States of America.
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landmark study, Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2007) show that second-born men whose
biologically older brothers passed away before reaching the age of one resemble first-
borns in their achievements. The argument is that the passing of their older brothers
renders them biological secondborns but social firstborns.
Apart from theory-specific criticism, birth order research has been subject to general
objections that question the validity of employed research methods to study birth or-
der effects. Spurious association theories attribute IQ related birth order effects to the
analysis of between-family data (Kanazawa, 2012). However, as shown by Sulloway
(2007), these theories are unable to provide explanations for various phenomena, such
as the observable distinction between biological and functional causes of birth order
effects (Kristensen and Bjerkedal, 2007) or the role of age spacing in explaining birth
order differences (Buckles and Munnich, 2012). Another objection is based on the
observation that the decision to receive a second child is not independent of the out-
come of the first pregnancy. This endogenous relationship could serve as an alternative
explanation for the firstborn advantage (Ejrnæs and Portner, 2004). However, Bagger
et al. (2013) and Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2010) use instruments to account for
endogeneity in fertility decision-making and show that birth order effects are robust
to this specification.
In light of the findings by Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2007), I consider two theories
as possible explanations for birth order effects in the context of this sample: resource
dilution theory and confluence theory.
3.2.2. Empirical evidence on birth order effects
In the following, I provide a selection of studies that have particular relevance to this
one, focusing on studies associating differences in educational achievement with birth
order effects. Furthermore, I will summarize findings of studies that employ data that
share peculiarities comparable to this sample, namely a non-biological family setting,
above average sibship size, and a low- and middle-income country environment. I do
not discuss criticism of empirical birth order effects research in-depth. Schooler (1972),
Galbraith (1982), and Kanazawa (2012) offer some of the main arguments that have
been brought forward by critics.
Ability and educational achievement in biological families. Belmont and
Marolla (1973), Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2011), Calimeris and Peters (2017),
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and Kristensen and Bjerkedal (2007) explore the relationship between birth order,
ability and educational achievement. Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2011) estimate
the IQs of first-born children to be three percent higher than those of second-born
children. Confirming evidence has been recognized in regard to negative educational
outcomes for higher birth order ranks (Barclay, 2015; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes,
2005; Haan, 2010; Kantarevic and Mechoulan, 2006). This has been established for
biological siblings (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005; Härkönen, 2014) and adop-
tive sibship groups alike (Barclay, 2015).
Ability and educational achievement in alternative care families. In their
study on children growing up with adoptive parents, Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug
(2006) argue that both adoptive and biological families carry features that are impor-
tant for outcomes but that the influence of biological and adoptive parents varies by
type of the observed determinant (for instance parental education, gender, income).
Beckett et al. (2006) and Lindblad, Hjern, and Vinnerljung (2003) associate positive
cognitive development with an earlier child age at adoption. While Hjern, Lindblad,
and Vinnerljung (2002) identify substantial differences in psychosocial life outcomes
of adopted children compared to non-adopted children, Barclay (2015) can replicate
birth order effects in alternative care families living in Sweden. Finally, there is an
overlap between adoption studies and studies on peer effects because sibling interac-
tions in large sibship groups are comparable to peer interactions.4 Scholars have been
able to show that the behavior, societal background and educational performance of
peers can change individual attainment in both directions (Ammermueller and Pis-
chke, 2009; Sacerdote, 2014). Sacerdote (2011) estimates the influence of peers on par
with other important determinants, such as class size (Biddle and Berliner, 2002) or
teacher quality (Darling-Hammond, 2000). While most peer research focuses on class-
mates, similar effects have also been estimated for cohorts living in close-knit settings
comparable to SOS Children’s Villages (Carrell, Fullerton, and West, 2009).
Sibship size and spacing. Multiple studies find sibship size to be negatively as-
sociated with educational attainment (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2010; Blake,
1981). Rodgers et al. (2000) were the first to show that large families do not imply
lower ability per se. Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005) found that educational
attainment gaps between larger and smaller families disappeared once birth order ef-
4. In SOS Children’s Villages, children are exposed to biologically unrelated siblings inside their
new family’s house and other children living in the same village but in separate houses. Both groups
form a peer environment.
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fects were taken into account. According to the authors, it is fertility decisions of
low socioeconomic status parents that cause mediocre outcomes for larger families, ce-
teris paribus. However, the same authors found mixed evidence in a later publication
(Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2010). Other scholars find a reversal (Davis, Cahan,
and Bashi, 1977) or total disappearance of birth order effects (Kanazawa, 2012) if
family size is considered. Building on confluence theory, Zajonc and Mullally (1997)
predict a reversal of effects between first and secondborns at a turnover age of 11 +/- 2
years, and for final life outcomes, a persistent advantage for firstborns and a persistent
disadvantage for lastborns, irrespective of sibship size.
Controlling for sibship size, the spacing of siblings continues to provide a potential
force influencing birth order effects. Zajonc (1976) predicts varying birth order effects
dependent on age spacing of siblings – with a generally positive association of indi-
vidual outcomes and spacing. Buckles and Munnich (2012) find a positive effect of
spacing on older siblings only. The evidence remains mixed as other studies propose
a null effect of spacing (Belmont, Stein, and Zybert, 1978; Black, Devereux, and Sal-
vanes, 2010).
Birth order effects in low- and middle-income countries and low-income
families in high-income countries
Evidence in low- and middle-income countries is heterogeneous (Mechoulan and Wolff,
2015). Studies from South America (De Haan, Plug, and Rosero, 2014; Emerson and
Souza, 2008; Lafortune and Lee, 2014) and Asia (Ejrnæs and Portner, 2004) find
positive birth order effects, suggesting better educational outcomes for later-born chil-
dren. Conversely, Moshoeshoe (2016), Hammitt, Liu, and Tsou (2012) and Calimeris
and Peters (2017) find negative birth order effects in Lesotho, Taiwan and Indonesia
respectively.
Amongst others, three potential explanations exist for these ambiguous findings: vari-
ation in family resources, child labor and parental discrimination/selective investment
or a combination thereof. All three factors differ regarding their total and relative levels
in low- and middle-income countries compared to high-income countries. Moshoeshoe
(2016) proposes family wealth as a determinant of within-country variation of birth
order effects in low- and middle-income countries. Lafortune and Lee (2014) find that
positive birth order effects are attenuated by increasing family assets in Mexico. In
low- and middle-income countries, wealth can be thought of as a proxy for the neces-
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sity to send earlier-born children off to work early, potentially leading to their sub-par
educational achievement. Where present, child labor effects confirm this hypothesis.
Emerson and Souza (2008) attribute positive birth order effects in low- and middle-
income countries to higher rates of child labor among earlier-born children. According
to Emerson and Souza (2008) and Edmonds (2006), earlier-born children tend to en-
gage more in child labor compared to their younger siblings and receive less education
in consequence.
Besides child labor and wealth, variation in parental investments will moderate birth
order effects, leading to birth order variation by country and culture. Jayachandran
and Kuziemko (2011) show that mothers in India engage in shorter breastfeeding spells
if the first-born child is female. The authors offer cultural gender preferences as an
explanation. This has been confirmed by Fors and Lindskog (2017), who find nega-
tive birth order effects in India and inferior outcomes for first-born girls compared to
first-born boys. So do Lafortune and Lee (2014) for South Korea. Ejrnæs and Portner
(2004) treat fertility decisions as endogenous and find positive birth order effects on the
Philippines. Multiple authors document other forms of discrimination. Mechoulan and
Wolff (2015) observe parental discrimination with respect to the allocation of financial
resources and gifts. Hotz and Pantano (2015) find weaker sanctioning towards later-
born siblings, who do not meet the expectations of their parents. De Haan, Plug, and
Rosero (2014) document less parental quality time for earlier-born children in Ecuador.
The first study that has used multi-country data from low- and middle-income coun-
tries is that of Tenikue and Verheyden (2010).5 The authors explore wealth and child
labor as potential explanations for birth order patterns. However, their data do not
indicate whether any young adults have left the household already. Arguably, this
threatens the identification of birth order effects. Moshoeshoe (2016) shows how this
factor is likely to bias results.
In high-income countries, multiple studies confirmed that low-income families tend to
show the most pronounced positive birth order effects, implying better outcomes for
later-born siblings (De Haan, Plug, and Rosero, 2014; Lafortune and Lee, 2014). For
families with low income in high-income countries, Bonesrønning and Massih (2011)
and Lafortune and Lee (2014) find smaller and reversed birth order effects. In South
Korea, the US and Mexico, Lafortune and Lee (2014) document more years of educa-
5. Lafortune and Lee (2014) use a multi-country dataset from one middle-income country (Mexico)
and two high-income countries (South Korea and the United States of America).
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tion for firstborns in families with higher educated fathers, while the opposite holds
true for families with fathers without formal education. Bonesrønning and Massih
(2011) find some evidence for more pronounced birth order effects in families with
highly educated mothers.
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3.3. Empirical strategy
3.3.1. Data
The data are provided by SOS Children’s Villages, an international NGO. The NGO
operates as a federation with national organizations in 133 territories and headquarters
in Innsbruck, Austria. Its budget exceeded one billion US Dollars in 2015. Individ-
ual donors, corporations as well as governments and other institutions are the main
funders. The NGO runs two main childcare programs in addition to a multitude of
services along the themes of education, health care, and emergency response.
The two care programs combined serve a total of 553,600 beneficiaries worldwide (SOS
Children’s Villages International, 2016). The larger program by the number of ben-
eficiaries is the family strengthening program with 467,400 beneficiaries. It provides
interventions to improve childcare and prevent the breakdown of biological families.
The second program, called family based care provides care to 86,200 beneficiaries
who have lost parental care or whose parents are no longer able to take care of them.
Children live in so-called villages. Their educational achievement is the subject of this
study.
Before admission, the organization determines a child’s need for alternative care by
means of a standardized process. Children are admitted on the grounds of four poten-
tial reasons for admission: loss of either one or both parents, the inability of caregivers
to take care, the referral from another care placement or child abandonment. Table
C.12 in the appendix displays the share of each reason for admission by region. After a
positive admission decision, SOS admits children to a village, where they will become
part of a family.
Families typically consist of one caregiver and up to ten children. The vast majority
of caregivers is female and working full time for SOS Children’s Villages in the func-
tional equivalent of a biological mother. Assignment to a specific family depends on
child-mother interaction during an initial trial period. Importantly, biological siblings
are never split up between two families. About ten families form one village. Villages
provide additional infrastructures such as schools, sports facilities, and the village’s
head office. Whether children have access to a school on site varies by location. Once
children are grown up and self-sustaining, they will move out, and new children enter
the family.
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Data for this study are obtained from a central program database which provides
data for the vast majority of all children living in SOS Children’s Villages in low- and
middle-income countries. Data are collected at village level monthly. A committee of
social workers, head of the village and other representatives of the respective national
organization is responsible for the collection of data, and for tracking educational
achievement. Commonly, data collection is paper-based with subsequent data entry
into a computer. Alternative care mothers can provide input, but a committee makes
the final decision on performance.6
The data provide the following information on all individuals: A codified surname and
first name, an individual’s gender and date of birth, their reason and date of admis-
sion. Besides, detailed reason for admission is available for some reasons for admission.
The database offers information on the house, village, and home country of an indi-
vidual. Educational performance is tracked on a scale from one to four, where four
is a good outcome. The variable will be described in more detail in the next section.
Appendix section C.1 provides the exact wording. According to related literature, it
will be referred to by educational achievement. For caregivers, full names are avail-
able. The study is based on panel data obtained from collection cycles from September
2014 through September 2016. For this timespan, data is retrieved at the end of each
quarter. Applying all exclusion restrictions results in 26,898 observations, from 4,362
individuals, living in 54 countries. The motivation to use multiple observations per
person is that the primary independent variable of interest (biological birth order) is
time-invariant and secondly, that multiple outcome observations increase statistical
power.
All figures presented in the following refer to the sample after application of exclusion
restrictions. Appendix table C.10 provides a detailed overview of the number of ob-
servations per country, and grading distributions within countries after application of
exclusion restrictions. The average age of children in the sample is 12 with a standard
deviation of 3.5 years. The final sample contains a slightly higher percentage of female
children (52 percent). On average, children have been admitted at the age of 6.4 with
a standard deviation of 3.1 years. The highest number of observations included in the
sample is Asian (17,577), followed by children from Latin America (5,121) and Africa
(4,200).
6. Not all villages can offer a full committee. In these cases, a social worker will carry out data
collection and data entry.
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The average number of children analyzed per biological sibship is 2.4 (SD = 0.7). The
equivalent figure for alternative care sibships is 9.5 (SD = 2.2). On average, children
have spent 46 percent of their life in SOS care.7 Further descriptive statistics for
first-, second-, and thirdborns with a split by region can be found in appendix tables
C.4, C.5, C.6 respectively. Unfortunately, the data do not provide further parental
background information, that goes beyond the child’s reason for admission. Parental
information such as employment status or age would be desirable.
Table 3.1.: Descriptive statistics for children by birth order rank
Firstborns Secondborns
Third-
or
higherborns
Full
sample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Outcome variable:
Educational achievement 3.02 0.73 3.02 0.72 3.07 0.71 3.03 0.73
Individual characteristics:
Age 13.65 3.17 11.16 3.12 9.75 2.76 12.02 3.46
Age at entry 7.77 3.06 5.54 2.75 4.54 2.46 6.35 3.13
Gender = female 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.50
No. bio. siblings 2.30 0.57 2.30 0.57 3.22 0.42 2.44 0.66
No. all siblings 9.50 2.17 9.50 2.17 9.61 2.18 9.52 2.17
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.42 0.22 0.49 0.24 0.52 0.25 0.46 0.23
Reason for admission:
Abandonment 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34
Death of parents 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48
Referral 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14
Inability caregiver 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41
Observations 11,693 11,693 2,871 26,898
Notes: Data describes final sample after application of sampling restrictions (see appendix); Variable definitions:
Age at entry = age at which the child has been admitted; Gender = Variable that is one for girls and zero for boys;
No. siblings bio. only = number of biological siblings; No. all siblings = number of all siblings in alternative care
family; Lifeshare spent in SOS care = Number of years in SOS alternative care divided by age; Referral = referral
from another care placement; Inability caregiver = inability of caregiver to take care of child.
Siblings are assigned to biological sibships based on the codified identifier that the
database operator assigned per surname per household. The accuracy of the match-
ing of identified sibships is assured through several quality checks. First, the date of
entry and reason for admission must be identical across all siblings. If both variables
are not identical across the sibship, all those sibships are excluded, who either carry
the same surname as their caregiver or that show contradicting reasons for admission
within a sibship. Individuals who share a surname with their caregiver are excluded
7. The percentage figure refers to time since admission to any village divided by age.
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because abandoned children and those who were referred from another care place-
ment are sometimes given the name of their primary SOS caregiver. This leads to a
shared surname amongst non-biological siblings. The process for the exclusion of all
cases of contradicting reasons for admission is further detailed in appendix section C.2.
Figure 3.1 displays the central relationship of interest analyzed in this paper. The
figure shows the average educational achievement of children based on age and split by
birth order rank. Firstborns show consistently higher average educational achievement
by age than secondborns.
Figure 3.1.: Lowess smoothing of educational achievement vs. age for first- and
secondborns
Notes: Dependent variable: average educational achievement by age; Lowess smoothing.
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3.3.2. Models
Estimation of baseline model. In the baseline model, educational achievement is
regressed on a biological birth order vector and a set of controls. A pooled OLS esti-
mation approach is used with biological sibship dummies and controls for individual,
biological sibship and alternative care family features as shown in baseline equation
3.1. (Results based on cross section estimations are presented in the appendix.)
Edui,j,k,t = β0+β1BIRTHORDERi+γj+δt+β2Xi+β3XTi,t+ρ1AltCareFamk,t+εi,t
(3.1)
The dependent variable Edui,j,k,t is the educational achievement of child i in sibship
j in alternative care family k at time t. The variable can take on four possible values
from 1 to 4, where 4 is good. The grading scheme uses the four values to indicate poor,
below average, satisfactory and outstanding performance respectively. The appendix
section C.1 presents the exact wording of all four values.
The birth order vector BIRTHORDERi contains the variables of interest and includes
birth order dummies for all birth order ranks but the first one, which is omitted. For
sibships of three siblings, this vector contains dummies for being second-born and be-
ing third-born. For estimations of biological families of more than three members, this
includes dummies for being second-born and being third-born or of higher rank.
γj is a biological sibship dummy for sibship j that is time-invariant and captures unob-
served biological family characteristics. To account for potential grading trends over
time, I introduce time dummies, denoted by δt for each quarter. The vector Xi ac-
counts for an individual’s time-invariant attributes: gender and reason for admission,
while XTi,t denotes time-variant attributes: age and relative lifeshare spent inside SOS
care. Age is coded with a vector of dummies containing one dummy for each possible
age from 3 through 21. Lifeshare spent in SOS is calculated as the number of years in
SOS alternative care divided by age. Finally, the AltCareFamk,t variable denotes the
number of children in an individual’s alternative care family, both biologically related
and unrelated. The baseline model will be estimated for all biological sibship groups
of N < 5 members. An alternative specification will estimate it for sibship pairs of
N = 2. Standard errors are clustered on the level of the individual in all models to
account for the serial correlation of errors within an individual over time.
In addition to the baseline model, I estimate two derivative models to study hetero-
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geneity in birth order effects. The first model divides the full sample by experience of
economic or emotional hardship. The second model introduces a gender interaction
effect and divides the sample by region. In a third derivative model, I estimate a facto-
rial family model that predicts the relationship between biologically unrelated siblings.
Estimation of hardship model. The hardship model is based on the baseline model
equation (1). I split the sample by experience of extreme hardship. The main question
to answer is whether birth order effects persist for children who have suffered extreme
hardship. While all children in this sample have suffered some form of hardship, some
children have experienced extreme hardship. I assess this experience of extreme hard-
ship based on the detailed reason for admission that has been provided for the majority
of children upon admission.8 The list of all detailed reasons for admission is presented
in appendix table C.13.
Two dummies indicate extreme economic and extreme emotional hardship respectively.
Experience of extreme hardship is coded as 0 by default in both cases.9 If the detailed
reason of admission is indicative of either type of hardship, the respective hardship
dummy (economic or emotional) is coded as 1. For the model, the sample is first di-
vided into children who have experienced extreme hardship during their childhood and
those who have not according to the detailed reason for admission. The group without
extreme hardship experience is divided into children whose parents passed away and all
others. For the group with extreme hardship experience, I run three models. The first
model includes all children with emotional hardship experience. The second model
includes all children with economic hardship experience. The third model includes all
children with either of the two types of experience. Importantly, children can have
suffered both economic and emotional hardship.
Estimation of gender split model. The gender split model is based on the baseline
model equation (1). It additionally interacts gender with being first-born. I estimate
it for the full sample and by region. The regional breakdown is motivated by previous
literature finding a strong preference for male offspring in Asia in general and India in
8. The general reason for admission groups are mutually exclusive, that is children will belong
to either of six groups. The detailed reasons are not. There can be multiple detailed reasons for
admission.
9. The default coding of 0 is based on the hypothesis that a missing detailed reason for admission
value indicates that another reason for admission other than the stated one is not given. One might
argue that a missing value is a missing assessment rather than the absence of hardship. In appendix
table C.21 an alternative coding that codes all missing values as missing and drops these observations
is presented.
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specific.
Estimation of the factorial family model. The third derivative model is used
to study educational achievement differences of biologically unrelated siblings, who
are living together in alternative care families. Specifically, I investigate whether it
matters to be the first, second or third oldest child of a specific biological birth order
rank in an alternative care family. This is coded via tuples that identify a children’s
position in their biological and alternative care family.
I identify all potential positions of an individual within both its initial, biological
and its new, alternative care family with the tuple (b,a). The first tuple entry (b) is
equivalent to an individual’s biological birth order rank. This biological birth order
rank reflects an individual’s position in its initial, biological family before admission to
alternative care. All biologically first-born children in the sample are assigned (1,a),
all secondborns are assigned (2,a), and all individuals with biological birth order rank
three or higher are assigned (3,a). The second tuple entry (a) reflects an individual’s
relative position in an alternative care family, given its biological birth order rank.
There are multiple biologically firstborns in an alternative care family, as there are
multiple secondborns, and so forth. Tuple entry (a) denotes the rank of an individual
within their alternative care family, within the group of children of the same biological
birth order rank. Hence, the oldest biologically firstborn in an alternative care family
is assigned rank 1, resulting in the tuple (1,1). The second oldest biologically firstborn
is assigned rank (1,2). All biologically firstborns who are younger than the second
oldest biologically firstborn are assigned rank (1,3).
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Assume that there is a small alternative care family with four children {X,x,Y,y}.
Within this family, {X,x} and {Y,y} form two biological sibships. The age structure of
{X,x,Y,y} in years is assumed to be {20,15,10,5} respectively. X will be assigned tuple
(1,1) for being biologically firstborn and being the oldest firstborn in its alternative
care family. Individual x is assigned (2,1) for being a biological secondborn but being
the oldest one in its alternative care family. Y is assigned tuple (1,2), and y is assigned
(2,2). As both tuple values (b) and (a) can take on values from 1 to 3 only, this leads
to 9 potential factorial combinations ranging from (1,1) to (3,3). Indicator vector
DTUPLEi,t contains one dummy for each of these combinations as shown in equation
3.2.
DTUPLEi = BioBirthorderRanki ∗ AlternativeCareFamilyRanki,t (3.2)
This indicator vector substitutes the former birth order vector in the baseline model
equation 3.1, resulting in model equation 3.3. Importantly, I still control for age and
employ biological sibship dummies. This implies that β1 absorbs only the effect of
relative rank within an alternative care family.
Edui,j,k,t = β0+β1DTUPLEi,t+γj+ δt+β2Xi+β3XTi,t+ρ1AltCareFamk,t+ εi,t
(3.3)
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3.4. Results
3.4.1. Results of the baseline model: Birth order effects
between biological siblings
Table 3.2 shows this study’s baseline results. The estimates suggest the existence of
negative birth order effects, implying lower educational achievement of secondborns
and laterborns. Educational achievement is regressed on biological birth order, a set
of controls and biological sibship dummies with a pooled OLS model. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of the individual.
The minimum control model is shown in column (1). It estimates birth order effects
with a gender dummy, time dummies, and age dummies only. Its estimate of birth
order effects is only significant at the 10 percent level. Column (2) shows the base-
line model results with full controls. The effect size in this baseline model indicates
a decrease in achievement of 2.4 percent from first- to secondborns.10 Column (3)
replicates this for sibling pairs and excludes all sibships of more than two siblings.
Being second-born is further associated with a slightly higher achievement compared
to being later-born. However, this difference is not statistically significant at the five
percent level in itself.
Across all models, age is negatively associated with educational achievement. The age
dummies are not presented for the sake of brevity.11 Female children outperform male
children, ceteris paribus. The results impute no association of the number of non-
biological siblings in alternative care families with educational achievement per se.
The reason for admission is not found to influence later educational achievement in
the overall sample. The insignificance of the reason for admission dummies is expected
as the reason for admission rarely varies between siblings.12 There is no statistically
significant evidence at the five percent level for the association between the percentage
of one’s lifetime spent in SOS alternative care and educational achievement.
10. This figure is calculated by the effect size of -0.079 and the baseline of 3.2 in average educational
achievement (This baseline value of 3.2 applies to the youngest children at the age of three and is
lower for older individuals. It is calculated by dividing the effect size by the baseline value.)
11. Figure 3.1 presents the negative relationship between age and education.
12. Due to the employment of sibship dummies, the reason for admission dummies only capture
within-sibship variance.
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Table 3.2.: Baseline model: birth order effects between biological siblings
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline
model
with
minimum
controls
Baseline
model
with
full
controls
Limited
baseline model:
sibling pairs
full
controls
Secondborn -0.051∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.021) (0.026)
Thirdborn or higher -0.005 -0.091∗∗
(0.040) (0.041)
Gender = female 0.104∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.023)
No. all siblings -0.003 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.158∗ 0.183∗
(0.090) (0.111)
Abandonment 0.087 0.139∗
(0.060) (0.072)
Death of parents 0.103∗ 0.014
(0.059) (0.069)
Referral -0.034 0.033
(0.115) (0.148)
Constant 3.433∗∗∗ 3.233∗∗∗ 3.206∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.158) (0.185)
Sibship dummies X X
Time dummies X X X
Age dummies X X X
Observations 26,898 26,898 17,644
Adj.R2 0.016 0.66 0.70
Clusters 4362 4362 2963
Robust standard
errors clustered
at individual level
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: Educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male
children; Sibship dummies; Minimum controls defined as control for sibship dummies, quar-
ter dummies and age dummies only; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
individual level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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3.4.2. Hardship model and gender split model: Sources of
heterogeneity in birth order effects
Results of the hardship model
Table 3.3 shows the baseline model results split by the experience of hardship. I find
no birth order effects for sibships, who experienced extreme emotional or economic
hardship before admission, irrespective of whether their parents passed away or not.
Within the subsample without hardship experience, I find birth order effects in both
subsamples. Birth order effects are robust and of comparable magnitude for indi-
viduals who have experienced parental death (column (1)) and those who have been
admitted on other grounds than parental death (column (2)).
I do not find significant birth order effects for the groups with hardship experience
(columns (3) through (5)) with the exception of thirdborns who have suffered from
emotional hardship. The general absence of birth order effects persists when splitting
the model into subregions, as displayed in appendix table C.20.
The heterogeneity in birth order effects based on hardship is also supported by the
descriptive data displayed in Lowess graphs in figure 3.2. Both figures display the
educational achievement of first- and secondborns by age. Birth order effects are more
evident in this depiction of raw data for those siblings who have not suffered extreme
hardship (top graph) than it is for children who have suffered hardship (bottom graph).
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Table 3.3.: Hardship model: baseline model split by experience of hardship
No extreme
hardship
Extreme
hardship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parental
death
Other
reasons Financial Emotional
Financial
and
emotional
Secondborn -0.091∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗ 0.012 -0.075 -0.030
(0.032) (0.046) (0.052) (0.050) (0.037)
Thirdborn or higher -0.148∗∗ -0.019 0.073 -0.179∗∗ -0.063
(0.061) (0.083) (0.108) (0.088) (0.071)
Gender 0.092∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.038) (0.056) (0.048) (0.038)
No. all siblings -0.003 -0.007 0.006 -0.005 -0.002
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Lifeshare spent
in SOS care 0.004 0.463
∗∗ 0.275 -0.210 0.065
(0.132) (0.181) (0.242) (0.247) (0.183)
Constant 3.807∗∗∗ 3.053∗∗∗ 1.679∗∗ 3.888∗∗∗ 3.588∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.256) (0.692) (0.325) (0.324)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X X X
Reason for
admission dummies X X X X X
Observations 13,273 5,665 3,701 4,642 7,960
Adj.R2 0.68 0.71 0.75 0.67 0.70
Clusters 2000 965 601 855 1404
Standard errors
clustered
at individual level
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male children; Sib-
ship dummies; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Figure 3.2.: Children without and with hardship experience: Lowess smoothing of
educational achievement vs. age for first- and secondborns
Dependent variable: average educational achievement by age; Top graph: individuals without expe-
rience of extreme hardship only; Bottom graph: individuals with experience of personal hardship only;
Lowess smoothing.
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Results of the gender split model
Table 3.4 reports the results of a gender-specific birth order effect estimation. Based on
the baseline estimation, I introduce an additional dummy interacting birth order and
gender. The reference group is being a male secondborn. I find that the achievement
gap between firstborns and secondborns is attenuated for girls (see column (1) of table
3.4). The regional split shows that Asia drives the moderate global effect (see table
3.4, columns (2) through (4)). First-born girls in Asia exhibit a mitigation of their
firstborn advantage. Within Asia, this mitigation is entirely attributable to India and
Nepal, as shown in the appendix table C.22. In India and Nepal, the full firstborn
advantage is revoked for women.
Table 3.4.: Gender split model: baseline model with gender interaction term
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full
sample Africa
Latin
America Asia
Firstborn=1 0.121∗∗∗ 0.010 0.111∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.069) (0.062) (0.032)
Gender = female=1 0.174∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.062) (0.053) (0.031)
Firstborn=1 X Gender = female=1 -0.086∗∗∗ -0.128 -0.053 -0.098∗∗
(0.033) (0.082) (0.077) (0.041)
Thirdborn -0.016 -0.025 -0.066 0.006
(0.028) (0.072) (0.064) (0.035)
Constant 3.405∗∗∗ 3.593∗∗∗ 3.658∗∗∗ 2.165∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.409) (0.359) (0.686)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X X
Reason for admission dummies
and lifeshare spent in SOS X X X X
Observations 26,898 4,200 5,121 17,577
Adj.R2 0.66 0.68 0.56 0.66
Clusters 4362 706 915 2741
Standard errors clustered
at individual level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: secondborn male children; Sib-
ship dummies; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Results of the factorial family model
I assess differences between children of the same biological birth order based on their
relative rank in their alternative care family via a pooled OLS model. Figure 3.3 sum-
marizes the results. The figure shows the coefficients of the indicator vector describing
the relative position within a non-biological alternative care family. The shown data
are for sibships without the experience of extreme hardship only (This omission is
based on the insight that this group does not show birth order effects). Appendix
table C.1 presents the estimates shown in figure 3.3 and for the full sample, includ-
ing individuals with hardship experience (The effects are smaller if one includes these
children). I do not find differences that are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level between children who are of the same biological rank but differ in their alterna-
tive care family rank. While large standard errors, also due to splitting the sample
into nine subgroups, prevent effect estimation of differences within the biological birth
order rank groups, figure 3.3 reveals a pattern which hints at the fact that relative
alternative care family rank might play a role in educational achievement.
Figure 3.3.: Factorial family model: On the importance of the relative rank
in the alternative care family
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(1,2) is the second oldest biological firstborn and so forth; Alternative care family dummies; Robust standard errors
are clustered at individual level; Lines indicate 95 percent confidence interval.
3.5 Robustness checks and validity 115
The omitted baseline group is composed of firstborns, who are the oldest firstborn
in their alternative care family (assigned tuple (1,1)). Controlling for age, they are
expected to perform better than the second oldest biologically firstborn (1,2). However,
this effect is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Biologically firstborns
are expected to perform better than any of the secondborns. Estimates indicate that
biological secondborns benefit from ranking higher in their alternative care family,
too. Compared to the baseline firstborn, the penalty for being the oldest secondborn
is smaller than the one of the third oldest secondborn. Again, the difference between
biologically secondborns is not statistically significant. The lowest performing children
are those with a biological birth order rank of three or higher, who also come third
or later in their alternative care family amongst children of the same biological birth
order (3,3). This relationship holds true although the youngest children tend to show
the highest achievement.
3.5. Robustness checks and validity
3.5.1. Robustness checks
The main birth order results predicting negative birth order effects as shown in table
3.2 are robust to different choices of dummies on country or family level and the re-
moval of all dummies (see appendix table C.17). I find more pronounced effects for
Latin America and Asia when splitting the baseline model by region (see appendix ta-
ble C.14). As shown in the regional breakdown, results are not driven by an individual
country alone (see appendix tables C.15 and C.16). The baseline model specification
is also robust to the estimation of single periods as shown in appendix tables C.18
and C.19. For the hardship model, results are also robust to a split by region (see ap-
pendix table C.20). Furthermore, I estimate the hardship model in a specification that
excludes all individuals with missing information regarding their detailed reason for
admission. The main finding with respect to the absence of birth order effects amongst
children who have experienced hardship remains unaffected by definition. Birth order
effects for individuals without hardship experience remain partially unaffected (see
appendix table C.21).13
13. This is likely be driven by a loss of observations. Particularly children who have lost both
parents often have no information regarding the detailed reason for admission. This is expected as
the loss of two parents justifies an admission without further explanation of experience of hardship.
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3.5.2. Internal and external validity
Internal validity. The endogeneity of fertility decision making poses a challenge to
birth order research in general, whenever it is not possible to instrument for fertility
decisions. However, the robustness of birth order effects in light of endogeneity has
already been shown by Bagger et al. (2013) and Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2010).
Moreover, the results of this study also hold true for different sibship size subsets, such
as sibling pairs (see column three of table 3.2). The factorial family model shown in
table 3.3 remains unaffected as well, since alternative care siblings’ features are statis-
tically independent of biological parents’ fertility decisions.
I match siblings based on a codified last name. This method could bias birth order
effects downwards. It might exclude real biological siblings for example due to dif-
ferently spelled names and hence differently codified last names. These false negative
cases would reduce the sample size. Bias would arise if false negative cases exhibited
birth order effects that were systematically different from correctly identified sibships.
For this to hold true, one would need to assume an unlikely association between false
rejection of a sibship and their (unmeasured) birth order effect size. Meanwhile, the
opposite scenario of a false positive scenario is more likely and expected to downward
bias the effects: children who by chance carry the same last name are not expected to
exhibit any birth order effects and will downward bias the estimation. I use quality
control checks to exclude these cases. These are described in appendix section C.2.
A final bias threatening internal validity could arise from non-random patterns in re-
porting of achievement data. For a considerable share of all children, achievement data
has not been reported. These individuals have not been included in this analysis. For
results to be unbiased, one needs to assume that a lack of reporting is independent
from a child’s performance relative to its siblings. This assumption seems to be rea-
sonable, in particular as the provision of educational achievement data varies rather
at village than at individual level.
External validity. The external validity of this study depends on whether this sample
can be considered representative of its underlying population or, alternatively, whether
deviations from population averages will bias results. Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug
(2004) provide a framework to assess the external validity of studies that employ
data from adoptive settings. While this study’s setting is different from an adoptive
context, it shares important characteristics: non-biological caregivers, non-biological
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siblings and a change of the care context from the child’s perspective. Björklund,
Lindahl, and Plug (2004) argue that three assumptions need to hold true to work with
adoption data and to extrapolate findings to biological sibships: (i) Children need to
be as good as randomly assigned to their adoptive families, (ii) they need to be adopted
early on in their lives and one needs to assume that (iii) studies on adoptive child-
parent relationships can be extrapolated to biological child-parent relationships (This
last assumption is based on the hypothesis of non-differential treatment of adoptees by
adoptive parents as well as the general similarity of individuals in adoptive settings vs.
non-adoptive settings concerning unobserved traits). I discuss whether the assump-
tions (i) through (iii) are met by this study in appendix section C.5.4. I conclude that
the sample’s traits can downward bias effect sizes but will not lead to a reversal in the
effect sign.
3.6. Discussion
Baseline model, gender model, and hardship model. This study is the first
one to deliver cross-continental evidence for birth order effects on educational achieve-
ment in low- and middle-income countries. I propose individual hardship and parental
gender preference as two explanations for previously documented heterogeneity in find-
ings. This within-sample heterogeneity relates the findings to the mixed-picture found
in previous studies using data from low- and middle-income countries. The effect
size for the baseline model is comparable to previous research. For example, Black,
Devereux, and Salvanes (2011) document IQ differences of around 3 points between
firstborns and secondborns.
Children who have been exposed to higher degrees of adversity prior to admission to
a village show mitigated and potentially reversed birth order effects. A lack of re-
sources in the case of economic hardship and the presence of adversity in the case of
emotional hardship provide two explanations.14 The relevance of hardship experience,
and thereby absence of parental resources, ties in with previous literature document-
ing the role of parental education in high-income countries (Lafortune and Lee, 2014).
14. The absence of child labor within alternative care is expected to dampen effects partially. Pre-
vious studies show that the existence of child labor typically disfavors earlier born children. The
parental anticipation of earlier born children engaging in child labor in the future can create this
disadvantage already previous to the oldest sibling engaging in child labor. The absence of child
labor in villages is hence expected to disperse this effect partially compared to settings with child
labor.
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This finding supports the resource dilution hypothesis by showing that the absence of
parental resources can lead to a mitigation of birth order effects.
The second source of heterogeneity is that of cultural gender preferences. A birth order
effect model with gender interaction, as shown in Table 3.4, recommends gender as a
far-reaching determinant concerning the development of differences between children
based on birth order. The disproportionately high share of female children amongst
abandoned children in Asia supports the hypothesis of a male preference.15 Less pro-
nounced birth order effects for female children accord with studies in countries with a
preference for male offspring (Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Fors and Lindskog,
2017).
Factorial family model. This study provides novel insight into interactions of chil-
dren within non-biological families. The factorial family model suggests that besides
birth order, children benefit from having younger siblings in their biologically unre-
lated family. In this sample’s setting, later- and last-born children receive more tutor-
ing opportunities than they would in their biological families. This alludes to existing
explanations that propose tutoring opportunities as one driver of the advantageous in-
tellectual development of firstborns (Zajonc, 2001; Zajonc, Markus, and Markus, 1979;
Zajonc and Markus, 1975). The estimates in table 3.3 imply a sizable advantage for
being in a higher alternative care family rank if biologically later-born. The pattern is
only suggestive as the standard errors do not allow to make statements on statistically
significant differences. However, I argue that the most likely reason for this pattern is
the interaction between children within their alternative care families, with tutoring as
a suggested mechanism, as proposed in confluence theory. Eskreis-Winkler, Fishbach,
and Duckworth (n.d., in press) show that troubled children, who are asked to moti-
vate others, benefit from mentoring. In a randomized trial setting, the motivation of
struggling children to do homework increased more than those of troubled peers that
received expert advise. The authors propose that it is a higher self-confidence that
leads to higher accomplishment.
The interaction between biologically unrelated siblings is expected to benefit older
siblings disproportionately. Exclusion of other potential influences suggests this mech-
anism. Prenatal factors and postnatal differences in biological parental resource di-
15. In the overall sample, 52 percent of all children are female. The equivalent figure for abandoned
children is 52 percent as well. In Asia, 53 percent of all children are female, whereas 56 percent of all
abandoned children are female.
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lution cannot account for the observed patterns. Biological parents can discriminate
between their own children before admission but are not in a position to intervene
in the period following admission. Selection-based explanations would imply that the
parents of older biological sibship groups are systematically different from those of
younger ones. I find the relative share of lifetime spent inside SOS Children’s Villages’
care to be statistically insignificant at the five percent level.16 If older cohorts differed
systematically, the share of a child’s life spent inside SOS care should capture this
effect. So should age control variables.
Discriminatory behavior by the alternative care mother is highly unlikely, too. The-
oretically, deliberate discriminatory behavior could induce these differences. If al-
ternative care mothers were actively discriminating in favor of the respective oldest
firstborn of a sibship cohort, the relative lifeshare spent inside alternative care should
capture this effect. However, it is insignificant throughout all models. Another factor
rendering this unlikely is the admission process itself. The alternative care mother is
experiencing a flow of children over time as younger siblings enter the family while
older siblings leave it. The oldest sibling of an alternative care family hence used to
be amongst its youngest. The social role of being alternative care family firstborn is
consequently temporary and developing over time. If being older was beneficial per
se, one would find age to have a positive sign and effect on grades – as opposed to its
current negative sign. And, if having more siblings was beneficial, one would find the
variable reflecting the number of total alternative care family siblings to be significant.
Policy implications. This study provides insight into the educational achievement
of vulnerable children in low- and middle-income countries who are without parental
care or at risk of losing it. This group is the target of many local and global develop-
ment programs and policies.
Results carry particular significance for families living in a context which is compara-
ble to the one of SOS Children’s Villages. This applies for example to children living
with relatives or non-kin families (foster care, youth facilities, and boarding schools)
and young asylum seekers/unaccompanied minors who are living in group homes. The
suggested interaction between biologically unrelated siblings via tutoring requires ac-
knowledgment by policymakers. Eskreis-Winkler, Fishbach, and Duckworth (n.d., in
press) documents the effectiveness of such tutoring interventions.
16. Definition of lifeshare spent in SOS care: Lifetime share spent inside a village divided by the
age of an individual.
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Acknowledging sources of relative achievement differences within families is important
for two reasons. First, building on this and other studies, policymakers will be able to
better identify family members in highest need for intervention. Secondly, knowledge
about the mechanics at work can inform the type of necessary intervention.
3.7. Conclusion
This study contributes to the debate on the formation of human capital and deter-
minants of educational achievement in low- and middle-income countries. It does so
by drawing from a dataset from three continents. The findings suggest strong hetero-
geneity in human capital formation, with economic and emotional hardship, parental
gender preferences and sibling interaction as mediating factors.
This study also contributes to the on-going theoretical dispute on the relevance of tu-
toring effects to explain birth order effects. The results can inform policy interventions
by identifying the most vulnerable members of families and describing the drivers of
the development of within-family differences. Tutoring is pointed out as a potentially
under-appreciated mediator of personal growth. While these findings advance the dis-
cussion, more multi-country evidence is needed to understand the mediators of birth
order effects more profoundly.
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A.1. Decision domains and contraception typology
Table A.1 presents the list of decision domains. The lead question for every domain
listed in the following is "In your household, who makes decisions about:". Individ-
uals can then circle letters representing single household members, such as A for the
respondent, B for the spouse, etc.
Table A.1.: List of single decision domains
Code Decisions Consideredin analysis
Reason for
omission
A1 Expenditure on food eaten at home Yes Not applicable
A2 Choice of food eaten at home No Considered as indicator forhousekeeping role
B Routine purchases for the householdof items such as cleaning supplies Yes Not applicable
C Your clothes No Indicator for housekeeping role;
unclear interpretation
("choice" vs. "expenditure")
D Your spouse’s clothes No
E Your children’s clothes No
F Your children’s education Yes Not applicable
G Your children’s health Yes Not applicable
H Large expensive purchases for thehousehold (i.e., refrigerator or TV) Yes Not applicable
I Giving money to your parents/family Yes Not applicable
J Giving money to yourspouse’s parents/family Yes Not applicable
K Gifts for parties/weddings Yes Not applicable
L Money for monthly arisan(savings lottery) Yes Not applicable
M Money for monthly savings Yes Not applicable
N Time the husband spendssocializing Yes Not applicable
O Time the wife spends socializing Yes Not applicable
P Whether you/your spouse works? Yes Not applicable
Q Whether you and your spouse usecontraception? Yes Not applicable
Table A.2 presents the typology of statement combinations used in the contraceptive
use decision domain. Our main estimates are based on couples of the first three
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concordance categories cCM, cCF and cCB and the first three discordance categories
cDFM, cDMF and cDOBOF. The grey-colored categories (cNM, cNF, cFN and cMN)
are not used in our models since they describe an outcome and decision at the same
time.
Table A.2.: Typology of responses: contraceptive use domain
Code Combination of husband’s and wife’s statement
Concordance
cCM Wife and Husb: (m) Both partners agree on the husband as thesole decision maker
cCF Wife and Husb: (f) Both partners agree on the wife as thesole decision maker
cCB Wife and Husb: (mf) Both partners agree on joint decision making
cCN Wife and Husb: (no use) Both partners agree that they do not usecontraceptive methods
Discordance
cDFM Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);Husb: (m)
Strong Discordance: wife perceives female decision-
making power (individually or jointly),
husband does not
cDMF Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);Wife: (m)
Strong Discordance: husband perceives female
decision-making power (individually or jointly), wife
does not
cDOBOF One Spouse: (mf);Other Spouse: (f)
Weak Discordance: both spouses perceive female
decision-making power, one of them perceives a sole
female decision maker, the other joint decision
making
cNM Wife: (no use);Husb: (m)
Wife states that couple does not use contraception,
husband perceives male decision making power only
cNF Wife: (no use);Husb: (f) ∨ (mf)
Wife states that couple does not use contraception,
Husband perceives female decision making power
(individually or jointly)
cFN Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);Husb: (no use)
Wife perceives female decision making power
(individually or joint), husband states that couple does
not use contraception
cMN Wife: (m);Husb: (no use)
Wife perceives male decision making power only,
husband states that couple does not use contraception
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A.2. Definitions and codings of variables
A.2.1. Distribution and coding of educational achievement
Table A.3.: Distribution and coding (see table notes) of
educational achievement
What is the
highest
educational level
attended?
Women Men
Educational level
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
2:Elementary school 36.1 34.9
3:Junior high general 17.4 15.4
4:Junior high vocational 0.5 0.8
5:Senior high general 14.4 15.8
6:Senior high vocational 9.7 12.5
11:Adult education A 0.0 0.1
12:Adult education B 0.3 0.4
13:Open university 0.1 0.1
14:Islamic School (pesantren) 0.2 0.2
15:Adult education C 0.5 1.0
60:College (D1,D2,D3) 3.8 3.1
61:University S1 7.9 9.0
62:University S2 0.4 0.8
63:University S3 0.0 0.1
72:Islamic Elementary School (Madrasah Ibtidaiyah) 1.7 1.3
73:Islamic Junior/High School (Madrasah Tsanawiyah) 4.3 2.4
74:Islamic Senior/High School (Madrasah Tsanawiyah) 2.6 2.0
90:Kindergarten 0.0
95:Other 0.0 0.0
98:Don’t Know 0.0
Observations 8,277 8,419
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Categories 2
and 72 are coded as elementary education, categories 3 to 6 and 11 to 15 and 73 and 74 are coded as
secondary education, categories 60 to 63 are coded as tertiary education. All remaining categories, for
instance, group 90, are grouped in the no education category. Individuals who reported that they never
received education are not listed in any category but also assigned to the no education group of our
model.
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A.2.2. Classification of covert methods
There are different approaches to classify covert methods. Ashraf, Field, and Lee
(2014) limit their analysis to injectables and test the results to implants and IUDs.
Gasca and Becker (2017, p. 7) estimate the rate of indirect, covert use as the share of
couples in which women use "female modern contraceptive methods" and men reported
not a modern method. They consider "female sterilization, contraceptive pill, implant,
injectable, IUD, diaphragm/foam/jelly and the female condom" as a modern method.
Biddlecom and Fapohunda (1998) report method utilization rates for both women
who report open and covert use. For example, injectables are preferred by women who
report covert use while only a small share of women who openly use contraceptives
report their use. The following table A.4 is based on previous studies. The second
column presents our reasoning for the classification.
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Table A.4.: Classification of covert methods
Covert methods Reasoning
Injection (1,2,3 months) Classified as covert method by Gasca and Becker (2017).
IUD (Intrauterin device)/
AKDR/Spiral Classified as covert method by Gasca and Becker (2017).
Norplant / Implant Discussed by Gasca and Becker (2017) but not consideredin their context due to limited availability of method.
Female Sterilization Can be used without husband taking notice.
Non-Covert methods
Pill
It is possible to covertly use the pill. However,
Chikovore et al., 2002 and Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2014)
describe the difficulties of women to hide them
consistently from men. We run a robustness
check for an alternative classification.
Condom Not useable without husband taking notice.
Rhythm / Calendar Difficult to use without husband taking notice.
Coitus Interruptus Not useable without husband taking notice.
Male Sterilization Not useable without husband taking notice.
Methods not considered
Traditional Herbs Traditional methods excluded analogous toGasca and Becker (2017)
Traditional Massage Traditional methods excluded analogous toGasca and Becker (2017)
Femidom
Ambiguity of covert/non-covert status leads
to exclusion. (However Gasca and Becker (2017)
classifies female condoms as female modern
contraceptive method.)
Intravag Ambiguity of covert/non-covert status
Other Ambiguity of covert/non-covert status
Notes: AKDR = Alat Kontrasepsi Dalam Rahim (Contraception Installation Tool Rahim)
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A.2.3. Definition of the instrumental variable
The instrumental variable approach is based on household exposure to natural disasters
and the reactions of households to them. Our knowledge of event experience and
reactions is based on responses to two questions in the IFLS-3 (2000) Survey. The
first question GE01 asks respondents about the experience of the list of events. It
elicits whether the household has experienced a crop loss or a natural disaster. The
question and options are listed in table A.5. The second question is about how the
household reacted to this event. The question and options are listed in table A.6.
We only consider the events of C crop loss and D natural disaster of table A.5 and
the options Q,S, T, U, V,W of table A.6. We do not include reactions O and P as
the inclusion leads to underidentification in some model specifications (see statistics
of appendix table A.5.4).
Table A.5.: List of possible household shocks
GE01: Has this household gone through [...] in the last 5 years? (Yes/No)
A Death of a householder or a family member who is not a householder
B
Sickness of a householder or a family member who is not a
householder that necessitated hospitalization or continuous
medical treatment
C Crop loss, reason (Other) [Blank space]
D Household/business loss due to earthquake, fire or othernatural disaster
E Any of the householders lost a job or failed in business?
F Decrease of household income, due to decrease of productionor very low price of products?
G1 Other, [Blank space]
G2 Other, [Blank space]
Notes: Question and responses taken from the IFLS-3 Survey (2000) supplementary materials; [Blank
space]: Space for interviewer to fill text.
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Table A.6.: List of possible household reactions
GE03: What steps have been taken by household members in response to this difficulty?
A Eat less food O Close/reduce business activities
B Buy less food P Changed business
C Take child out of school Q Changed job/quit job
D Reduce current spending R Take a border into the household
E Delay plans to spend money S Start working for pay
F Save less money T Increase working hours
G Use savings U Take an additional job
H Sell possessions V Expand business activities
I Borrow money W Start a business
J Move within village X Pray
K Move to new village Y Other [Blank space]
L Receive assistance from friends/family Z Nothing
M Receive assistance from government
N Receive assistance from other group
Notes: Question and responses taken from the IFLS-3 Survey (2000) supplementary materials; [Blank space]: Space
for interviewer to fill text.
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A.3. Auxiliary tables
A.3.1. Differences in attributes of couples that give discordant
responses
Table A.7.: Couple attributes by discordance type in labor market decision domain
DFM(1) vs.
DOBOF (2)
DMF(1) vs
DOBOF(2)
Mean(1) Mean(2) Diff. Mean(1) Mean(2) Diff.
Individual attributes:
Age 38.58 43.61 -5.03∗∗∗ 39.46 43.61 -4.15∗∗∗
Sp: age 42.96 48.43 -5.47∗∗∗ 44.27 48.43 -4.16∗∗∗
Elementary education 0.38 0.40 -0.02 0.40 0.40 0.00
Any secondary education 0.49 0.42 0.07∗∗ 0.47 0.42 0.05∗
Any college education 0.08 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.11 -0.03
Sp: Elementary education 0.37 0.43 -0.07∗∗ 0.36 0.43 -0.07∗∗
Sp: Any secondary education 0.50 0.44 0.06∗ 0.48 0.44 0.05
Sp: Any college education 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.03
Household attributes:
N HH adults 2.40 2.47 -0.08 2.39 2.47 -0.09∗
N HH children 1.70 1.57 0.13∗ 1.75 1.57 0.18∗∗
Migration indicator 0.21 0.16 0.05∗ 0.22 0.16 0.06∗∗
Household economy:
Log HH income 16.65 16.56 0.09 16.56 16.56 0.00
Any land 0.32 0.33 -0.02 0.34 0.33 0.01
Female income share 0.16 0.36 -0.20∗∗∗ 0.13 0.36 -0.24∗∗∗
Log h worked pa 6.91 7.17 -0.26∗∗∗ 6.74 7.17 -0.43∗∗∗
Sp: Log h worked pa 7.41 7.26 0.15∗∗ 7.39 7.26 0.13∗
Decision share:
Wife: own decision share 0.79 0.76 0.03∗∗ 0.61 0.76 -0.15∗∗∗
Husb: wife’s decision share 0.59 0.78 -0.19∗∗∗ 0.78 0.78 -0.00
Wife: husband’s decision share 0.62 0.45 0.16∗∗∗ 0.62 0.45 0.17∗∗∗
Husb: own decision share 0.65 0.58 0.07∗∗∗ 0.69 0.58 0.11∗∗∗
Notes: T-Test; Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; In-
dividual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes;
Decision making domain: "Whether you/your spouse works"; Variable definitions: N HH chil-
dren: number of children in household; N HH adults: number of adults in household; Migration
indicator: household moved since last wave (yes = 1/no = 0); Log HH income: Log of annual income
in IDR; Wife:/Husb.: provides wife’s/husband’s perspective on decision making power respectively;
Typology: DFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not, DMF: husband
perceives female decision making power, wife does not, DOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision
making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making;
***/**/* indicate significance of difference at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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A.3.2. Contraception and covert method use estimates
The wife reports the use of contraception and the used method in a separate interview.
Table A.8 displays the association between responses to the question of who makes
decisions about “whether you and your spouse use contraception” and contraceptive
use as the dependent variable.
Table A.9 displays the association between responses to the question of who makes
decisions about “whether you and your spouse use contraception” and covert method
use as the dependent variable, conditional on contraceptive use.
Appendix table A.40 provides the average reported contraceptive and covert method
rates for women whose spouses were and were not present during this interview.
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Table A.8.: Estimate of association between statement combinations
and contraceptive use
Dependent variable:
Couple uses contraception
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No controls Baseline
Baseline
with
exclusion
restriction 1
Baseline
with
exclusion
restriction 2
Baseline
with
exclusion
restrictions
1 and 2
Concordance:
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m) -0.226∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.145∗ -0.233∗∗∗ -0.112
(0.041) (0.045) (0.075) (0.048) (0.074)
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf) -0.071∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010)
Discordance:
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb: (m) -0.078
∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.028) (0.038) (0.028) (0.032)
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife: (m) -0.058
∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.038 -0.078∗∗∗ -0.041∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.019) (0.022)
cDOBOF: One spouse: (f);
Other spouse: (mf) -0.022 -0.029 -0.011 -0.022 0.001
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016)
Constant 0.756∗∗∗ 1.037∗∗∗ 1.198∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 1.276∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.191) (0.188) (0.169) (0.199)
Region dummies X X X X
Control for (spousal) age,
HH income and education X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 5,682 5,167 2,571 4,716 2,475
R2 0.0075 0.069 0.052 0.076 0.070
Clusters 18 18 18 18 18
Robust standard
errors clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: contraceptive use; Baseline group: concor-
dant couples, perceiving wife as the sole decision maker; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes
by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional
data, one observation is one couple; Decision making domain: “whether you and your spouse use
contraception”; Exclusion restriction 1: exclusion of women who respond that they personally want
to receive any additional children ("Do you personally wish to have another child?"); Exclusion re-
striction 2: exclusion of women who state that they do not use contraceptives, due to divorcee/widow
status, recent birth (being pre-menstrual or absent from sex) or current breastfeeding; Typology:
cCM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, cCB: concordant report of joint decision
making, cDFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not, cDMF: husband per-
ceives female decision making power, wife does not, cDOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision
making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making;
Robust standard errors in brackets; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at regional
level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.9.: Estimate of association between statement combinations and covert
method use
Dependent variable: Couple uses covert method
conditional on contraceptive use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No controls Baseline
Baseline
with
exclusion
restriction 1
Baseline
with
exclusion
restriction 2
Baseline
with
exclusion
restrictions
1 and 2
Concordance:
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m) -0.050 -0.077 -0.147 -0.077 -0.147
(0.063) (0.060) (0.089) (0.060) (0.089)
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.029 0.056∗∗∗ 0.029
(0.027) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
Discordance:
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb: (m) 0.100
∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife: (m) 0.084
∗∗∗ 0.052 0.014 0.052 0.014
(0.028) (0.030) (0.049) (0.030) (0.049)
cDOBOF: One Spouse: (f);
Other Spouse: (mf) 0.051
∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019)
Constant 0.685∗∗∗ 1.133∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗∗ 1.133∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.140) (0.190) (0.140) (0.190)
Region dummies X X X X
Control for (spousal) age,
HH income and education X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 4,016 3,640 2,047 3,640 2,047
R2 0.0072 0.069 0.071 0.069 0.071
Clusters 18 18 18 18 18
Robust standard
errors clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: covert contraceptive method use; Baseline
group: concordant couples, perceiving wife as the sole decision maker; Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014),
cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision making domain: “whether you and
your spouse use contraception”; Exclusion restriction 1: exclusion of women who respond that they
personally want to receive any additional children ("Do you personally wish to have another child?");
Exclusion restriction 2: exclusion of women who state that they do not use contraceptives, due to
divorce/widow status, recent birth (being premenstrual or absent from sex) or current breastfeeding;
Typology: cCM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, cCB: concordant report
of joint decision making, cDFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not,
cDMF: husband perceives female decision making power, wife does not, cDOBOF: both spouses
perceive female decision making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other
joint decision making; Robust standard errors in brackets; Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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A.3.3. Fixed effects analysis: Single domains
Tables A.10, A.11, A.12, A.13, A.14, A.15, and A.16 employ a panel model approach
with individual fixed effects to survey the relationship of changes in female economic
and decision making power over time – from both perspectives, the husband’s and the
wife’s. Female power is surveyed across multiple domains of eight economic household
decisions – each table presents two. Economic power is measured as the wife’s con-
tribution to household income. Across all tables, the dependent variable is whether
the wife or husband agree that the wife has any say in the respective decision domain,
irrespective of the spouse’s position.
If the wife contributes more to the household income, husbands, as well as wives, tend
to attribute more power to the wife over time in the dimensions of expensive purchases
and labor market participation. A similar picture of less statistical significance emerges
for expenditure for food. As the female income share increases, neither husbands or
wives do attribute more decision making power to women with respect to savings and
giving money to either of the spouses’ families. Women associate higher relative income
of themselves with more say over routine purchases and gifts for parties/weddings.
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Table A.10.: Female share of income and female decision making power across
domains (1/7)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of expenditure for food eaten
at home
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of routine purchases for the HH
of items such as cleaning supplies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife says yes Husband says yes Wife says yes Husband says yes
Female income share 0.058∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.023) (0.024) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant 0.305 1.302∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.421) (0.127) (0.184)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 14,802 14,802 20,855 20,855
Time dummies and
individual
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision making
power in specific domain; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers to
husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one observation is one couple;
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table A.11.: Female share of income and female decision making power across
domains (2/7)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of children’s education
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of children’s health
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife says yes Husband says yes Wife says yes Husband says yes
Female income share 0.032∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.004 0.008
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018)
Constant 0.657∗∗∗ 0.331 0.646∗∗∗ 0.495∗
(0.247) (0.320) (0.243) (0.259)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 20,855 20,855 20,851 20,851
Time dummies and
individual
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision
making power in specific domain; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse
(Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one
observation is one couple; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.12.: Female share of income and female decision making power across
domains (3/7)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of large expensive purchases
(i.e., refrigerator or TV)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
Domain of Gifts for
parties/weddings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife says yes Husband says yes Wife says yes Husband says yes
Female income share 0.054∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.018) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015)
Constant 0.332 0.698∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.246) (0.163) (0.171)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 20,740 20,740 20,851 20,851
Time dummies and
individual
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate;Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision making
power in specific domain; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers
to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one observation is one
couple; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table A.13.: Female share of income and female decision making power across
domains (4/7)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of giving money
to wife’s family
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of giving money
to husband’s family
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife says yes Husband says yes Wife says yes Husband says yes
Female income share 0.013 -0.017 0.006 -0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Constant 0.939∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.241) (0.275) (0.232)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 20,850 20,850 20,851 20,851
Time dummies and
individual
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision
making power in specific domain; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse
(Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one
observation is one couple; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.14.: Female share of income and female decision making power across
domains (5/7)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of money for monthly Arisan (lottery)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of monthly savings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife says yes Husband says yes Wife says yes Husband says yes
Female income share 0.052∗∗ 0.028 0.036 0.025
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant -0.149 -0.093 -0.295 -0.578∗∗
(0.299) (0.287) (0.275) (0.276)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 20,855 20,855 20,855 20,855
Time dummies and
individual
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision making power
in specific domain; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s
attributes; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one observation is one couple; ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Table A.15.: Female share of income and female decision making power across
domains (6/7)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of time husband
spends socializing
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of time wife
spends socializing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife says yes Husband says yes Wife says yes Husband says yes
Female income share -0.013 0.075∗∗∗ -0.014 0.010
(0.025) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016)
Constant 0.330 0.503 0.820∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.347) (0.157) (0.179)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 20,855 20,855 20,855 20,855
Time dummies and
individual
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision
making power in specific domain; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse
(Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one
observation is one couple; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.16.: Female share of income and female decision making power across
domains (7/7)
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of labor market
decision-making
Dependent variable:
Wife has decision-making power in
domain of contraception use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wife says yes Husband says yes Wife says yes Husband says yes
Female income share 0.291∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.027
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Constant 0.002 0.351 1.078∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗
(0.258) (0.250) (0.262) (0.253)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children, migration X X X X
Observations 20,855 20,855 20,847 20,847
Time dummies and
individual
fixed effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision
making power in specific domain; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse
(Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one
observation is one couple; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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A.3.4. Fixed effects analysis: overall decision share
Table A.17.: Female share of income and perceived
female decision making power across all domains
(1) (2)
Wife’s
perspective
Husband’s
perspective
Female income share 0.045∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Log HH income 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.463∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.119)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children X X
Observations 20,855 20,855
Year, Regional FE Yes Yes
Robust SEs Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: female overall de-
cision share; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014, one
observation is one couple; Definition: Overall female/male decision mak-
ing share: Number of decisions with female/male involvement divided by
number of overall decisions; Robust standard errors in brackets; ***/**/*
indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
A.3 Auxiliary tables 139
Table A.18.: Without labor domain: female share of income and perceived female
decision making power across all domains
(1) (2)
Wife’s
perspective
Husband’s
perspective
Female income share 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Log HH income 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant 0.505∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.122)
Control for (spousal) age
and HH income X X
Control for N HH adults,
N HH children X X
Observations 20,855 20,855
Year, Regional FE Yes Yes
Robust SEs Yes Yes
Notes: Fixed effects estimate; Dependent variable: female overall de-
cision share; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data 2000 to 2014,
one observation is one couple; Definition: Overall female/male decision
making share: Number of decisions with female/male involvement divided
by number of overall decisions excluding labor domain decision making;
Robust standard errors in brackets; ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
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A.3.5. Instrumental variable first stage estimates
Table A.19.: Instrumental variable first stage estimate:
effects of labor supply shocks on female income share
Dependent variable: Female income share
(1) (2)
Land-owners only Full sample
CL: Start working for pay -0.063∗∗∗ (0.023) -0.040 (0.024)
CL: Changed job/quit job 0.171 (0.121) 0.145∗ (0.074)
CL: Increased working hours 0.015 (0.033) 0.014 (0.031)
CL: Take an additional job -0.050∗ (0.030) -0.044∗ (0.024)
CL: Expand business acitvities -0.057∗∗ (0.025) -0.057∗∗ (0.023)
CL: Start a business 0.023 (0.032) 0.037 (0.029)
ND: Start working for pay -0.039 (0.087) 0.063 (0.090)
ND: Changed job/quit job 0.164∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.155∗∗∗ (0.015)
ND: Increased working hours 0.031 (0.145) -0.124 (0.099)
ND: Take an additional job -0.120∗∗∗ (0.027) -0.071∗∗ (0.030)
ND: Expand business acitvities 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.)
ND: Start a business 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.)
Any land -0.046∗∗∗ (0.008)
Constant -0.351∗∗∗ (0.086) -0.369∗∗∗ (0.059)
Control for (spousal) age
and education X X
Control for HH income,
N HH adults, N HH children X X
Observations 2,276 6,053
Regional dummies Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes
Note: Instrumental variable first stage estimate; Data: IFLS-3 wave (2000), cross-sectional data, one
observation is one couple; Independent variables express changes in labor supply due to either ND: natural
disaster or CL: crop loss; Estimates do not vary between husband’s perspective and wife’s perspective as
only wife’s income and not decision share is estimated in first stage; Robust standard errors in brackets
are clustered at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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A.4. Descriptive statistics
A.4.1. Contraception
Table A.20.: Frequency of use of contraceptive methods over time
Which birth control device/method
do you/does your husband use now?
2000 2007 2014 Full Sample
Contraceptive method
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
Pill 24.1 23.2 20.9 22.6
1_Month_Injection 1.7 5.7 8.1 5.5
2_Month_Injection 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4
3_Month_Injection 35.5 47.1 45.8 43.5
Intravag 0.1 0.1 0.1
Condom 1.7 1.8 2.9 2.2
IUD/AKDR/Spiral 15.0 8.1 8.1 10.0
Norplant/Implant 8.7 4.0 5.9 6.0
Female_Sterilization/Tubectomy 8.6 5.0 5.2 6.1
Male_Sterilization 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4
Rhythm/calendar 2.1 2.6 1.4 2.0
Coitus_Interruptus 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.6
Traditional_Herbs 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.5
Traditional_Massage 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other 0.1 0.3 0.2
Observations 3,094 4,017 4,228 11,339
Notes: Three residual categories merged into other section; One couple is one observation; The rate of covert
contraceptive use is calculated as the number of women who use contraceptive methods divided by all women
who use contraceptives.
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Table A.21.: Contraception domain: contraceptive use and covert method use by
response type
Frequencies of responses by couple if
wife reports in seperate interview... Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
... no
use ... use
... no
covert
method
... covert
method Full sample
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
Concordance:
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
cCF: Wife and Husb: (f) 0.10 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.15
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf) 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.31 0.25
cCN: Wife and Husb: (no use) 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.09
Sum concordance 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50
Discordance:
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb:(m) 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife:(m) 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06
cDOBOF: One Spouse: (f);
Other Spouse: (mf) 0.17 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.23
cNM: Wife: (no use);
Husb: (m) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
cNF: Wife: (no use);
Husb: (f) ∨ (mf) 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06
cFN: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb: (no use) 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06
cFM: Wife: (m);
Husb: (no use) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Sum discordance 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50
Observations 2,665 4,228 1,096 3,113 8,662
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision
making domain: “whether you and your spouse use contraception”; Typology: cCM: concordant
report of husband as sole decision maker, cCB: concordant report of joint decision making, cDFM:
wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not, cDMF: husband perceives female
decision making power, wife does not, cDOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision making power,
one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making.
A.4 Descriptive statistics 143
A.4.2. Instrumental variable approach: geographical
distribution of shocks
Table A.22.: Distribution of instrument events across provinces
Household loss due to earthquake
fire, or other natural disaster Crop loss
Loss No Loss Crop loss No crop loss
Province
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
North_Sumartra 8.4 6.0 6.8 5.9
West_Sumatra 5.6 4.5 3.2 4.7
Riau 0.9 0.3 0.3
South_Sumartra 8.4 4.9 4.3 5.0
Lampung 0.9 4.5 12.1 3.3
Jakarta 10.3 7.4 0.5 8.5
West_Java 19.6 18.0 17.3 18.1
Central_Java 10.3 12.9 15.5 12.5
Yogyakarta 1.9 5.9 5.7 5.8
East_Java 15.0 14.2 8.4 15.0
Bali 3.7 5.6 3.2 5.9
West_Nusa_Tenggara 1.9 6.6 6.6 6.6
South_Kalimantan 7.5 4.6 11.8 3.6
South_Sulawesi 5.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
Central_Kalimantan 0.0 0.1
Observations 107 6,424 808 5,723
Notes: Data: IFLS-3 wave (2000), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple.
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A.5. Robustness checks
A.5.1. Estimates using 2007 data
Figure A.1.: Histograms of perceived female (left graph) and male (right graph)
decision-making power with 2007 data
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Note: Data: IFLS-4 wave (2007), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Graph: two histograms
on male and female perception of male and female decision-making power. Grey area: husband’s perception.
Black lined bars: wife’s perception. Scale: left (right) graph: decision-making power is captured as number of
household decision domains the wife (husband) is involved in over total number of household decision domains;
Value 1 on x-axis indicates that wife (husband) has a say in all household decisions.
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Table A.23.: Type of statement combinations
and labor outcomes with 2007 data
Dependent variables:
(1) (2) (3)
Wife
working
(Yes = 1/
No = 0)
Hours
worked
(in h worked pa)
Unpaid
family
worker
(Yes = 1/
No = 0)
Concordance:
CF: Wife and Husb: (f) 0.519∗∗∗ 965.260∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(0.026) (151.683) (0.043)
CB: Wife and Husb: (mf) 0.483∗∗∗ 1046.705∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗
(0.021) (51.778) (0.027)
CN: Wife and Husb: (none) 0.603∗∗∗ 1513.645∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(0.033) (85.859) (0.037)
Discordance:
DFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb: (m) ∨ (none) 0.278
∗∗∗ 540.894∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
(0.014) (50.542) (0.021)
DMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife: (m) ∨ (none) 0.199
∗∗∗ 375.495∗∗∗ -0.039∗
(0.025) (59.323) (0.022)
DOBOF: One Spouse: (f);
Other Spouse: (mf) 0.448
∗∗∗ 1008.505∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗
(0.024) (94.427) (0.027)
DONOM: One Spouse: (none);
Other Spouse: (m) 0.014 371.239 -0.307
∗∗∗
(0.109) (335.969) (0.104)
Household attributes:
Log HH income 0.041∗∗∗ 221.271∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗
(0.008) (25.788) (0.014)
Constant -0.334∗∗ -3.4e+03∗∗∗ 1.407∗∗∗
(0.119) (392.292) (0.190)
Control for (spousal) age and education X X X
Control for N HH adults, N HH children, migration X X X
Region dummies X X X
Observations 7,562 7,562 4,802
R2 0.22 0.16 0.14
Clusters 19 19 19
Robust standard errors clustered at regional level Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: employment status of wife (binary), re-
ported hours worked per year (weekly hours multiplied with weeks worked) and status as unpaid
family worker (binary); Baseline group: concordant couples, perceiving husband as the decision
maker; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s
attributes; Data: IFLS-4 wave (2007), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Ty-
pology: CM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, CF: concordant report of wife
as sole decision maker, CB: concordant report of joint decision making; CN: concordant report of
neither partner as decision maker, DFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband
does not, DMF: husband perceives female decision making power, wife does not, DOBOF: both
spouses perceive female decision making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker,
the other joint decision making, DONOM: one of the spouses perceives that neither spouse makes
the decision, the other spouse perceives male decision maker; Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.24.: Type of statement combinations
and contraception use with 2007 data
Dependent variable:
Couple uses contraception
(1) (2) (3)
No controls Baseline
Baseline
with
exclusion
restriction 2
Concordance:
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m) -0.102 -0.113 -0.112
(0.089) (0.077) (0.089)
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf) -0.083∗ -0.066 -0.047
(0.044) (0.046) (0.034)
Discordance:
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb:(m) -0.060
∗∗ -0.018 -0.022
(0.025) (0.027) (0.028)
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife:(m) -0.041 -0.047 -0.035
(0.041) (0.048) (0.034)
cDOBOF: One Spouse: (f);
Other Spouse: (mf) -0.047 -0.047 -0.037
(0.043) (0.040) (0.031)
Constant 0.843∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.163) (0.137)
Income, age, HH and
education control X X
Region dummies X X
Observations 4,838 4,734 4,371
R2 0.0048 0.052 0.056
Clusters 17 17 17
Robust standard
errors clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: contraceptive
use; Baseline group: concordant couples, perceiving wife as the sole
decision maker; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by de-
fault, Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS-4 wave
(2007), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision
making domain: “whether you and your spouse use contraception”;
Typology: cCM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker,
cCB: concordant report of joint decision making, cDFM: wife perceives
female decision making power, husband does not, cDMF: husband per-
ceives female decision making power, wife does not, cDOBOF: both
spouses perceive female decision making power, one of them perceives
a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making; Informa-
tion for exclusion restriction 1 unavailable in 2007; ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.25.: Type of statement combinations
and their association with covert method use with 2007 data
Dependent variable: Couple uses covert method
conditional on contraceptive use
(1) (2) (3)
No controls Baseline + Exclusionrestriction 2
Concordance:
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m) -0.165 -0.100 -0.100
(0.119) (0.093) (0.093)
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf) 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Discordance:
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb:(m) -0.000 0.007 0.007
(0.033) (0.029) (0.029)
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife:(m) 0.048 0.029 0.029
(0.058) (0.043) (0.043)
cDOBOF: One Spouse: (f);
Other Spouse: (mf) 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant 0.715∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.131) (0.131)
Income, age, HH and
Education control X X
Region dummies X X
Observations 3,753 3,671 3,671
R2 0.0012 0.046 0.046
Clusters 17 17 17
Robust standard
errors clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: covert contraceptive use
conditional on contraceptive use; Baseline group: concordant couples, perceiv-
ing wife as the sole decision maker; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes
by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes; Data: IFLS-4 wave
(2007), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision making
domain: “whether you and your spouse use contraception”; Typology: cCM:
concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, cCB: concordant report
of joint decision making, cDFM: wife perceives female decision making power,
husband does not, cDMF: husband perceives female decision making power, wife
does not, cDOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision making power, one of
them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making; In-
formation for exclusion restriction 1 unavailable in 2007; Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at
the 1%/5%/10% level.
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A.5.2. Alternative specification: covert methods
Table A.26.: Exclusion of all pill users:
types of statement combinations
and covert method use
Dependent variable: Couple uses covert method
conditional on contraceptive use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No controls Baseline + Exclusionrestriction 1
+ Exclusion
restriction 2
+ Exclusion
restriction
1 and 2
Concordance:
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m) -0.264∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.067) (0.089) (0.067) (0.089)
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf) -0.046∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗
(0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017)
Discordance:
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb:(m) -0.043
∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.044∗∗∗ -0.029
(0.012) (0.010) (0.024) (0.010) (0.024)
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife:(m) -0.046
∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016)
cDOBOF: One spouse: (f);
Other spouse: (mf) -0.017
∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
Constant 0.978∗∗∗ 1.281∗∗∗ 1.276∗∗∗ 1.281∗∗∗ 1.276∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.093) (0.108) (0.093) (0.108)
Region dummies X X X X
Income, age, HH and
education ccntrol X X X X
Observations 3,155 2,849 1,612 2,849 1,612
R2 0.025 0.088 0.082 0.088 0.082
Clusters 18 18 18 18 18
Robust standard
errors clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: covert contraceptive use conditional on contra-
ceptive use; Baseline group: concordant couples, perceiving wife as the sole decision maker; Data:
IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision making domain:
“whether you and your spouse use contraception”; Typology: cCM: concordant report of husband as
sole decision maker, cCB: concordant report of joint decision making, cDFM: wife perceives female
decision making power, husband does not, cDMF: husband perceives female decision making power,
wife does not, cDOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision making power, one of them perceives a
sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making; Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at regional level ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table A.27.: Classification of pill as covert method:
types of statement combinations
and covert method use
Dependent variable: Couple uses covert method
conditional on contraceptive use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No controls Baseline
Baseline
with
exclusion
restriction 1
Baseline
with
exclusion
restriction 2
Baseline
with
exclusion
restriction
1 and 2
Concordance:
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m) -0.239∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.058) (0.074) (0.058) (0.074)
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf) -0.041∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014)
Discordance:
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb:(m) -0.039
∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.030 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.030
(0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) (0.021)
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife:(m) -0.040
∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
cDOBOF: One spouse: (f);
Other spouse: (mf) -0.015
∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Constant 0.985∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.071) (0.083) (0.071) (0.083)
Region dummies X X X X
Income, age, HH and
education control X X X X
Observations 4,016 3,640 2,047 3,640 2,047
R2 0.024 0.076 0.069 0.076 0.069
Clusters 18 18 18 18 18
Robust standard
errors clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard OLS estimate; Dependent variable: covert contraceptive use conditional on
contraceptive use; Baseline group: concordant couples, perceiving wife as the sole decision maker;
Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision making
domain: “whether you and your spouse use contraception”; Typology: cCM: concordant report
of husband as sole decision maker, cCB: concordant report of joint decision making, cDFM: wife
perceives female decision making power, husband does not, cDMF: husband perceives female decision
making power, wife does not, cDOBOF: both spouses perceive female decision making power, one of
them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making; Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at regional level ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
150 A. Diverging perceptions of female decision-making power
A.5.3. Alternative specification: household income share
Table A.28.: Fixed effects model: alternative coding of household income share
Food expenditure: Wife: 
Husb:
Routine purchases: Wife: 
Husb:
Children's education: Wife: 
Husb: 
Children's health: Wife:
Husb: 
Large expensive purchases: Wife:
Husb:
Money to wife's family: Wife:
Husb:
Money to husband's family: Wife:
Husb:
Gifts for weddings/parties: Wife:
Husb:
Monthly Arisan (lottery): Wife:
Husb:
Monthly savings: Wife:
Husb:
Time husband spends social.: Wife:
Husb:
Time wife spends social.: Wife:
Husb:
Labor market decisions: Wife:
Husb:
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Coefficient of female income share on
Outcome that wife / husband 
 perceive female decision making power
Note: Alternative household share calculation; Fixed effects estimate; Data: IFLS waves 3, 4 and 5, panel data
2000 to 2014, one observation is one couple, Dependent variable: wife (husband) states that wife has decision
making power in specific domain; Ticks indicate 95 percent confidence interval.
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Table A.29.: IV model: alternative coding of household income share
Dependent variable:
female decision-making share from ...
(1) (2) (3) (4)
...Wife’s
perspective
(Land-owners
only)
...Husband’s
perspective
(Land-owners
only)
...Wife’s
perspective
(Full
sample)
...Husband’s
perspective
(Full
sample)
Female income share 0.481∗∗ 0.482∗∗ 0.538∗∗ 0.574∗∗
(0.206) (0.202) (0.242) (0.238)
Any land 0.049∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Constant 0.687∗∗∗ 0.771∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.154) (0.121) (0.125)
Control for (spousal) age
and education X X X X
Control for income,
N HH adults, N HH children,
migration
X X X X
Observations 1,499 1,499 3,377 3,377
Underid. F-Statistic 15.7 15.7 17.0 17.0
(p-Value) 0.110 0.110 0.0755 0.0755
Weak id. F-Statistic 9.578 9.578 25.26 25.26
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Instrumental variable reduced results; Dependent variable: female share in house-
hold decision making across all decision domains; Data: IFLS-3 wave (2000), cross-sectional
data, one observation is one couple; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default,
Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s attributes
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A.5.4. Alternative specification: instrumental variable coding
Table A.30 repeats the instrumental variable estimation with an alternative instru-
ment coding. Before, we coded an indicator variable vector reflecting all possible six
reactions [Q, S, T, U, V, W] of table A.6 to the two events (crop loss and natural dis-
asters). We now include an extended list of reactions, namely [O, P, Q, S, T, U, V, W].
Keeping our two possible events, this results in a vector of 16 indicator variables. This
instrument is not valid as suggested by the underidentification and overidentification
statistics provided in table A.30.
Table A.30.: IV model: reduced form results with alternative set of instruments
Dependent variable:
female decision-making share from ...
(1) (2) (3) (4)
...Wife’s
perspective
(Land-
owners
only)
...Husband’s
perspective
(Land-
owners
only)
...Wife’s
perspective
(Full
sample)
...Husband’s
perspective
(Full
sample)
Female income share 0.457∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗ 0.437∗∗
(0.189) (0.179) (0.199) (0.184)
Any land 0.033∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010)
Constant 0.523∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.098) (0.086) (0.083)
Control for (spousal) age
and education X X X X
Control for HH income,
N HH adults, N HH children,
migration
X X X X
Observations 2,276 2,276 6,053 6,053
Underid. F-Statistic 22.9 22.9 20.3 20.3
Underid. P-val. 0.0431 0.0431 0.0878 0.0878
Weak id. F-Statistic 16.81 16.81 11.31 11.31
Overid. F-Statistic 9.795 15.87 10.60 26.72
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard
errors Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form IV results; Dependent variable: female share in household decision making across all
decision domains; Individual level attributes are wife’s attributes by default, Spouse (Sp:) refers to husband’s
attributes; alternative coding of instrument; Data: IFLS-3 wave (2000), cross-sectional data, one observation is
one couple; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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A.6. Further analyses
A.6.1. Relative education and power
The four tables A.31, A.32, A.33 and A.34 describe the relationship between perceived
power from both partners’ perspective and educational achievement of both partners.
Tables A.31, A.32, A.33 and A.34 show that holding male education constant, higher
female education is associated with higher female power. This is true for the husband’s
and the wife’s perspective. A comparison across tables also allows to see that holding
female education constant, higher education of husbands is associated with higher self-
perceived power (The group of not formally educated husbands forms an exception in
this regard).
We also observe that the male (female) assessment of female (male) power is almost
always lower than the female (male) self-assessment. The gap between not formally
educated women and women that received a tertiary education is substantial. For
wives of husbands with primary or secondary education, the difference amounts to
between nine and ten percentage points – from the wife’s perspective. This difference
is even larger (eleven percentage points) for women whose husbands have received
tertiary education.
Table A.31.: Education and power: wives
with husbands without formal education
Husband without formal education,
wife with:
no formal
education
elementary
education
secondary
education
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
Perception of female power:
Wife: own decision share 0.65 0.73 0.83
Husb: wife’s decision share 0.59 0.63 0.71
Perception of male power:
Wife: husband’s decision share 0.51 0.49 0.63
Husb: own decision share 0.61 0.59 0.71
Observations 109 123 13
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple.
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Table A.32.: Education and power: wives
with husbands with primary education
Husband with primary education,
wife with:
no formal
education
elementary
education
secondary
education
tertiary
education
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
Perception of female power:
Wife: own decision share 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.80
Husb: wife’s decision share 0.64 0.68 0.70 0.80
Perception of male power:
Wife: husband’s decision share 0.53 0.57 0.62 0.57
Husb: own decision share 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.60
Observations 252 1,988 794 18
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple.
Table A.33.: Education and power: wives
with husbands with secondary education
Husband with secondary education,
wife with:
no formal
education
elementary
education
secondary
education
tertiary
education
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
Perception of female power:
Wife: own decision share 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.80
Husb: wife’s decision share 0.64 0.69 0.72 0.76
Perception of male power:
Wife: husband’s decision share 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.67
Husb: own decision share 0.71 0.67 0.70 0.69
Observations 24 966 2,867 414
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple.
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Table A.34.: Education and power: wives
with husbands with tertiary education
Husband with tertiary education,
wife with:
no formal
education
elementary
education
secondary
education
tertiary
education
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
–
mean
share
Perception of female power:
Wife: own decision share 0.44 0.66 0.77 0.82
Husb: wife’s decision share 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.78
Perception of male power:
Wife: husband’s decision share 0.58 0.65 0.69 0.72
Husb: own decision share 0.78 0.72 0.73 0.75
Observations 3 50 466 574
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple.
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A.6.2. Couple attributes associated with the perception of
female power
Table A.35 estimates the relationship between the overall female decision making share
and individual as well as household attributes. We do so for both perspectives, the
husband’s and the wife’s. We run four distinct models for four variables of particular
interest: female income share, dowry and female ownership over the family’s house
or the family’s business. We find that from the wife’s perspective, female business
ownership is positively associated with female decision making power, while it is not
from the husband’s perspective. From both perspectives, female education is positively
associated with female decision making power as is the overall household income.
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A.6.3. Cross tabulation of labor supply and contraceptive use
domains
Table A.36.: Cross tabulation of labor supply and contraceptive use domains
Labor supply
Concordance
in percent of column
Labor supply
Discordance
in percent of column
Full
sample
CM CF CB DFM DMF DOBOF
Contraceptive use
Concordance:
cCM 5.3 0.7 1.4 1.7 2.0
cCF 26.2 65.0 12.3 19.0 18.4 27.3 19.0
cCB 17.4 8.3 49.3 25.3 27.7 21.7 32.1
Discordance:
cDFM 13.1 5.0 3.8 17.8 3.6 5.3 9.2
cDMF 13.1 4.5 5.6 16.0 11.0 8.4
cDOBOF 24.9 21.7 29.4 31.0 32.6 34.8 29.3
Observations 1,492 60 2,415 1,560 776 374 6,688
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Typology: CM: concordant report
of husband as sole decision maker, CF: concordant report of wife as sole decision maker, CB: concordant report of joint
decision making; CN: concordant report of neither partner as decision maker, DFM: wife perceives female decision making
power, husband does not, DMF: husband perceives female decision making power, wife does not, DOBOF: both spouses
perceive female decision making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other joint decision making,
DONOM: one of the spouses perceives that neither spouse makes the decision, the other spouse perceives male decision
maker; One observation is one couple.
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A.6.4. Presence of spouse at interview
This section provides insight into the endogenous relationship between the presence
of spouse at the other spouse’s interview and reported decision making power and
outcomes. We assume that this relationship is endogenous because we expect that the
presence of a spouse is not independent of couples’ unobserved features.
able A.37 relates statement combinations to the average reported decision-making
power of husbands and wives. Tables A.38 and A.39 do so for the labor supply and
contraceptive decision domain respectively. The first column of both tables presents
average values for all couples at which both spouses were present at the interview of
their spouse. Columns two and three present equivalent values for only one spouse
being present at the other spouse’s interview with the other spouse being interviewed
alone. The last column presents results for the case that both spouses were alone
during their interviews.
In table A.37, we find that the average rates of total discordance across all dimensions
are highest where neither spouse was present during the other spouse’s interview.
Compared to cases in which both partners are present at each other’s interview, we find
less frequent concordant reporting of joint decision making and higher rates of any form
of discordance. In table A.38, we find similar patterns for the specific question on labor
supply decision making. There is no clear emerging picture concerning the relationship
between spouse presence and rates of discordance in the domain of contraceptive use
decision making (see table A.39). In table A.40, we find that the reported rates of
contraceptive use and covert method use do not differ at a statistically significant
level between women whose partners were present and those whose partners were not
present during their interview. In table A.41, we find that the reported rates of overall
female decision shares are higher if husbands were present during the wives’ interviews.
Same holds for the husband’s reported decision share from the wife’s perspective. The
husband’s self-reported decision share is uninformed by the fact whether he was or was
not present during his wife’s interview.
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Table A.37.: Concordance and discordance by presence of spouse: averages across
all domains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Both
present
at both
interviews
Wife at
husb.’s
interview
Wife
alone
at own
interview
Husb. at
wife’s
interview
Husb.
alone
at own
interview
No
presence
of
spouse
Full
sample
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
Concordance:
CM: Wife and Husb: (m) 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
CF: Wife and Husb: (f) 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09
CB: Wife and Husb: (mf) 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.31
CN: Wife and Husb: (none) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Sum concordance 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.54
Discordance:
DFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb: (m) ∨ (none) 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16
DMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife: (m) ∨ (none) 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
DOBOF: One spouse: (f);
Other spouse: (mf) 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
DONOM: One spouse: (none);
Other spouse: (m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sum discordance 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.46
Observations 2,803 2,258 1,195 2,406 8,662
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Typology:
CM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, CF: concordant report of wife as sole
decision maker, CB: concordant report of joint decision making; CN: concordant report of neither
partner as decision maker, DFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not,
DMF: husband perceives female decision making power, wife does not, DOBOF: both spouses per-
ceive female decision making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other
joint decision making, DONOM: one of the spouses perceives that neither spouse makes the decision,
the other spouse perceives male decision maker
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Table A.38.: Concordance and discordance by presence of spouse:
labor supply domain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Both
present
at both
interviews
Wife at
husb.’s
interview
Wife
alone
at own
interview
Husb. at
wife’s
interview
Husb.
alone
at own
interview
No
presence
of
spouse
Full
sample
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
Concordance:
CM: Wife and Husb: (m) 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.21
CF: Wife and Husb: (f) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
CB: Wife and Husb: (mf) 0.40 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.37
CN: Wife and Husb: (none) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sum concordance 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.59
Discordance:
DFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb: (m) ∨ (none) 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.23
DMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife: (m) ∨ (none) 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12
DOBOF: One spouse: (f);
Other spouse: (mf) 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
DONOM: One spouse: (none);
Other spouse: (m) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sum discordance 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.43 0.41
Observations 2,803 2,258 1,195 2,406 8,662
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Typology:
CM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, CF: concordant report of wife as sole
decision maker, CB: concordant report of joint decision making; CN: concordant report of neither
partner as decision maker, DFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not,
DMF: husband perceives female decision making power, wife does not, DOBOF: both spouses per-
ceive female decision making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the other
joint decision making, DONOM: one of the spouses perceives that neither spouse makes the decision,
the other spouse perceives male decision maker; Decision on “whether you / your spouse works”.
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Table A.39.: Concordance and discordance by presence of spouse:
decision making on contraceptive use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Both
present
at both
interviews
Wife at
husb.’s
interview
Wife
alone
at own
interview
Husb. at
wife’s
interview
Husb.
alone
at own
interview
No
presence
of
spouse
Full
sample
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
–
in percent
of column
Concordance:
cCM: Wife and Husb: (m) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
cCF: Wife and Husb: (f) 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.15
cCB: Wife and Husb: (mf) 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25
cCN: Wife and Husb: (no use) 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09
Sum concordance 0.50 0.52 0.47 0.50 0.50
Discordance:
cDFM: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb:(m) 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
cDMF: Husb: (f) ∨ (mf);
Wife:(m) 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
cDOBOF: One Spouse: (f);
Other Spouse: (mf) 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.24 0.23
cNM: Wife: (no use);
Husb: (m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
cNF: Wife: (no use);
Husb: (f) ∨ (mf) 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06
cFN: Wife: (f) ∨ (mf);
Husb: (no use) 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
cFM: Wife: (m);
Husb: (no use) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sum discordance 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.50 0.50
Observations 2,803 2,258 1,195 2,406 8,662
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Typology:
CM: concordant report of husband as sole decision maker, CF: concordant report of wife as sole
decision maker, CB: concordant report of joint decision making; CN: concordant report of neither
partner as decision maker, DFM: wife perceives female decision making power, husband does not,
DMF: husband perceives female decision making power, wife does not, DOBOF: both spouses
perceive female decision making power, one of them perceives a sole female decision maker, the
other joint decision making, DONOM: one of the spouses perceives that neither spouse makes the
decision, the other spouse perceives male decision maker; Decision on “whether you and your spouse
use contraception”.
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Table A.40.: Presence of spouse: contraceptive use
Contraceptive use and covert methods use
by presence of husband during
book 4 interview
Husband
not present Husband present Diff.
N
Husband
not present
N
Husband
present
Contraceptive use 0.62 0.60 0.02 3,840 3,053
Use of covert method 0.74 0.74 -0.00 2,375 1,834
Total observations 6,893
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Decision making do-
main: “whether you and your spouse use contraception”; Covert: Injections, IUD, AKDR, Spiral, Norplant,
Implant, Female Sterilization. Non-covert: Pill, Condom, Rhythm, Calendar, Coitus Interruptus, Male Steriliza-
tion. Not considered: Femidom, Intravag, Traditional Massage, Traditional Herbs, others.
Table A.41.: Presence of spouse: overall perception of power
Overall perception of power by presence
of husband during interview
Husband
not present
Husband
present Diff.
N
Husband
not present
N
Husband
present
Perception of female power:
Wife: Own decision share 0.73 0.75 -0.01*** 4,664 3,998
Husb: Wife’s decision share 0.70 0.71 -0.02*** 4,664 3,998
Perception of male power:
Wife: Husband’s decision share 0.61 0.65 -0.03*** 4,664 3,998
Husb: Own decision share 0.67 0.68 -0.01 4,664 3,998
Total Observations 8,662
Notes: Data: IFLS-5 wave (2014), cross-sectional data, one observation is one couple; Definition: Overall female/male
decision making share: Number of decisions with female/male involvement divided by number of overall decisions.
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B.1. Definitions and coding of variables
Living conditions variable scale
The scale is reversed from the original scaling in the raw data to offer a more intuitive
interpretation.
4 = Family lives in conditions that are adequate, as per local standards (defined on
community level in consultation with key stakeholders).
3 = Family lives in conditions that are fairly adequate, as per local standards.
2 = Family lives in conditions that are below local standards, but not compromising
the personal well-being of individual (and/or family).
1 = Family lives in conditions that are below local standards, and are compromising
the personal well-being of individual (and/or family).
Emotional well-being scale
The scale is reversed from the original scaling in the raw data to offer a more intuitive
interpretation.
4 = Care-giver is pro-active in addressing the situation of her/his family, and is emo-
tionally stable, with a generally positive outlook.
3 = Care-giver often takes action to address the situation of her/his family, but is
struggling to cope with stress or is emotionally unstable.
2 = Care-giver rarely takes action to address the situation of her/his family, and is
struggling to cope with stress or is emotionally unstable.
1 = Care-giver is passive (not taking any action to address the situation of her/his
family) and/or is emotionally unstable (showing signs of anger, irritability, aggression
or depression).
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Alcoholism variable
Social workers report whether alcohol and/or drug use negatively affects the family.
If either one of the two caregivers abuses alcohol or drugs, it is coded as 1, if none of
the two abuse alcohol or drugs, it is coded as 0.
B.2. Auxiliary tables
B.2.1. Household expenditure data and treatment status by
regency/city
Table B.1 shows total household expenditure figures in IDR of all regencies/cities
considered in the study. Table B.2 shows the development of household expenditure
figures in IDR over time and the assignment of regions to treatment and control status.
Table B.2 displays household expenditure growth over time in columns one and two.
Numbers are based on World Bank data. In column three the table indicates whether
a given regency/city is located on Java or not. Column four shows whether a regency
is part of the treatment group. The treatment group is located in the areas of DI
Yogyakarta and Yogyakarta. Regencies that are on Java but not in the treatment
group form the control group. Regencies that are neither on Java nor in the treatment
group are not part of the main analysis but part of the synthetic control approach.
Regencies and cities on Java (see column 3 for information on location) display a
bandwidth ranging from -14 percent to positive 13 percent for 2013 on 2014. The
rural DI Yogyakarta region around the city of Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta, Kota) displays
the lowest overall growth figure of negative 14 percent. It is also the region in which
a large share of the treatment group is located.
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Table B.1.: Household expenditure by year and by regency/city
Household expenditure per capita
in IDR
2011 2012 2013 2014
Regency/city
Aceh Barat, Kab. 540,932 638,680 632,962 684,435
Aceh Besar, Kab. 634,162 713,185 648,954 713,994
Bogor, Kab. 600,637 738,744 683,325 774,349
Bogor, Kota 763,232 816,762 811,084 883,508
DI Yogyakarta, Prop. 649,901 721,349 692,732 748,303
Jawa Barat, Prop. 587,951 674,459 680,911 781,065
Medan, Kota 717,967 861,019 976,107 957,268
Semarang, Kab. 522,294 661,918 630,186 739,148
Semarang, Kota 749,405 760,646 1,023,720 1,058,218
Sikka, Kab. 332,327 379,175 447,326 462,701
Tabanan, Kab. 755,171 830,672 838,093 993,577
Yogyakarta, Kota 913,793 904,525 1,088,371 940,194
Observations 26,879 26,879 26,879 26,879
Notes: Data: Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER),
World Bank Group; Total household expenditure per capita over time in IDR; Abbrevia-
tions Kab and Kota refer to regencies (Kabupaten) and cities (Kota); Prop. refers to areas
with available province-level data, only.
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Table B.2.: Household expenditure growth (in IDR)
and treatment/control status by regency/city
Household expenditure per capita Treatment status
Growth
2011 to
2014
Growth
2013 to
2014
Share of
group
living
on Java
Share of
group in
treatment
group
Regency/city in percent in percent in percent in percent
Aceh Barat, Kab. 0.27 0.08 0.00 0.00
Aceh Besar, Kab. 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.00
Bogor, Kab. 0.29 0.13 1.00 0.00
Bogor, Kota 0.16 0.09 1.00 0.00
DI Yogyakarta, Prop. 0.15 0.08 1.00 1.00
Jawa Barat, Prop. 0.33 0.15 1.00 0.00
Medan, Kota 0.33 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Semarang, Kab. 0.42 0.17 1.00 0.00
Semarang, Kota 0.41 0.03 1.00 0.00
Sikka, Kab. 0.39 0.03 0.00 0.00
Tabanan, Kab. 0.32 0.19 0.00 0.00
Yogyakarta, Kota 0.03 -0.14 1.00 1.00
Total 0.29 0.05 0.45 0.25
Observations 26,879 26,879 26,879 26,879
Notes: Data: Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER), World Bank Group;
Assignment to Java / Non Java groups and treatment group according to geographical location; Abbreviations Kab
and Kota refer to regencies (Kabupaten) and cities (Kota); Prop. refers to areas with available province level data,
only.
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B.2.2. Household expenditure data and treatment status by
SOS Children’s Villages community
Table B.3 shows the development of household expenditure at the level of SOS Chil-
dren’s Villages communities. The first letter indicates the programme with which a
community is associated (see also table notes).
Table B.3.: Java only: Household expenditure growth over time by
SOS Children’s Villages community and by treatment status
Household expenditure
per capita
Treatment
status
Household
expend.
2014
in IDR
Growth
2013 to
2014
in percent
Growth
2011 to
2014
in percent
Share of
group in
treatment
group
in percent
SOS Children’s Villages
community name
J: Bogor (Summarized) 854,322.24 0.10 0.19 0.00
L: Andesde 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Cakrawala 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Huntap 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Huntap Glagaharjo 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Jayagiri 781,065.46 0.15 0.33 0.00
L: Jogoluhur 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Kota Jogja 940,194.33 -0.14 0.03 1.00
L: Pakridhan Yogawidagdo 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Puri Manunggal B.A.B. 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Pusaka 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Sapa Jiwa 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Seputar 781,065.46 0.15 0.33 0.00
L: Sumedang 781,065.46 0.15 0.33 0.00
L: Turus Becik 748,303.42 0.08 0.15 1.00
L: Wangunsari 781,065.46 0.15 0.33 0.00
S: Ambarawa 739,147.83 0.17 0.42 0.00
S: Sayung 1058217.76 0.03 0.41 0.00
S: Tambak Rejo 1058217.76 0.03 0.41 0.00
Total 843,459.94 0.06 0.22 0.55
Observations 12,169 12,169 12,169 12,169
Notes: Data: Indonesia Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-DAPOER), World Bank Group;
Total household expenditure per capita over time in IDR; The first letter indicates the SOS Children’s Village
programme with which a programme is associated. J for SOS Social Centre Jakarta, L for SOS Social Centre
Lembang, S for SOS Family Strengthening Programme Semarang; Abbreviations Kab and Kota refer to
regencies (Kabupaten) and cities (Kota); Prop. refers to regions on province level.
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B.3. Descriptive statistics
B.3.1. Number of observations by quarter (full sample and
Java only)
Table B.4 presents the total number of observations over time for the full sample. This
sample is used for the synthetic control approach. Table B.5 presents the subsample of
communities on Java. This sample is used for the difference-in-differences estimation.
Table B.4.: Number of observations by quarter: full sample
Number
Quarters totalobservations
Relative share
in percent
Cumulative share
in percent
1 1,989 7.4 7.4
2 2,024 7.5 14.9
3 2,029 7.5 22.5
4 2,027 7.5 30.0
5 2,025 7.5 37.6
6 2,024 7.5 45.1
7 2,019 7.5 52.6
8 2,018 7.5 60.1
9 2,018 7.5 67.6
10 1,931 7.2 74.8
11 1,737 6.5 81.3
12 1,715 6.4 87.6
13 1,685 6.3 93.9
14 1,638 6.1 100.0
Observations 26,879
Notes: One observation is one family; Quarter 1/2/3/4 = data collected during first,
second, third, fourth quarter of 2013 respectively; Quarter 5/6/7/8 = data collected
during first, second, third, fourth quarter of 2014 respectively; Quarter 9/10/11/12 = data
collected during first, second, third, fourth quarter of 2015 respectively; Quarter 13/14 =
data collected during first and second quarter of 2016 respectively; For the estimations, I
only consider families that have been admitted to the support program before 2013 and
for which reports are given until at least 2015; All observations of families that do not
fulfill these prerequisites are dropped.
B.3 Descriptive statistics 171
Table B.5.: Number of observations by quarter: Java only
Number
Quarters observationsJava only
Relative share
in percent
Cumulative share
in percent
1 897 7.4 7.4
2 906 7.4 14.8
3 910 7.5 22.3
4 909 7.5 29.8
5 908 7.5 37.2
6 906 7.4 44.7
7 901 7.4 52.1
8 900 7.4 59.5
9 900 7.4 66.9
10 831 6.8 73.7
11 813 6.7 80.4
12 815 6.7 87.1
13 808 6.6 93.7
14 765 6.3 100.0
Observations 12,169
Notes: Java only. One observation is one family; Quarter 1/2/3/4 = data collected during
first, second, third, fourth quarter of 2013 respectively; Quarter 5/6/7/8 = data collected
during first, second, third, fourth quarter of 2014 respectively; Quarter 9/10/11/12 = data
collected during first, second, third, fourth quarter of 2015 respectively; Quarter 13/14 =
data collected during first and second quarter of 2016 respectively; For the estimations, I
only consider families that have been admitted to the support program before 2013 and
for which reports are given until at least 2015; All observations of families that do not
fulfill these prerequisites are dropped.
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B.3.2. Descriptive statistics for treatment group by domestic
violence status
Table B.6 presents descriptive statistics for those families living in the treatment area.
The treatment group is divided into whether there are domestic violence reports or
not.
Table B.6.: Descriptive statistics for treatment group by presence of domestic
violence
Families of
treatment group
with:
no
domestic
violence
domestic
violence Diff.
Outcome variables:
Share of fam. with domestic vio. 0.00 1.00 -1.00
Log household expenditure per capita 13.58 13.60 -0.02
Living conditions (1 to 4=good) 2.51 2.49 0.02
Emotional well-being (1 to 4=good) 2.67 2.27 0.40∗∗∗
Share families with alcohol/drug abuse 0.01 0.15 -0.14∗∗∗
Cargegiver characteristics:
Caregiver education (1 to 4) 5.41 6.15 -0.74∗
Age female caregivers 41.86 37.35 4.52∗
Age male caregivers 44.22 41.45 2.77
Share biological children 0.99 1.00 -0.01
Support variables:
Time since program
admission in years 5.52 4.27 1.25
∗∗∗
Support: Food 0.65 0.83 -0.18∗
Support: Healthcare 0.79 0.93 -0.13∗
Support: Material 0.30 0.56 -0.26∗∗∗
Support: Economic 0.65 0.66 -0.01
Support: Living conditions 0.57 0.68 -0.11
Support: Psychosocial 0.78 0.93 -0.15∗
Support: Childcare 0.76 0.93 -0.17∗
Support: Legal 0.45 0.66 -0.21∗∗
Notes: Data: Only treatment area; Only data for three last quarters of 2014 (post-treatment);
Treatment group divided into families without report of domestic violence (column 1) and with
report of domestic violence (column 2) during this period; Definition variables: Education care-
giver on scale 1 to 4 indicates 1) no formal education, 2) primary education, 3) lower secondary
education, and 4) higher achievement than lower secondary education respectively; Support do-
mains indicate support given by SOS in respective domains; See appendix section B.1 for exact
other scales and definitions of variables.
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B.3.3. Descriptive statistics by location on Java
Table B.7 presents descriptive statistics for those families that live on Java and those
that live not on Java. Communities on Java are used for all difference-in-differences
estimates. The families that are not living on Java are only used for the synthetic
control approach (together with families living on Java).
Table B.7.: Descriptive statistics by location on Java
Java Non-Java Fullsample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Outcome variables:
Share of fam. with domestic vio. 0.002 0.047 0.002 0.049 0.002 0.048
Log household expenditure per capita 13.581 0.19 13.241 0.32 13.394 0.32
Living conditions (1 to 4=good) 2.677 0.63 2.368 0.49 2.496 0.57
Emotional well-being (1 to 4=good) 2.843 0.61 2.910 0.30 2.882 0.46
Share families with alcohol/drug abuse 0.006 0.074 0.016 0.13 0.011 0.11
Cargegiver characteristics:
Caregiver education (1 to 4) 2.609 0.75 2.317 0.52 2.443 0.65
Age female caregivers 46.449 11.0 41.319 9.24 42.723 10.0
Age male caregivers 44.529 10.2 44.759 11.4 44.644 10.8
Share biological children 0.988 0.11 0.997 0.052 0.993 0.083
Support variables:
Time since program
admission in years 5.901 1.99 6.265 1.57 6.101 1.78
Support: Food 0.547 0.50 0.561 0.50 0.555 0.50
Support: Healthcare 0.682 0.47 0.926 0.26 0.816 0.39
Support: Material 0.254 0.44 0.150 0.36 0.196 0.40
Support: Economic 0.482 0.50 0.609 0.49 0.552 0.50
Support: Living conditions 0.514 0.50 0.207 0.41 0.345 0.48
Support: Psychosocial 0.785 0.41 0.434 0.50 0.592 0.49
Support: Childcare 0.760 0.43 0.615 0.49 0.680 0.47
Support: Legal 0.404 0.49 0.305 0.46 0.349 0.48
Observations 2,713 3,329 6,042
Notes: Data: Statistics based on data from first three quarters of 2013; Definition variables: Education caregiver
on scale 1 to 4 indicates 1) no formal education, 2) primary education, 3) lower secondary education, and 4) higher
achievement than lower secondary education respectively; Support domains indicate support given by SOS in
respective domains; See appendix section B.1 for exact other scales and definitions of variables.
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B.4. Robustness checks
B.4.1. Main specification estimated with male primary
caregivers only
Table B.8.: Treatment effects on domestic violence with
male primary caregivers only
Dependent variable:
domestic violence
(1) (2) (3)
No
controls
Minimum
controls
Full
controls
(Baseline
model)
Treatment 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.002∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.011∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004)
Time dummies X X
Programme dummies X X
Age group dummies X X
Support dummies X
Time since
admission and
no. of children
X
Observations 8,773 8,732 8,732
Adj.R2 0.0081 0.015 0.015
Clusters 4 4 4
Family fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Standard erros
clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Difference-in-differences estimate with family fixed-effects; Depen-
dent variable: domestic violence (yes = 1/no = 0); Robust standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance
at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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B.4.2. Alternative outcomes estimated with fixed effects
Table B.9.: Treatment effects on alternative outcomes with fixed effects
Alternative outcomes:
(fixed effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household
expenditure
Household
living
conditions
Emotional
well-being
Alcohol/
drug
abuse
Treatment -0.054∗ -0.060 -0.067∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.053) (0.018) (0.000)
Time s. Prog. Adm. -0.007∗∗∗ 0.021 0.003 0.004∗
(0.001) (0.010) (0.018) (0.002)
Constant 13.651∗∗∗ 2.595∗∗∗ 2.953∗∗∗ -0.031∗
(0.015) (0.054) (0.200) (0.012)
Time dummies X X X X
Programme dummies X X X X
Age group dummies X X X X
No. of children X X X X
Observations 7,207 11,134 11,583 12,128
Adj.R2 0.37 0.018 0.057 0.010
Clusters 4 4 4 4
Family level
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard erros
clustered
at regional level
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Difference-in-differences estimate with family fixed-effects; Dependent variable: column 1:
log of household expenditure in IDR (measured at regency-/city-level), column 2: living conditions
(measured at micro level, scale of 1 to 4, where 4 is good), column 3: emotional well-being (scale of 1
to 4, where 4 is good), column 4: alcohol/drug abuse affects family (yes = 1/no = 0) respectively, see
appendix section B.1 for definitions of variables; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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B.4.3. Omission of Kabupaten Gunungkidul region from
baseline model
Table B.10.: Omission of Kabupaten Gunungkidul region from baseline model
Fixed effects model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No
controls
with smaller
sample
Minimum
controls
with smaller
sample
Full
controls
with smaller
sample
Full
controls
with full
sample
(Baseline Model)
Treatment 0.033∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.002∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.282∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.028) (0.049) (0.026)
Quarter dummies X X X
Programme dummies X X X
Age group dummies X X X
Support dummies X X
Time s. Adm. and
No. of Children X X
Observations 10,305 10,270 10,270 12,128
R2 0.016 0.077 0.091 0.069
Adj.R2 0.0160 0.0750 0.0888 0.0673
Clusters 4 4 4 4
Family FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
SEs clustered
at regional level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Difference-in-differences estimate with family fixed-effects; Dependent variable: domestic violence (yes =
1/no = 0); Columns one to three without Kabupaten Gunungkidul. Column four presents baseline model with full
sample; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at regional level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
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B.4.4. Synthetic control approach: verifying robustness of
previous results
I employ a synthetic control approach to create a control group that allows evaluating
how the treated region could have developed if it would not have been affected by a
volcano eruption. To conduct the analysis, the sample is collapsed on the regency/city
level. The primary caregiver’s age group, the level of primary caregiver education,
the primary caregiver sex, living conditions and household expenditure are used as
pre-treatment regressors to approximate a synthetic control group. Synthetic control
estimations are run for all outcome variables, except for the household expenditure
macro data (This is only available on annual level). The pre-treatment period is
defined as the first 3 quarters of 2013. The treatment period is defined as the first
quarter of 2014 (The last quarter of 2014 is spared due to its exposure to the first
eruption of Mount Merapi). The finding is confirming the hypothesis, that there was
indeed an adverse development caused by the eruption.
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B.5. Disaster information and map
B.5.1. Detailed account of Mount Merapi eruption
The following report of the Mount Merapi eruption is published by Wunderman
(2014b) and describes the eruption and its consequences. Begin of quote (Italics,
bold text by Wunderman (2014b)):
"Actvitiy during 2014. BPPTK noted that on 17 January at 1615, a
white plume rose to 50 m above the summit, heading E. At 1854 LT on 10
March 2014, Merapi erupted forming an ash plume that blew W. The event
was captured on an automated closed-circuit video (CCTV Pasarbubar)
and was followed by two more blasts within a minute (the first at 1855).
At 1908, BPPTK noted a volcanic earthquake (with a maximum amplitude
of 20 cm). Another video monitor (CCTV Bubar) recorded brown eruptive
columns that rose straight up, reaching up to ~1.5 km above the summit.
During 1925 to 1930, the eruption gradually stopped. Around this time,
ash fell on several villages including Umbulharjo, Kepuharjo, Sidorejo, and
Balerante, areas located ~6–7 km to the S of Merapi. During 14-20 March
2014, thick gas plumes rose to ~600 m above the summit. On 17 March,
the BPPTK recorded one such event at 0530. On 27 March 2014, an erup-
tion lasted from 1312 to 1316 LT. The VAAC detected volcanic ash to
~9.8 km altitude, using multi-spectral MTSAT-2 imagery, and the Avia-
tion Color Code was raised to Red. A pilot reported that the "large ash
cloud [was] moving NW." Darwin VAAC received a SACS SO2 alert at
2150 for the plume, and atmospheric SO2 gas was detected SE of Merapi.
By 2232, the volcanic ash appeared to be dissipating; the advisory was
terminated at 0830 on 28 March. The 27 March eruption was the subject
of a Jakarta Post news article by Muryanto and Ayuningtyas (2014), who
indicated that ash fell in the Kemalang and Balerante Klaten regency and
that it was 1 mm thick in some areas. The article also noted an M 5.4
tectonic earthquake that struck ~115 km SE of Malang regency, East Java
on 23 March. The ash discharge had apparently been occurring regularly
since the 2010 eruption but authorities had not taken this as a sign of
an escalation in activity, and they urged locals to remain calm. However,
according to the article, Sukiman, a resident of the nearby Deles district,
said villagers responded to half an hour of ash falling by hitting "kenton-
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gan [bamboo drums] to warn others of the danger." On 15 April, BPPTK
reported that a thick white plume rose to a maximum of 300 m above the
summit. Several tectonic earthquakes occurred in April 2014. On 18 April
at 2033, BPPTK recorded tectonic earthquakes 151 km SW of Merapi at
a depth of 10 km. On 19 April, four more tectonic earthquakes occurred
between 0800 and 2000, and an earthquake lasting 20 minutes was recorded
at 0421 from a station on the peak of Merapi. On 20 April from 0426 to
0440, rumbling could be heard within a radius of 8 km around the volcano.
The BPPTK reported that on 20 April at 1600, an ash plume traveled
W towards the village of Sewukan, amid foggy conditions. The associ-
ated eruption was followed by a widely heard roar and a later thin-to-thick
plume rose to 400 m above the summit at 1800. The activity ultimately
led to ashfall in Sewukan and in sectors to the SE, S, and SW, up to 15 km
away from Merapi’s summit. The ash from this eruption was also detected
by Darwin VAAC, who stated that the ash plume rose to ~10.7 km and
extended ~260 km W to NW. The ash was difficult to distinguish from
meteorological clouds, and at 1004 LT on 21 April, the VAAC terminated
the advisory. In a news article, Minggu (2014) added further details on
the eruption omitted here. The BPPTK conducted a field expedition on
22 April to Merapi’s crater. The expedition found that the eruption on 20
April had changed the summit crater morphology (figure 63). The slit that
cut through the lava dome trending NE had widened by 70 m to the W,
and reddish material that the team judged as indicative of oxidation was
visible around the center of the lava dome. They also found new eruptive
products along the crater’s W side and evidence of new growth at the lava
dome."
Detailed account of Mount Kelud eruption
The following account of the Mount Kelud eruption has been published by Wunderman
(2014a) and describes the eruption. Begin of quote (Italics, bold text by Wunderman
(2014a)):
"Synopsis. On 13 February 2014, the Indonesian National Board for
Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana-BNPB)
reported that a major eruption occurred at Kelut (also known as Kelud)
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volcano in East Java, Indonesia. Ground-based observers had little insight
about the ash plume height, but a number of satellite observations helped
to constrain the height and other eruption parameters such the direction
of plume movement. CALIPSO satellite data revealed that a rapidly rising
portion of the plume ejected material up to an altitude exceeding ~26 km,
well into the tropical stratosphere. Most of the less rapidly rising portions
of the plume remained lower, at 19-20 km altitude. The 2014 eruption
destroyed a dome emplaced in the volcano’s caldera during the previous
eruption in 2007 (BGVN 33:03 and 33:07). According to BNPB in a report
issued on 18 February 2014, ~7 people were killed and ~100,000 evacuated.
At least one commercial aircraft flew into the plume, later landing success-
fully but incurring costly engine damage.
This report discusses the pre- and syn-eruption observations from the early
January through 25 February 2014. Much of the detailed reporting used
here describing Kelut’s behavior came from the Indonesian Centre for Vol-
canology and Geological Hazard Mitigation (CVGHM; also known as Pusat
Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi Bencana Geologi, PVMBG). Kelut is located just
S of Surabaya (Surabaja), Indonesia’s second largest city (see a map, figure
8 in BGVN 33:03). [...]
According to CVGHM, ash plumes rose to an altitude of 17 km and caused
ashfall in areas NE, NW, W, and elsewhere as far as Pacitan (133 km
WSW), Kulon Progo (236 km W), Temanggung (240 km WNW), and
Banyuwangi (228 km E). As ash began to blanket parts of the region, 40
airline flights were cancelled; impacted airports included Juanda (81 km
NE), Adi Sucipto Yogya (208 km W), and Adi Sumarmo Solo (175 km
WNW). News articles reported that flights in and out of seven airports
were cancelled or rerouted. [...]
On 14 February BNPB reported that the eruption had killed four people
(but later estimates were higher): one died due to a collapsing wall, one
from ash inhalation, and two from "shortness of breath." All four victims
lived within 7 km of Kelut in the regency of Malang, an area that re-
ceived ashfall up to 20 cm thick. By 0600 on 14 February, BNPB reported
that the number of displaced people reached 100,248, but the report also
noted that volcanic activity had declined. Later that day BNPB noted
that 76,388 people remained evacuated. Seismicity continued to decline
and was at moderate levels during 15-17 February. During 16-20 February
white plumes rose as high as 1 km and drifted N, NE, and E. Heavy rain
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on 18 February caused lahars in Ngobo, Mangli (Kediri, 35 km WNW),
Bladak (Blitar, 20 km SW), and Konto (Malang, 35 km E). BNPB noted
that the lahars flooded five houses and one mosque, and destroyed two
homes and one bridge. An 18 February BNPB report noted that a total
of 7 people in Malang regency had died, and that the ashfall had affected
farms, including cattle health and dairy production, and the water supply.
Damage to infrastructure in Malang included 3,782 houses, 20 government
buildings, 251 schools, 9 hospitals, and 36 churches. Data from satellite
instruments provided a 14 February 2014 image on sulfur dioxide (SO2)
from Kelut (figure 20). The plume had spread primarily W of the volcano.
[...]
Summary of damage. According to the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2014), "over the first few days
the eruption affected 201,228 people (58,341 families) from 35 villages in
three districts: Blitar, Kediri, and Malang. . . As of 14 February 2014,
there had been seven fatalities and 70 people in hospitals in serious con-
dition suffering from ash inhalation. Around this time the number of in-
ternally displaced persons (IDPs) had reduced to 100,248 people who had
evacuated and camped across the province in 172 IDP camps set up to
cater for their basic needs." "In addition to the volcanic ash, heavy rain
fell and produced cold lahar flooding in Malang, Kediri and Blitar districts.
This caused further damage to buildings, farm lands, and roads." Table 4
gives data on damage to structures in the 3 affected districts surrounding
Kelut through February 2014. The figures are expected to increase once a
more thorough assessment is made. [...]
Lutfi was reported to have stated further that the "impact of Mount Ke-
lud’s eruption will extend far beyond the initial cleanup efforts. Fruit
farmers reportedly lost more than Rp 24 billion ($2 million) in revenue as
ash and debris destroyed whole fields of apples, durian and rambutan that
were ready for harvest. The trees, covered in a thick coating of ash, had
withered from lack of sunlight."
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Appendix C. Birth order effects and
educational achievement
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C.1. Coding of variables
Educational achievement scale
In the database, the main outcome variable is named educational performance. To
align with the terminology used in the previous literature, I use the term educational
achievement, when referring to educational outcomes in this study. This is done be-
cause the description of the raw data fits the definition of educational achievement by
York, Gibson, and Rankin (2015).
The scale is reversed from the original scaling in the raw data to offer a more intuitive
interpretation.
4 = Outstanding performance=Child is learning very well, and progressing as expected
by caregivers, teachers, and other leaders.
3 = Satisfactory performance=Child is learning well, but caregivers, teachers, or other
leaders have a few concerns about progress.
2 = Below average performance=Child is learning and progressing poorly or is falling
behind.
1 =Poor performance=Child has serious problems with learning.
Note: The scale for South America consists of five instead of only four potential out-
comes. The two highest ones are merged based on their wording. Their joint share
among all remaining four outcomes is comparable to the other two continents.
186 C. Birth order effects and educational achievement
C.2. Sampling restrictions
General sampling restrictions. Applying all of the following sampling restrictions
reduces the sample size of 53,907 individuals to 4,362 individuals, which I then observe
over time. Besides, four countries are excluded.
On country-level, I exclude all countries that show double-peaked grading patterns in
educational achievement, that is distributions with the two most common grades being
separated by another grade. Local, cultural understanding of grading is expected to
be different from the rest of the sample. China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Honduras
have grading curves with two peaks. For example, China has 67 percent of individuals
ranked on the highest and best grade, 5 percent ranked on the second highest grade
and then again 17 percent on the third highest grade and 12 percent on the lowest
grade (sample average is 25, 54, 19, 2 percent respectively). This informs the notion
that in these countries, all lower grades are rather considered to be a punishment than
grading on a continuous curve. Baseline model results are not reported but robust to
including these countries.1
On alternative care family level, I exclude SOS families with either more than 15 or
less than two alternative care siblings. The reason for doing so is to find a compro-
mise between including the largest number of regular families and excluding so-called
Youth Facilities, which are run by SOS but do not operate a traditional alternative
care family model.
On biological sibship level, I only include sibships with less than five members. I run
alternative specifications for sibship groups with two members. This is done to pre-
vent false identification of non-biological siblings that have been assigned a placeholder
name that is not the name of the primary caregiver.
On an individual level, I drop a full biological sibship if one of its individuals is bound
by any of the following individual-level restrictions. I use a wide age frame of three
to 21 years to assure inclusion of all individuals who are receiving schooling. I ex-
clude only children as they are out of focus for birth order analysis. Also, all multiple
birth siblings (for example twins) are omitted for the reason that their development
is expected to be different from single-birth children with the same birth order rank
1. The baseline model run on those countries only shows significant birth order effects for third-
borns, but not for secondborns.
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(see Barclay (2015)). I exclude all observations with missing education or age data
within the sibship as both are key for all models. To assure accurate identification of
biological firstborns, all individuals with siblings outside of SOS Children’s Villages
care are omitted.
Process for the exclusion of individuals based on conflicting reasons for
admission within a sibship. I conduct a quality check on all children who have
contradicting reason for admission. If individuals of a sibship differ concerning their
reason for admission, this can be a sign of false positive identification on the grounds
of a shared surname within an alternative care family. A conflict is assumed in two
cases. The first case is given if at least one sibling of an identified sibship is registered
as a half-orphan without mother and another sibling of the same sibship is registered
as a half-orphan without a father. As both reasons cannot hold true in parallel, all
individuals for which this case applies are excluded. The second case is given if the
following sequence of events is given. The earliest admitted child of a sibship enters
a village on the grounds of loss of both parents. Later, siblings with the same name
enter the same family due to loss of only one parent. These statements cannot hold
true in parallel in this specific sequence and thus are excluded.
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C.3. Auxiliary tables
Table C.1 displays the factorial family model estimation results. The last specification
in column 3 is used for the graph in figure 3.3 in the main part of this essay.
Table C.1.: Factorial family model: Relative rank in alternative care family and
educational achievement
(1) (2) (3)
Minimum
control
Baseline
controls
Baseline
controls
no hardship
only
(1,2) Bio. Rank 1, AC Family Relative Rank 2 -0.056 -0.047 -0.095∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.051)
(1,3) Bio. Rank 1, AC Family Relative Rank 3 -0.052 -0.050 -0.046
(0.039) (0.038) (0.048)
(2,1) Bio. Rank 2, AC Family Relative Rank 1 -0.110∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.047)
(2,2) Bio. Rank 2, AC Family Relative Rank 2 -0.151∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.054)
(2,3) Bio. Rank 2, AC Family Relative Rank 3 -0.154∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.061)
(3,1) Bio. Rank 3, AC Family Relative Rank 1 -0.150∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.067)
(3,2) Bio. Rank 3, AC Family Relative Rank 2 -0.089 -0.079 -0.106
(0.068) (0.069) (0.091)
(3,3) Bio. Rank 3, AC Family Relative Rank 3 -0.379∗∗ -0.437∗∗ -0.469∗∗
(0.178) (0.192) (0.200)
Time dummies X X X
Age dummies X X X
Sibship dummies X X X
Baseline model controls X X
Reason for
admission dummies X X
Observations 26,898 26,898 18,938
Adj.R2 0.65 0.66 0.67
Clusters 4362 4362 2958
Standard errors
clustered at
individual level Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: male chil-
dren of alternative care family relative rank (1,1); Alternative care family relative rank:
given the biological birth order rank, position in alternative care family based on age.
(1,1) is the oldest biological firstborn of an alternative care family, (1,2) is the sec-
ond oldest biological firstborn et cetera; Sibship dummies = biological sibship dummies;
Minimum controls defined as the control for sibship dummies, quarter dummies, and age
dummies only; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level;
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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C.4. Descriptive statistics
The vast majority of children (90 percent) is between seven and 18 years old. The
largest age group are the 11 to 13-year-olds (compare table C.2). Table C.3 presents a
cross tabulation of biological birth order and the relative alternative care family rank
within the biological birth order. The fact that there are many cases of biologically
firstborns falling into the last category (3) of alternative care family rank is attributable
to singletons. The relative position within a family is coded before I exclude children
that, eg do not have any biological siblings in SOS care.
C.4.1. Age distribution and birth order ranks statistics
Table C.2.: Number of observations by age
Overview
N Rel. sharein percent
Cum. share
in percent
3 28 0.1 0.1
4 196 0.7 0.8
5 412 1.5 2.4
6 744 2.8 5.1
7 1,225 4.6 9.7
8 1,787 6.6 16.3
9 2,304 8.6 24.9
10 2,667 9.9 34.8
11 2,832 10.5 45.3
12 2,817 10.5 55.8
13 2,806 10.4 66.2
14 2,487 9.2 75.5
15 1,968 7.3 82.8
16 1,626 6.0 88.9
17 1,263 4.7 93.5
18 884 3.3 96.8
19 511 1.9 98.7
20 273 1.0 99.7
21 68 0.3 100.0
Observations 26,898
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Table C.3.: Overview birth order ranks
and relative alternative care family ranks
Relative
alternative care family rank
within biological birth order
1 2 3 Total
Biological birth order
1 1,821 2,139 7,733 11,693
2 5,180 4,288 2,225 11,693
3 2,823 659 30 3,512
Observations 9,824 7,086 9,988 26,898
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C.4.2. Descriptive statistics by birth order rank and region
Table C.4.: Descriptive statistics for first-born children
Attributes of firstborns
Africa Latin America Asia Full sample
mean mean mean mean
Age at entry 7.69 7.95 7.73 6.35
Age 13.36 14.50 13.49 12.02
Educational achievement 3.08 2.65 3.11 3.03
Gender = female 0.52 0.50 0.58 0.52
No. bio. siblings 2.22 2.40 2.29 2.44
No. all siblings 8.99 7.60 10.15 9.52
Notes: Share of women is statistically different from 50 percent in Asia only (at 5 percent level).
Table C.5.: Descriptive statistics for second-born children
Attributes of secondborns
Africa Latin America Asia Full sample
mean mean mean mean
Age at entry 5.25 5.60 5.59 6.35
Age 10.67 12.00 11.04 12.02
Educational achievement 3.12 2.72 3.07 3.03
Gender = female 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.52
No. bio. siblings 2.22 2.40 2.29 2.44
No. all siblings 8.99 7.60 10.15 9.52
Notes: Share of women is statistically different from 50 percent in Asia and Latin-America only (at
5 percent level).
Table C.6.: Descriptive statistics for third- and later-born children
Attributes of thirdborns or higher
Africa Latin America Asia Full sample
mean mean mean mean
Age at entry 7.69 7.95 7.73 6.35
Age 13.36 14.50 13.49 12.02
Educational achievement 3.08 2.65 3.11 3.03
Gender = female 0.52 0.50 0.58 0.52
No. bio. siblings 2.22 2.40 2.29 2.44
No. all siblings 8.99 7.60 10.15 9.52
Notes: Share of women is statistically different from 50 percent in Africa only (at 5 percent level).
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C.4.3. Descriptive statistics by reason for admission
Table C.8.: Descriptive statistics for children by experience of hardship
No hardship
prior to admission
Hardship
prior to admission
Full
sample
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Outcome variable:
Educational achievement 3.05 0.72 2.98 0.74 3.03 0.73
Age 12.08 3.46 11.86 3.44 12.02 3.46
Age at entry 6.40 3.13 6.21 3.14 6.35 3.13
Gender 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50
No. bio. siblings 2.43 0.65 2.47 0.69 2.44 0.66
No. all siblings 9.62 2.15 9.27 2.22 9.52 2.17
Lifeshare spent
in SOS care 0.46 0.23 0.47 0.24 0.46 0.23
Reason for admission:
Abandonment 0.11 0.31 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.34
Death of parents 0.70 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.63 0.48
Referral 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
Inability caregiver 0.18 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.41
Share of regions:
Share Africa 0.20 0.40 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.36
Share Latin America 0.14 0.34 0.31 0.46 0.19 0.39
Share Asia 0.67 0.47 0.62 0.48 0.65 0.48
Observations 18,938 7,960 26,898
Notes: Data describes final sample after application of sampling restrictions.
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C.4.4. Distribution of educational achievement by region and
country
Table C.9.: Distribution of of educational achievement by region
Asia LatinAmerica Africa Full sample
Educational achievement
1 275 130 87 492
(1.6) (2.5) (2.1) (1.8)
2 2,706 1,942 562 5,210
(15.4) (37.9) (13.4) (19.4)
3 9,497 2,339 2,368 14,204
(54.0) (45.7) (56.4) (52.8)
4 5,099 710 1,183 6,992
(29.0) (13.9) (28.2) (26.0)
Observations 17,577 5,121 4,200 26,898
Notes: Column percentages in parantheses.
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Table C.10.: Educational achievement distribution by country (I/II)
Country Educational achievementdistribution by country
Number of observations
by country
1 2 3 4 Total N Rel.share
Cum.
Share
in percent in percent
Angola 0.00 20.00 60.00 20.00 100.00 70 0.26 0.26
Argentina 1.32 36.84 51.32 10.53 100.00 76 0.28 0.54
Bangladesh 0.69 6.39 73.19 19.72 100.00 720 2.68 3.22
Benin 8.13 30.08 44.72 17.07 100.00 123 0.46 3.68
Bolivia 3.34 35.72 43.61 17.33 100.00 1,408 5.23 8.91
Botswana 0.00 24.24 12.12 63.64 100.00 33 0.12 9.03
Cambodia 0.32 12.77 33.55 53.35 100.00 1,237 4.60 13.63
Centr. Afr. Rep. 10.00 40.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 90 0.33 13.97
Chad 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 18 0.07 14.03
Chile 0.00 39.06 55.79 5.15 100.00 233 0.87 14.90
Colombia 4.25 52.75 39.75 3.25 100.00 400 1.49 16.39
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.00 8.75 68.75 22.50 100.00 160 0.59 16.98
Cote d’Ivoire 11.11 36.11 25.00 27.78 100.00 36 0.13 17.12
Dominican Rep. 2.91 49.82 38.91 8.36 100.00 275 1.02 18.14
El Salvador 0.82 21.31 37.70 40.16 100.00 122 0.45 18.59
Equat. Guinea 0.00 0.00 26.03 73.97 100.00 146 0.54 19.14
Ethiopia 0.00 0.88 40.98 58.14 100.00 571 2.12 21.26
Gambia 0.00 78.57 21.43 0.00 100.00 14 0.05 21.31
Guatemala 4.35 33.15 48.37 14.13 100.00 184 0.68 21.99
Guinea 7.37 1.05 53.68 37.89 100.00 95 0.35 22.35
Haiti 3.70 14.81 70.37 11.11 100.00 135 0.50 22.85
India 1.55 15.58 58.43 24.44 100.00 7,811 29.04 51.89
Indonesia 0.00 0.00 65.22 34.78 100.00 46 0.17 52.06
Jamaica 23.38 48.05 23.38 5.19 100.00 77 0.29 52.35
Kenya 4.92 6.56 65.57 22.95 100.00 183 0.68 53.03
Laos 1.66 12.31 60.51 25.52 100.00 1,869 6.95 59.97
Liberia 12.50 33.33 42.50 11.67 100.00 360 1.34 61.31
Malawi 0.00 22.73 27.27 50.00 100.00 88 0.33 61.64
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Table C.11.: Educational achievement distribution by country (II/II)
Country Educational achievementdistribution by country
Number of observations
by country
1 2 3 4 Total N Rel.share
Cum.
share
in percent in percent
Mexico 1.58 72.33 26.09 0.00 100.00 253 0.94 62.58
Namibia 0.00 17.78 40.00 42.22 100.00 45 0.17 62.75
Nepal 1.01 14.58 43.78 40.64 100.00 2,675 9.94 72.69
Nicaragua 2.37 28.46 37.15 32.02 100.00 253 0.94 73.63
Niger 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 20 0.07 73.71
Nigeria 0.00 0.00 93.33 6.67 100.00 45 0.17 73.88
Palestine 0.00 15.38 46.15 38.46 100.00 13 0.05 73.92
Panama 4.40 61.54 34.07 0.00 100.00 182 0.68 74.60
Paraguay 0.60 30.35 46.59 22.46 100.00 837 3.11 77.71
Peru 0.32 30.81 62.24 6.64 100.00 633 2.35 80.07
Philippines 0.00 6.16 61.85 31.99 100.00 422 1.57 81.63
Senegal 0.85 14.41 84.75 0.00 100.00 118 0.44 82.07
Sierra Leone 0.00 3.90 89.22 6.88 100.00 436 1.62 83.69
Somalia 0.00 0.00 78.95 21.05 100.00 19 0.07 83.76
Somaliland 0.00 4.60 81.03 14.37 100.00 174 0.65 84.41
South Africa 4.35 4.35 43.48 47.83 100.00 23 0.09 84.50
Sri Lanka 0.92 14.96 52.82 31.30 100.00 869 3.23 87.73
Swaziland 0.18 14.86 44.57 40.40 100.00 552 2.05 89.78
Thailand 0.00 5.98 68.41 25.61 100.00 535 1.99 91.77
Togo 0.00 15.14 41.08 43.78 100.00 185 0.69 92.46
Venezuela 0.00 25.00 75.00 0.00 100.00 40 0.15 92.61
Vietnam 5.67 34.24 41.13 18.95 100.00 1,393 5.18 97.78
Zambia 0.00 13.07 71.68 15.25 100.00 505 1.88 99.66
Zanzibar 0.00 42.86 57.14 0.00 100.00 70 0.26 99.92
Zimbabwe 0.00 19.05 61.90 19.05 100.00 21 0.08 100.00
Total 1.83 19.37 52.81 25.99 100.00 26,898 100.00
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C.5. Robustness checks
Tables C.14, C.15, and C.16 show baseline model estimates for different sub-regions. I
find that the general effect is driven by countries in Latin America and Asia. In Asia,
both main regions display birth order effects. In Latin America, observed birth order
effects are driven by one main region.
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C.5.1. Baseline model estimation for individual regions
Table C.14.: Baseline model estimation for individual regions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
model
full sample
Baseline
model
Africa
only
Baseline
model
Latin
America
only
Baseline
model
Asia
only
Secondborn -0.079∗∗∗ 0.054 -0.099∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.057) (0.049) (0.025)
Thirdborn or higher -0.091∗∗ 0.018 -0.181∗ -0.093∗
(0.041) (0.097) (0.104) (0.049)
Gender = female 0.138∗∗∗ 0.088∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.048) (0.043) (0.025)
No. all siblings -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.158∗ -0.236 0.109 0.206∗
(0.090) (0.179) (0.245) (0.108)
Abandonment 0.087 -0.006 0.124 0.082
(0.060) (0.106) (0.137) (0.069)
Death of parents 0.103∗ -0.022 0.404∗∗∗ 0.070
(0.059) (0.122) (0.150) (0.071)
Referral -0.034 0.000 0.245 -0.124
(0.115) (.) (0.213) (0.132)
Constant 3.515∗∗∗ 3.547∗∗∗ 3.829∗∗∗ 2.302∗∗∗
(0.281) (0.434) (0.383) (0.704)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X X
Observations 26,898 4,200 5,121 17,577
Adj.R2 0.66 0.68 0.56 0.66
Clusters 4362 706 915 2741
Standard errors
clustered
at individual level
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male children;
Sibship dummies; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/*
indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table C.15.: Baseline model estimation with
Asia in 2 subgroups
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline
model
Asia
only
Baseline
model
Asia group 1
only
Baseline
model
Asia group 2
only
Secondborn -0.095∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.034) (0.036)
Thirdborn or higher -0.093∗ -0.043 -0.201∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.063) (0.073)
Gender = female 0.114∗∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.034) (0.034)
No. all siblings -0.003 -0.002 -0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.206∗ 0.223 0.273
(0.108) (0.138) (0.172)
Abandonment 0.082 -0.015 0.146∗∗
(0.069) (0.104) (0.070)
Death of parents 0.070 -0.020 0.198∗
(0.071) (0.098) (0.107)
Referral -0.124 -0.177 -0.080
(0.132) (0.164) (0.150)
Constant 2.302∗∗∗ 4.023∗∗∗ 2.158∗∗∗
(0.704) (0.438) (0.657)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X
Observations 17,577 10,486 7,091
Adj.R2 0.66 0.63 0.72
Clusters 2741 1679 1062
Standard errors
clustered
at individual level
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male chil-
dren; Sibship dummies; Groups based on cultural cluster – Group 1: India, Nepal. Group 2:
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam; Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/* indicate significance at
the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table C.16.: Baseline model with Latin America in 3 subgroups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
model
Latin
America
only
Baseline
model
Latin
America
group 1
only
Baseline
model
Latin
America
group 2
only
Baseline
model
Latin
America
group 3
only
Secondborn -0.099∗∗ -0.009 -0.208∗∗∗ -0.057
(0.049) (0.074) (0.080) (0.090)
Thirdborn or higher -0.181∗ -0.246∗ -0.043 -0.296
(0.104) (0.147) (0.172) (0.230)
Gender = female 0.218∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.068) (0.069) (0.076)
No. all siblings -0.002 -0.007 0.013 -0.029
(0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.029)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.109 0.670 0.147 -0.476
(0.245) (0.427) (0.399) (0.290)
Abandonment 0.124 0.331∗ 0.334 -0.192
(0.137) (0.193) (0.284) (0.203)
Death of parents 0.404∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗ 0.394 0.082
(0.150) (0.199) (0.304) (0.232)
Referral 0.245 0.372∗ 1.502∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.194) (0.392) (0.187)
Constant 3.829∗∗∗ 3.134∗∗∗ 2.914∗∗∗ 4.739∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.468) (0.648) (0.394)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X X
Observations 5,121 2,350 1,764 994
Adj.R2 0.56 0.51 0.62 0.67
Clusters 915 391 327 184
Standard errors
clustered
at individual level
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male children;
Sibship dummies; Groups based on cultural cluster – Group 1: Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru;
Group 2: Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Paraguay, Venezuela; Group 3:
El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama; Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at individual level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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C.5.2. Alternative specifications for baseline model
Table C.17.: Baseline estimation with different types of dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sibship
dummies
Family
dummies
Village
dummies
Country
dummies
No
dummies
Secondborn -0.079∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.046∗ -0.065∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Thirdborn or higher -0.091∗∗ -0.054 -0.043 -0.002 -0.032
(0.041) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040)
Gender = female 0.138∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
No. all siblings -0.003 0.004 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.158∗ 0.015 -0.001 0.072 0.086∗
(0.090) (0.061) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Constant 3.233∗∗∗ 3.667∗∗∗ 2.431∗∗∗ 3.182∗∗∗ 3.092∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.287) (0.325) (0.232) (0.138)
Time dummies,
age dummies X X X X X
Reason for
admission dummies X X X X X
Sibship dummies X
Family dummies X
Village dummies X
Country dummies X
Observations 26,898 26,898 26,898 26,898 26,898
Adj.R2 0.66 0.55 0.28 0.13 0.041
Clusters 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362
Standard errors
clustered
at individual level
Yes
Standard errors
clustered
at family level
Yes
Standard errors
clustered
at village level
Yes Yes
Standard errors
clustered
at country level
Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male
children; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/*
indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table C.18.: Baseline estimation for each quarter (I/II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2014Q3 2014Q4 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3
Secondborn -0.107∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.066∗
(0.058) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.036)
Thirdborn or higher -0.122 -0.153∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗ -0.085
(0.113) (0.082) (0.081) (0.075) (0.068)
Gender = female 0.127∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
No. all siblings 1.005 0.296∗∗ -0.101 0.434 0.445
(0.760) (0.116) (0.284) (0.304) (0.305)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.351 0.221 0.235 0.096 0.066
(0.285) (0.189) (0.171) (0.166) (0.152)
Abandonment 0.194 0.001 0.022 0.175∗ 0.129
(0.162) (0.146) (0.125) (0.098) (0.099)
Death of parents 0.254∗ 0.154 0.100 0.090 0.104
(0.143) (0.115) (0.105) (0.096) (0.090)
Referral -0.197 -0.070 -0.133 -0.084 -0.123
(0.257) (0.211) (0.185) (0.184) (0.176)
Constant -5.806 0.653 3.994 -0.498 -1.130
(6.349) (1.417) (2.838) (2.852) (2.889)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X X X
Observations 1,074 2,213 2,397 2,651 2,765
Adj.R2 0.55 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.48
Clusters 1074 2213 2397 2651 2765
SEs clustered
at individual Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male children; Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10%
level.
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Table C.19.: Baseline estimation for each quarter (II/II)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2 2016Q3 2016Q4
Secondborn -0.065∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.060∗ -0.053∗ -0.082∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Thirdborn or higher -0.082 -0.120∗ -0.023 -0.033 -0.097
(0.063) (0.064) (0.065) (0.066) (0.064)
Gender = female 0.113∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
No. all siblings 0.876 0.917 0.151 -0.053 0.869
(0.568) (0.598) (0.162) (0.302) (0.574)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.012 0.082 0.184 0.245∗ 0.045
(0.137) (0.134) (0.129) (0.128) (0.152)
Abandonment 0.115 0.078 0.088 0.158 0.135
(0.105) (0.111) (0.101) (0.102) (0.111)
Death of parents 0.132 0.112 0.071 0.077 0.145
(0.090) (0.091) (0.087) (0.084) (0.091)
Referral 0.015 0.019 0.005 0.103 0.049
(0.197) (0.196) (0.179) (0.196) (0.199)
Constant -4.334 -4.767 2.365∗∗ 4.048 -3.922
(4.910) (5.216) (1.197) (2.588) (4.988)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X X X
Observations 3,090 3,124 3,186 3,318 3,080
Adj.R2 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.49
Clusters 3090 3124 3186 3318 3080
SEs clustered
at individual level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male children; Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
206 C. Birth order effects and educational achievement
C.5.3. Robustness checks of hardship and gender split model
Table C.20.: Hardship model estimation for individual regions
Extreme hardship
experience only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Africaonly
Latin
America
only
Asia
only
Secondborn -0.030 -0.198 -0.081 0.001
(0.037) (0.147) (0.065) (0.046)
Thirdborn or higher -0.063 -0.355 -0.303∗∗ 0.046
(0.071) (0.251) (0.128) (0.088)
Gender = female 0.216∗∗∗ 0.103 0.334∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.113) (0.064) (0.046)
No. all siblings -0.002 -0.026 -0.008 0.002
(0.005) (0.031) (0.013) (0.004)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.065 0.298 -0.154 0.052
(0.183) (0.551) (0.314) (0.233)
Constant 3.588∗∗∗ 3.727∗∗∗ 4.098∗∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.663) (0.408) (0.713)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X X
Reason for
admission dummies X X X X
Observations 7,960 500 2,507 4,953
Adj.R2 0.70 0.59 0.61 0.74
Clusters 1404 113 493 798
Standard errors
clustered
at individual level
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male children;
Individuals with experience of personal hardship only; Sibship dummies; Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table C.21.: Hardship model: different coding of hardship experience
No extreme
hardship
Extreme
hardship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parental
death
Other
reasons Economic Emotional
Financial
and
emotional
Secondborn -0.087 -0.091∗∗ 0.012 -0.075 -0.030
(0.063) (0.046) (0.052) (0.050) (0.037)
Thirdborn or higher -0.178 -0.019 0.073 -0.179∗∗ -0.063
(0.117) (0.083) (0.108) (0.088) (0.071)
Gender = female 0.160∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.038) (0.056) (0.048) (0.038)
No. all siblings 0.014 -0.007 0.006 -0.005 -0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Lifeshare spent
in SOS care 0.188 0.463
∗∗ 0.275 -0.210 0.065
(0.304) (0.181) (0.242) (0.247) (0.183)
Constant 3.421∗∗∗ 3.053∗∗∗ 1.679∗∗ 3.888∗∗∗ 3.588∗∗∗
(0.429) (0.256) (0.692) (0.325) (0.324)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X X X
Reason for
admission dummies X X X X X
Observations 4,179 5,664 3,701 4,642 7,960
Adj.R2 0.71 0.71 0.75 0.67 0.70
Clusters 637 964 601 855 1404
Standard errors
clustered
at individual level
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: firstborn male children; Sib-
ship dummies; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at individual level; ***/**/* indicate
significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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Table C.22.: Gender split model: Asia only baseline model with gender interaction
term: interacting gender with being first-born
(1) (2) (3)
Asia Nepal andIndia
Rest
of Asia
Firstborn=1 0.144∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.032) (0.043) (0.046)
Gender = female=1 0.152∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.042) (0.044)
Firstborn=1 X Gender = female=1 -0.098∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ 0.101∗
(0.041) (0.054) (0.060)
Thirdborn 0.006 0.035 -0.048
(0.035) (0.046) (0.051)
No. all siblings -0.003 -0.002 -0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Lifeshare spent in SOS care 0.208∗ 0.247∗ 0.258
(0.107) (0.137) (0.166)
Abandonment 0.080 -0.017 0.147∗∗
(0.069) (0.103) (0.071)
Death of parents 0.070 -0.021 0.191∗
(0.071) (0.098) (0.107)
Referral -0.116 -0.151 -0.087
(0.132) (0.165) (0.160)
Constant 2.165∗∗∗ 3.888∗∗∗ 2.041∗∗∗
(0.686) (0.393) (0.669)
Sibship dummies,
time dummies,
age dummies
X X X
Observations 17,577 10,486 7,091
Adj.R2 0.66 0.63 0.72
Clusters 2741 1679 1062
Standard errors
clustered
at individual level
Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: educational achievement; Baseline group: secondborn male
children; Sibship dummies; Asia only; Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at
individual level; ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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C.5.4. Validity of extrapolation of findings
Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2004) argue that in order to extrapolate findings from
adoption data to the general population, the following needs to hold: (i) Children
need to be as good as randomly assigned to their adoptive families, (ii) they need to
be adopted early on in their lives and one needs to assume that (iii) studies on adoptive
child-parent relationships can be extrapolated to biological child-parent relationships.
In the following section, I discuss whether the assumptions made by Björklund, Lin-
dahl, and Plug (2004) hold in this setting.
(i) Children are not randomly selected into families. Consequently, SOS Children’s
Villages parents’ attributes are not expected to be statistically independent of those
of their children. Rather, children and parents have a say in whom they are paired
up with and have a trial period of living together. The data do not allow to reject
the hypothesis, that the sorting of children and caregivers will moderate birth order
effects. However, the rotation of children in and out of the family makes it unlikely
that a selection induced by caregiver behavior occurs at this level.
(ii) An additional threat to external validity stems from a comparatively high age of
admission. However, the baseline estimation does not suggest that the relative share
of life spent in SOS Children’s Villages’ acts as a significant driver of educational
achievement at the five percent level.2 It is hence not expected that treatment in SOS
Children’s Villages leads to a reversal in birth order effects per se.3
(iii) Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug (2004) assert that adoptive children and their par-
ents, as well as their relationships, shall not carry unobservable traits that lead to
bias and consequently systematic deviation from what one would expect in biological
settings. Generally, the sample is selected insofar as individuals are expected to dispro-
portionately be of underprivileged socio-economic background, relative to the average
population. However, first, this group is of particular interest to policymakers as it is
often a target of policy interventions. Furthermore, within-sample differences based
on hardship experience are still expected to provide valuable insight. The gender and
culture-specific effects found in India support the belief that the sample confirms to
2. If it did, this would imply that longer exposure to biological parents changed later educational
achievement.
3. One hypothesis that I cannot reject is that of heterogeneous opposing effects that cancel out.
While some children might benefit from an early admission, others might suffer, resulting in a zero
net effect.
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general cultural patterns found in respective populations. Concerning parental influ-
ence, SOS parents are not expected to discriminate between siblings of different birth
order actively. As described in-depth in the discussion part, non-biological caregivers
are exposed to a rotation of children rendering discrimination very unlikely. Exposure
to non-discriminatory parents can downward-bias effect sizes compared to biological
settings but will not lead to a reversal in signs. Concerning family composition, sample
families are of above average size compared to average biological and adoptive fami-
lies. Growing up in large families is likely to dampen birth order effects, as Härkönen
(2014), as well as Zajonc and Sulloway (2007), find. However, considering the consis-
tent insignificance of the alternative care sibship size variable, I conclude that family
sizing is not expected to moderate educational achievement in this setting.
Bibliography
Bibliography
Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. 2010. “Synthetic Control
Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s
Tobacco Control Program.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 105
(490): 493–505.
Abadie, Alberto, and Javier Gardeazabal. 2003. “The economic costs of conflict: A
case study of the Basque country.” American Economic Review 93 (1): 113–132.
Adams, Paul R., and Gerald R. Adams. 1984. “Mount Saint Helens’s ashfall. Evidence
for a disaster stress reaction.” The American Psychologist 39 (3): 252–260.
Aizer, Anna. 2010. “The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence.” American
Economic Review 100 (4): 1847–59.
. 2011. “Poverty, Violence and Health: The Impact of Domestic Violence During
Pregnancy on Newborn Health.” The Journal of Human Resources 46 (3): 518–
538.
Alesina, Alberto, Benedetta Brioschi, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2016. “Violence Against
Women: A Cross-cultural Analysis for Africa.” NBER Working Paper Series
21901.
Allendorf, Keera. 2007. “Couples’ Reports of Women’s Autonomy and Health-care
Use in Nepal.” Studies in Family Planning 38 (1): 35–46.
Ambler, Kate, Cheryl Doss, Caitlin Kieran, and Simone Passarelli. 2017. “He Says,
She Says Exploring Patterns of Spousal Agreement in Bangladesh.” IFPRI Dis-
cussion Paper 01616.
Ammermueller, Andreas, and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. “Peer effects in European
primary schools: evidence from PIRLS.” Journal of Labor Economics 27 (3):
315–348.
Anastario, Michael, Nadine Shebab, and Lynn Lawry. 2009. “Increased gender-based
violence among women internally displaced in Mississippi 2 years post–Hurricane
Katrina.” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 3 (1): 18–26.
Anderberg, Dan, Helmut Rainer, Jonathan Wadsworth, and Tanya Wilson. 2015.
“Unemployment and Domestic Violence: Theory and Evidence.” The Economic
Journal 126 (597): 1947–1979.
Bibliography 213
Anderson, C. Leigh, Travis W. Reynolds, and Mary Kay Gugerty. 2017. “Husband and
Wife Perspectives on Farm Household Decision-making Authority and Evidence
on Intra-household Accord in Rural Tanzania.” World Development 90:169–183.
Anderson, Siwan, and Mukesh Eswaran. 2009. “What determines female autonomy?
Evidence from Bangladesh.” Journal of Development Economics 90 (2): 179–
191.
Arouri, Mohamed, Cuong Nguyen, and Adel Ben Youssef. 2015. “Natural Disasters,
Household Welfare, and Resilience: Evidence from Rural Vietnam.” World De-
velopment 70:59–77.
Ashraf, By Nava, Erica Field, and Jean Lee. 2014. “Household Bargaining and Excess
Fertility: An Experimental Study in Zambia.” American Economic Review 104
(7): 2210–2237.
Baez, Javier, Alejandro de la Fuente, and Indhira Santos. 2010. “Do natural disasters
affect human capital? An assessment based on existing empirical evidence.” IZA
Discussion Paper Series 5164.
Bagger, Jesper, Javier A. Birchenall, Hani Mansour, and Sergio Urzúa. 2013. “Edu-
cation, Birth Order, and Family Size.” IZA Discussion Paper Series 7454.
Bandiera, Oriana, Niklas Buehren, Robin Burgess, Markus Goldstein, Selim Gulesci,
Imran Rasul, and Munshi Sulaiman. 2018. “Women’s Empowerment in Action:
Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial in Africa.” Working Paper.
Banerjee, Abhijit, Esther Duflo, Nathanael Goldberg, Dean Karlan, Robert Osei,
William Parienté, Jeremy Shapiro, Bram Thuysbaert, and Christopher Udry.
2015. “A multifaceted program causes lasting progress for the very poor: Evi-
dence from six countries.” Science 348 (6236): 1260799.
Barclay, Kieron J. 2015. “Birth order and educational attainment: Evidence from fully
adopted sibling groups.” Intelligence 48:109–122.
Barclay, Kieron J., and Mikko Myrskylä. 2014. “Birth order and physical fitness
in early adulthood: Evidence from Swedish military conscription data.” Social
Science and Medicine 123:141–148.
Bardi, Massimo, and Silvana M. Borgognini-Tarli. 2001. “A survey on parent-child
conflict resolution: Intrafamily violence in Italy.” Child Abuse and Neglect 25
(6): 839–853.
214 Bibliography
Basu, Kaushik. 2006. “Gender and say: A model of household behaviour with en-
dogenously determined balance of power.” Economic Journal 116 (511): 558–
580.
Beaman, Lori, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia
Topova. 2009. “Powerful women: does exposure reduce bias?” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 124 (4): 1497–1540.
Bech, Per, Lis Raabaek Olsen, Mette Kloller, and Niels Kristian Rasmussen. 2003.
“Measuring well-being rather than the absence of distress symtoms: a compari-
son of the SF-36 Mental Health subscale and the WHO-Five Well-Being Scale.”
International Journal of Methods in Psychiatric Research 12 (2): 85–91.
Becker, Gary S., and H. Gregg Lewis. 1973. “On the Interaction between the Quantity
and Quality of Children.” Journal of Political Economy 81 (2 (Part 2: New
Economic Approaches to Fertility)): S279–S288.
Becker, Stan, Fannie Fonseca-Becker, and Catherine Schenck-Yglesias. 2006. “Hus-
bands’ and wives’ reports of women’s decision-making power inWestern Guatemala
and their effects on preventive health behaviors.” Social Science and Medicine
62 (9): 2313–2326.
Beckett, Celia, Barbara Maughan, Michael Rutter, Jenny Castle, Emma Colvert,
Christine Groothues, Jana Kreppner, Suzanne Stevens, Thomas G. O’Connor,
and Edmund J. S. Sonuga-barke. 2006. “Do the Effects of Early Severe Depri-
vation on Cognition Persist Into Early Adolescence? Findings From the English
and Romanian Adoptees Study.” Child Development 77 (3): 696–711.
Belley, Philippe, and Lance Lochner. 2007. “The Changing Role of Family Income and
Ability in Determining Educational Achievement.” Journal of Human Capital 1
(1): 37–89.
Belmont, Lillian, and Francis A. Marolla. 1973. “Birth Order, Family Size, and Intel-
ligence.” Science 182 (117): 1096–1101.
Belmont, Lillian, Zena Stein, and Patricia Zybert. 1978. “Child spacing and birth
order: effect on intellectual ability in two-child families.” Science 202 (4371):
995–996.
Berkowitz, Leonard. 1993. McGraw-Hill series in social psychology. Aggression: Its
causes, consequences, and control. New York, NY: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company.
Bibliography 215
Bertrand, Marianne, Emir Kamenica, and Jessica Pan. 2015. “Gender Identity and
Relative Income within Households.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 571–
614.
Biddle, Bruce J., and David C. Berliner. 2002. “Small class size and its effects.”
Educational Leadership 59 (5): 12–23.
Biddlecom, Ann E., and Bolaji M. Fapohunda. 1998. “Covert Contraceptive Use:
Prevalence, Motivations, and Consequences.” Studies in Family Planning 29
(4): 360.
Björklund, Anders, Mikael Lindahl, and Erik Plug. 2004. “Intergenerational Effects
in Sweden : What Can We Learn from Adoption Data?” IZA Discussion Paper
Series 1194.
. 2006. “The Origins of Intergenerational Associations: Lessons from Swedish
Adoption Data.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (3): 999–1028.
Black, Sandra E., Paul J. Devereux, and Kjell G. Salvanes. 2005. “The More the
Merrier? The Effect of Family Size and Birth Order on Children’s Education.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2): 669–700.
. 2010. “Small Family, Smart Family?: Family Size and the IQ Scores of Young
Men.” The Journal of Human Resources 45 (1): 33–58.
. 2011. “Older and wiser? Birth order and IQ of young men.” CESifo Economic
Studies 57 (1): 103–120.
Blackburn, Susan. 2004a. “Violence.” Chap. 8 in Women and the State in Modern
Indonesia, 194–219. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 2004 b. Women and the State in Modern Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Blake, Judith. 1981. “Family Size and the Quality of Children.” Demography 18 (4):
421–442.
Bobonis, Gustavo J., Melissa González-Brenes, and Roberto Castro. 2013. “Public
transfers and domestic violence: The roles of private information and spousal
control.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (1): 179–205.
Bonesrønning, Hans, and Sofia Sandgren Massih. 2011. “Birth order effects on young
students’ academic achievement.” Journal of Socio-Economics 40 (6): 824–832.
Bruins, Marianne. 2017. “Women’s economic opportunities and the intra-household
production of child human capital.” Labour Economics 44 (C): 122–132.
216 Bibliography
Buckles, Kasey S., and Elizabeth L. Munnich. 2012. “Birth Spacing and Sibling
Outcomes.” The Journal of Human Resources 47 (3): 613–642.
Bueno, Cruz Caridad, and Errol A. Henderson. 2017. “Bargaining or Backlash? Ev-
idence on Intimate Partner Violence from the Dominican Republic.” Feminist
Economics 23 (4): 90–116.
Buttell, Frederick P., and Michelle Mohr Carney. 2009. “Examining the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Police Responses to Domestic Violence.” Traumatology 15
(2): 6–9.
Calimeris, Lauren, and Christina Peters. 2017. “Food for thought: the birth order
effect and resource allocation in Indonesia.” Applied Economics 49 (54): 1–12.
Cameron, Lisa, and Christopher Worswick. 2003. “The Labor Market as a Smoothing
Device: Labor Supply Responses to Crop Loss in Indonesia.” Review of Devel-
opment Economics 7 (2): 327–341.
Cameron, Stephen V., and James J. Heckman. 2001. “The Dynamics of Educational
Attainment for Black, Hispanic, and White Males.” Journal of Political Economy
109 (3): 455–499.
Card, David, and Gordon B. Dahl. 2011. “Family violence and football: The effect of
unexpected emotional cues on violent behavior.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
126 (1): 103–143.
Carrell, Scott E., Richard L. Fullerton, and James E. West. 2009. “Does Your Co-
hort Matter? Measuring Peer Effects in College Achievement.” Journal of Labor
Economics 27 (3): 439–464.
Caruso, Gérman Daniel. 2017. “The legacy of natural disasters: The intergenera-
tional impact of 100 years of natural disasters in Latin America.” Journal of
Development Economics 127:209–233.
Cavallo, Eduardo A., Sebastian Galiani, Ilan Noy, and Juan Pantano. 2013. “Catas-
trophic Natural Disasters and Economic Growth.” Review of Economics and
Statistics 95 (5): 1549–1561.
Cavallo, Eduardo A., and Ilan Noy. 2010. “The Economics of Natural Disasters: A
Survey.” IDB Working Paper Series, no. 124.
Chikovore, Jeremiah, Gunilla Lindmark, Lennarth Nystrom, Michael T Mbizvo, and
Beth Maina Ahlberg. 2002. “The hide-and-seek game: Men’s perspectives on
abortion and contraceptive use within marriage in a rural community in Zim-
babwe.” Journal of Biosocial Science 34 (3): 317–332.
Bibliography 217
Chin, Yoo Mi. 2011. “Male backlash, bargaining, or exposure reduction?: Women’s
working status and physical spousal violence in India.” Journal of Population
Economics 25 (1): 175–200.
Cools, Sara, and Andreas Kotsadam. 2017. “Resources and Intimate Partner Violence
in Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Development 95:211–230.
Cunha, F., and James J. Heckman. 2009. “The Economics and Psychology of Inequality
and Human Development.” Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2-
3): 320–364.
Curtis, Thom, Brent C. Miller, and E. Helen Berry. 2000. “Changes in reports and
incidence of child abuse following natural disasters.” Child Abuse and Neglect 24
(9): 1151–1162.
Darling-Hammond, Linda. 2000. “Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Re-
view of State Policy Evidence Previous Research.” Education 8 (1): 1–44.
Davis, Daniel J., Sorel Cahan Cahan, and Joseph Bashi. 1977. “Birth order and intel-
lectual development: the confluence model in the light of cross-cultural evidence.”
Science 196 (4297): 1470–14722.
De Haan, Monique, Erik Plug, and Jose Rosero. 2014. “Birth Order and Human Capital
Development: Evidence from Ecuador.” The Journal of Human Resources 49 (2):
359–392.
Denlay, Patricia L., and Elizabeth Shrader. 2000. Gender and post-disaster reconstruc-
tion: The case of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua. Washington, DC:
LCSPG / LAC Gender Team - The World Bank.
Deryugina, Tatyana, Laura Kawano, and Steven D Levitt. 2018. “The Economic
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Its Victims: Evidence from Individual Tax Re-
turns.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 10 (2): 202–233.
Desforges, Charles, and Alberto Abouchaar. 2003. The impact of parental involvement
, parental support and family education on pupil achievements and adjustment:
A literature review. Vol. 433. Nottingham: DfES publications.
Donald, Aletheia, Gayatri Koolwal, Jeannie Annan, Kathryn Falb, and Markus Gold-
stein. 2017. Measuring Women’s Agency. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Downey, Douglas B. 2001. “Number of Siblings and Intellectual Development: The
Resource Dilution Explanation.” American Psychologist 56 (6/7): 497–504.
218 Bibliography
Duflo, Esther. 2000. “Child Health and Household Resources in South Africa: Evidence
from the Old Age Pension program.” The American Economic Review 90 (2):
393–398.
. 2012. “Women, Empowerment, and Economic Development.” Journal of
Eonomic Literature 50 (4): 1051–1079.
Duflo, Esther, and Christopher Udry. 2004. “Intrahousehold Resource Allocation
in Cote D’Ivoire: Social Norms, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices.”
NBER Working Paper Series 10498.
Dutton, Donald G., and Randall P. Kropp. 2000. “A Review of Domestic Violence
Risk Instruments.” Trauma, Violence & Abuse 1 (2): 171–181.
Ebot, Jane O. 2014. “Place Matters: Community Level Effects of Women’s Autonomy
on Ethiopian Children’s Immunization Status.” African Population Studies 28
(2): 1202–1215.
Edmonds, Eric V. 2006. “Understanding in child labor sibling differences.” Journal of
Population Economics 19 (2006): 795–821.
Ejrnæs, Mette, and Claus C. Portner. 2004. “Birth Order and the Intrahousehold
Allocation of Time.” Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (4): 1008–1019.
Emerson, Patrick M., and André Portela Souza. 2008. “Birth Order, Child Labor, and
School Attendance in Brazil.” World Development 36 (9): 1647–1664.
Eskreis-Winkler, Lauren, Ayelet Fishbach, and Angela Duckworth. n.d. “Dear Abby:
Should I Give Advice or Receive it?” Psychological Science in press.
Fernandez, Cristina A., Benjamin Vicente, Brandon D. L. Marshall, Karestan C. Koe-
nen, Kristopher L. Arheart, Robert Kohn, Sandra Saldivia, and Stephen L. Buka.
2017. “Longitudinal course of disaster-related PTSD among a prospective sample
of adult Chilean natural disaster survivors.” International Journal of Epidemi-
ology 46 (2): 440–452.
Ferreira, Francisco H G, and Norbert Schady. 2009. “Aggregate economic shocks, child
schooling, and child health.” World Bank Research Observer 24 (2): 147–181.
Fisher, Sarah. 2010. “Violence Against Women and Natural Disasters: Findings From
Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka.” Violence Against Women 16 (8): 902–918.
Fors, Heather Congdon, and Annika Lindskog. 2017. “Within-Family Inequalities
in Human Capital Accumulation in India: Birth Order and Gender Effects.”
University of Gothenburg - Working Paper in Economics 700.
Bibliography 219
Frankenberg, Elizabeth, and Duncan Thomas. 2001. “Measuring Power.” IFPRI Food
Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper 113.
Galbraith, Richard C. 1982. “Sibling spacing and intellectual development: A closer
look at the confluence models.” Developmental Psychology 18 (2): 151–173.
García-Moreno, Claudia, Christina Pallitto, Karen Devries, Heidi Stöckl, Charlotte
Watts, and Naeemah Abrahams. 2013. Global and regional estimates of violence
against women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and
non-partner sexual violence. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization
(WHO).
Gasca, Natalie C., and Stan Becker. 2017. “Using Couples’ Discordant Reports To
Estimate Female Covert Use of Modern Contraception in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
Journal of Biosocial Science 50 (3): 326–346.
Ghuman, Sharon J., Helen J. Lee, and Herbert L. Smith. 2006. “Measurement of
women’s autonomy according to women and their husbands: Results from five
Asian countries.” Social Science Research 35:1–28.
Gignoux, Jérémie, and Marta Menéndez. 2016. “Benefit in the wake of disaster: Long-
run effects of earthquakes on welfare in rural Indonesia.” Journal of Development
Economics 118:26–44.
Gitter, Seth R., and Bradford L. Barham. 2007. “Credit, Natural Disasters, Coffee,
and Educational Attainment in Rural Honduras.” World Development 35 (3):
498–511.
Goenjian, Armen K., Alan M. Steinberg, Louis M. Najarian, Lynn A. Fairbanks, Made-
line Tashjian, and Robert S. Pynoos. 2000. “Prospective Study of Posttraumatic
Stress, Anxiety, and Depressive Reactions After Earthquake and Political Vio-
lence.” The American Journal of Psychiatry 157 (6): 911–916.
Goldin, Claudia. 2006. “The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employ-
ment, Education, and Family.” American Economic Review 96 (2): 1–21.
Granbois, Donald H., and Ronald P. Willett. 1970. “Equivalence of Family Role
Measures Based on Husband and Wife Data.” Journal of Marriage and Family
32 (1): 68–72.
Gray, Jeffrey S. 1998. “Divorce-Law Changes, Household Bargaining, and Married
Women’s Labor Supply.” American Economic Review 88 (3): 628–642.
Gualtieri, Thomas, and Robert E. Hicks. 1985. “An immunoreactive theory of selective
male aﬄiction.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (3): 427–441.
220 Bibliography
Haan, M de. 2010. “Birth order, family size and educational attainment.” Economics
of Education Review 29 (4): 576–588.
Hammitt, James, Jin-Tan Liu, and Meng-Wen Tsou. 2012. “The intergenerational
transmission of education: Evidence from Taiwanese adoptions.” Economics Let-
ters 115 (1): 134–136.
Hanushek, Eric A., and Ludger Woessmann. 2015. The Knowledge Capital of Nations:
Education and the Economics of Growth. Cambridge, MA: CES ifo Book Series,
The MIT Press.
Härkönen, Juho. 2014. “Birth order effects on educational attainment and educational
transitions in West Germany.” European Sociological Review 30 (2): 166–179.
Harris, Alma. 2008. “Do parents know they matter? Engaging all parents in learning.”
Educational Research 5 (3): 37–41.
Hartog, Joop, and Hessel Oosterbeek. 1998. “Health, wealth and happiness: why
pursue a higher education?” Economics of Education Review 17 (3): 245–256.
Hayati, Elli Nur. 2013. “Domestic violence against women in rural Indonesia: Searching
for multilevel prevention.” Medical Dissertations, Umea University.
Hayati, Elli Nur, Malin Eriksson, Mohammad Hakimi, Ulf Högberg, and Maria Em-
melin. 2013. “Elastic bands strategy: women’s lived experience of coping with
domestic violence in rural Indonesia.” Global Health Action 6 (1): 18894.
Hayati, Elli Nur, Ulf Högberg, Mohammad Hakimi, Mary C. Ellsberg, and Maria
Emmelin. 2011. “Behind the silence of harmony: risk factors for physical and
sexual violence among women in rural Indonesia.” BMC Women’s Health 11 (1):
52.
Hayes, Brittany E., and Katharine A. Boyd. 2017. “Influence of Individual- and
National-Level Factors on Attitudes toward Intimate Partner Violence.” Socio-
logical Perspectives 60 (4): 685–701.
Heath, Rachel. 2014. “Women’s Access to Labor Market Opportunities, Control
of Household Resources, and Domestic Violence: Evidence from Bangladesh.”
World Development 57:32–46.
Heckman, James J., Lance J. Lochner, and Petra E. Todd. 2006. “Earnings Functions,
Rates of Return and Treatment Effects: The Mincer Equation and Beyond.”
Chap. 7 in Handbook of the Economics of Education, edited by Eric A. Hanushek
and Finis Welch, 1:307–458. St. Louis, MO: Elsevier.
Bibliography 221
Hidrobo, Melissa, Amber Peterman, and Lori Heise. 2016. “The effect of cash, vouch-
ers, and food transfers on intimate partner violence: Evidence from a randomized
experiment in Northern Ecuador.” American Economic Journal: Applied Eco-
nomics 8 (3): 284–303.
Hjern, Anders, Frank Lindblad, and Bo Vinnerljung. 2002. “Suicide, psychiatric illness,
and social maladjustment in intercountry adoptees in Sweden: a cohort study.”
The Lancet 360 (9331): 443–448.
Hoddinott, John, and Bill Kinsey. 2001. “Child growth in the time of drought.” Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 63 (4): 409–436.
Hotz, V Joseph, and Juan Pantano. 2015. “Strategic Parenting, Birth Order and
School Performance.” Journal of Population Economics 28 (4): 911–936.
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. 2014. Emergency
Plan of Action (EPoA) Indonesia: Volcanic Eruption – Mt Kelud. Online Report.
Accessed September 4, 2018. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/MDRID009dref.pdf.
Janvry, Alain de, Frederico Finan, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Renos Vakis. 2006. “Can
conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety nets in keeping children at
school and from working when exposed to shocks?” Journal of Development
Economics 79:349–373.
Jati, Raditya. 2015. National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo
Framework for Action (2013-2015). Progress Report 2013-2014. The Indonesian
National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB). Accessed September 4,
2018. https://www.preventionweb.net/files/41507%7B%5C_%7DIDN%7B%5C_
%7DNationalHFAprogress%7B%5C_%7D2013-15.pdf.
Jayachandran, Seema, and Ilyana Kuziemko. 2011. “Why Do Mothers Breastfeed
Girls Less than Boys? Evidence and Implications for Child Health in India.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (3): 1485–1538.
Jejeebhoy, Shireen J. 2002. “Convergence and Divergence in Spouses’ Perspectives on
Women’s Autonomy in Rural India.” Studies in Family Planning 33 (4): 299–
308.
Jensen, Robert. 2000. “Agricultural volatility and investments in children.” American
Economic Review 90 (2): 399–404.
222 Bibliography
Jensen, Robert. 2012. “Do labor market opportunities affect young women’s work and
family decisions? Experimental evidence from India.” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 127 (2): 753–792.
Jensen, Robert, and Emily Oster. 2009. “The Power of TV: Cable Television and
Women’s Status in India.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (3): 1057–
1094.
Jewkes, Rachel. 2002. “Intimate partner violence: causes and prevention.” The Lancet
359 (9315): 1423–1429.
Kabeer, Naila. 1999. “Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measure-
ment of Women’s Empowerment.” Development and Change 30 (3): 435–464.
Kabeer, Naila, Simeen Mahmud, and Sakiba Tasneem. 2011. “Does Paid Work Provide
a Pathway to Women’s Empowerment? Empirical Findings from Bangladesh.”
IDS Working Paper 375.
Kanazawa, Satoshi. 2012. “Intelligence, Birth Order, and Family Size.” Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin 38 (9): 1157–1164.
Kantarevic, Jasmin, and Stéphane Mechoulan. 2006. “Birth Order , Educational
Attainment , and Earnings: An Investigation Using the PSID.” The Journal of
Human Resources 41 (4): 755–777.
Kochar, Anjini. 1999. “Smoothing consumption by smoothing income: Hours-of-work
responses to idiosyncratic agricultural shocks in rural India.” The Review of
Economics and Statistics 81 (1): 50–61.
Kristensen, Petter, and Tor Bjerkedal. 2007. “Explaining the relation between birth
order and intelligence.” Science 316 (5832): 1717.
Lafortune, Jeanne, and Soohyung Lee. 2014. “All for One? Family Size and Children’s
Educational Distribution Under Credit Constraints.” American Economic Re-
view: Papers and Proceedings 104 (5): 365–369.
Lindblad, Frank, Anders Hjern, and Bo Vinnerljung. 2003. “Intercountry Adopted
Children as Young Adults – A Swedish Cohort Study.” American Journal of
Orthopopsychiatry 73 (2): 190–202.
Loayza, Norman V., Eduardo Olaberría, Jamele Rigolini, and Luc Christiaensen. 2012.
“Natural Disasters and Growth: Going Beyond the Averages.” World Develop-
ment 40 (7): 1317–1336.
Bibliography 223
Lundberg, Shelly J., Robert A. Pollak, and Terence J. Wales. 1997. “Do Husbands and
Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit.”
The Journal of Human Resources 32 (3): 463–480.
Lundberg, Shelly, and Robert A. Pollak. 1994. “Non-cooperative Bargaining Models of
Marriage.” American Economic Review (Papers & Proceedings) 84 (2): 132–137.
. 1996. “Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage.” The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 10 (4): 139–158.
Lupri, Merlin, and Eugen Brinkerhoff. 1978. “Theoretical and Methodological Issues
in the Use of Decision-Making as an Indicator of Conjugal Power: Some Cana-
dian Observations.” The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de
sociologie 3 (1): 1–20.
Maccini, Sharon, and Dean Yang. 2009. “Under the Weather: Health, Schooling, and
Economic Consequences of Early-Life Rainfall.” American Economic Review 99
(3): 1006–1026.
Majlesi, Kaveh. 2016. “Labor market opportunities and women’s decision making
power within households.” Journal of Development Economics 119:34–47.
Malhotra, Anju, and Sidney Ruth Schuler. 2005. “Women’s Empowerment as a Vari-
able in International Development.” Chap. 3 in Measuring Empowerment: Cross-
Disciplinary Perspectives, edited by Deepa Narayan, 71–88. Washington, DC:
The World Bank.
Malhotra, Anju, Sidney Ruth Schuler, and Carol Boender. 2002. “Measuring Women’s
Empowerment as a Variable in International Development.” Background Paper
Prepared for the World Bank Workshop on Poverty and Gender: New Perspec-
tives (World Bank).
Mankiw, Gregory, David Romer, and David N Weil. 1992. “A Contribution to the
Empirics of Economic Growth.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2):
407–437.
Mbaye, Linguère Mously, and Natascha Wagner. 2017. “Bride Price and Fertility
Decisions: Evidence from Rural Senegal.” Journal of Development Studies 53
(6): 891–910.
Mboane, Ramos, and Madhav P. Bhatta. 2015. “Influence of a husband’s health-
care decision making role on a woman’s intention to use contraceptives among
Mozambican women.” Reproductive Health 12 (1): 1–8.
224 Bibliography
McElroy, Marjorie B, and Mary Jean Horney. 1981. “Nash-Bargained Household
Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand.” International
Economic Review 22 (2): 333–349.
McFarlane, Alexander C. 1998. “Epidemiological evidence about the relationship
between ptsd and alcohol abuse: The nature of the association.” Addictive Be-
haviors 23 (6): 813–825.
Mechoulan, Stéphane, and François Charles Wolff. 2015. “Intra-household allocation
of family resources and birth order: evidence from France using siblings data.”
Journal of Population Economics 28 (4): 937–964.
Miguel, Edward. 2005. “Poverty and witch killing.” Review of Economic Studies 72
(4): 1153–1172.
Moffitt, Terrie E., Avshalom Caspi, Robert F. Krueger, Lynn Magdol, Gayla Margolin,
Phil A. Silva, and Ros Sydney. 1997. “Do partners agree about abuse in their re-
lationship? A psychometric evaluation of interpartner agreement.” Psychological
Assessment 9 (1): 47–56.
Moshoeshoe, Ramaele. 2016. “Birth Order Effects on Educational Attainment and
Child Labour: Evidence from Lesotho.” ERSA Working Paper 621.
Neria, Yuval, Arijit Nandi, and Sandro Galea. 2008. “Post-traumatic stress disorder
following disasters: a systematic review.” Psychological Medicine 38 (4): 467–
480.
Nilan, Pam, Argyo Demartoto, Alex Broom, and John Germov. 2014. “Indonesian
Men’s Perceptions of Violence Against Women.” Violence Against Women 20
(7): 869–888.
Noy, Ilan. 2009. “The macroeconomic consequences of disasters.” Journal of Develop-
ment Economics 88 (2): 221–231.
OECD. 2015. OECD Economic Surveys: Indonesia 2015. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Overstreet, Stacy, Alison Salloum, Berre Burch, and Jill West. 2011. “Challenges As-
sociated with Childhood Exposure to Severe Natural Disasters: Research Review
and Clinical Implications.” Journal of Child & Adolescent Trauma 4 (1): 52–68.
Parkinson, Debra. 2017. “Investigating the Increase in Domestic Violence Post Disas-
ter: An Australian Case Study.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence.
Bibliography 225
Parkinson, Debra, and Claire Zara. 2013. “The hidden disaster: Domestic violence in
the aftermath of natural disaster.” Australian Journal of Emergency Manage-
ment 28 (2): 28–35.
Paxson, Christina, Elizabeth Fussell, Jean Rhodes, and Mary Waters. 2012. “Five
years later: Recovery from Post Traumatic Stress and Psychological Distress
Among Low-Income Mothers Affected by Hurricane Katrina.” Social Science &
Medicine 74 (2): 150–7.
Picardo, Carla W., Shirley Burton, and John Naponick. 2010. “Physically and Sexu-
ally Violent Experiences of Reproductive-Aged Women Displaced by Hurricane
Katrina.” The Journal of the Louisiana State Medical Society 162 (5): 282–290.
Pierotti, Rachael S. 2013. “Increasing Rejection of Intimate Partner Violence: Evidence
of Global Cultural Diffusion.” American Sociological Review 78 (2): 240–265.
Price, Joseph. 2008. “Parent-Child Quality Time: Does Birth Order Matter?” The
Journal of Human Resources 43 (1): 240–265.
Quarm, Daisy. 2018. “Random Measurement Error as a Source of Discrepancies
between the Reports of Wives and Husbands concerning Marital Power and
Task Allocation.” Journal of Marriage and Family 43 (3): 521–535.
Rahman, Lupin, and Vijayendra Rao. 2004. “The determinants of gender equity in
India: Examining Dyson and Moore’s thesis with new data.” Population and
Development Review 30 (2): 239–268.
Rasul, Imran. 2008a. “Household bargaining over fertility : Theory and evidence from
Malaysia.” Journal of Development Economics 86:215–241.
. 2008 b. “Household bargaining over fertility: Theory and evidence from
Malaysia.” Journal of Development Economics 86 (2): 215–241.
Reading, Richard. 2008. “The impact of exposure to domestic violence on children and
young people: A review of the literature.” Child Abuse & Neglect 32:797–810.
Retherford, Robert D., and William H. Sewell. 1991. “Birth Order and Intelligence:
Further Tests of the Confluence Model.” American Sociological Review 56 (2):
141–158.
Rezaeian, Mohsen. 2013. “The association between natural disasters and violence: A
systematic review of the literature and a call for more epidemiological studies.”
Journal of Research in Medical Sciences 18 (12): 1103–1107.
226 Bibliography
Rhodes, Jean, Christian Chan, Christina Paxson, Cecilia Elena Rouse, Mary Waters,
and Elizabeth Fussell. 2010. “The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Mental
and Physical Health of Low-Income Parents in New Orleans.” American Journal
of Orthopsychiatry 80 (2): 237–247.
Rodgers, Joseph Lee. 1984. “Confluence Effects: Not Here, Not Now!” Developmental
Psychology 20 (2): 321–31.
Rodgers, Joseph Lee, Hobart Cleveland, Edwin van den Oord, and David C. Rowe.
2000. “Resolving the debate over birth order, family size, and intelligence.” The
American Psychologist 55 (6): 599–612.
Rosborough, Stephanie, Jennifer L. Chan, and Parveen Parmar. 2009. “Responding to
Gender-based Violence in Disasters: Grappling With Research Methods to Clear
the Way for Planning.” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 3 (1):
8–10.
Rosenzweig, Mark R. 1995. “Why are there returns to schooling?” American Economic
Review 85 (2): 153–158.
Rowe, David C., Wendy J. Vesterdal, and Joseph L. Rodgers. 1998. “Herrnstein’s
syllogism: genetic and shared environmental influences on IQ, education, and
income.” Intelligence 26 (4): 405–423.
Rubonis, Anthony V., and Leonard Bickman. 1991. “Psychological Impairment in the
Wake of Disaster: The Disaster-Psychopathology Relationship.” Psychological
Bulletin 109 (3): 384–399.
Runyan, Desmond, Corrine Wattam, Robin Ikeda, Hassan Fatma, and Laurie Ramiro.
2002. “Child abuse and neglect by parents and other caregivers.” Chap. 3
in World report on violence and health, edited by Etienne G. Krug, Linda L.
Dahlberg, Mercy James A., Anthony B. Zwi, and Lozano Rafael, 57–86. Geneva:
World Health Organization.
Sacerdote, Bruce. 2011. “Peer Effects in Education: How Might They Work, How Big
Are They and How Much Do We Know Thus Far?” Chap. 4 in Handbook of
the Economics of Education, edited by Eric A. Hanushek, Stephen Machin, and
Ludger Woessmann, 3:249–277. St. Louis, MO: Elsevier.
. 2014. “Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Peer Effects: Two
Steps Forward?” Annual Review of Economics 6 (1): 253–272.
Safilios-Rothschild, Constantina. 1970. “The Study of Family Power Structure: A
Review 1960-1969.” Journal of Marriage and Family 32 (4): 539–552.
Bibliography 227
Schaner, Simone, and Smita Das. 2016. “Female Labor Force Participation in Asia:
Indonesia Country Study.” ADB Economics Working Paper Series 474.
Schooler, Carmi. 1972. “Birth order effects: Not here, not now!” Psychological Bulletin
78 (3): 161–175.
Schumacher, Julie A., Scott F. Coffey, Fran H. Norris, Melissa Tracy, Kahni Clements,
and Sandro Galea. 2010. “Intimate Partner Violence and Hurricane Katrina:
Predictors and Associated Mental Health Outcomes.” Violence and Victims 25
(5): 588–603.
Sekhri, Sheetal, and Adam Storeygard. 2014. “Dowry deaths: Response to weather
variability in India.” Journal of Development Economics 111:212–223.
Sety, M., K. James, and J. Breckenridge. 2014. “Understanding the Risk of Domestic
Violence During and Post Natural Disasters: Literature Review.” Chap. 5 in Is-
sues of Gender and Sexual Orientation in Humanitarian Emergencies, edited by
Larry W. Roeder, 99–111. Cham: Springer International Publishing Switzerland.
Shah, Manisha, and Bryce Millett Steinberg. 2017. “Drought of Opportunities: Con-
temporaneous and Long Term Impacts of Rainfall Shocks on Human Capital.”
Journal of Political Economy 125 (2): 527–561.
Sonne, Susan C., Sudie E. Back, Claudia Diaz Zuniga, Carrie L. Randall, and Kathleen
T. Brady. 2009. “Gender Differences in Individuals with Comorbid Alcohol De-
pendence and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.” American Journal on Addictions
12 (5): 412–423.
SOS Children’s Villages International. 2016. International Annual Report 2015. Vi-
enna, Austria. Accessed September 4, 2018. https://issuu.com/soschi
ldrensvillagesinternational/docs/sos%7B%5C_%7Dchildrens%7B%5C_
%7Dvillages%7B%5C_%7Dinternationa.
Statistics Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik - BPS) National Population and Family
Planning Board (BKKBN) Kementerian Kesehatan (Kemenkes—MOH) and ICF
International. 2012. Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey 2012. Jakarta,
Indonesia: BPS, BKKBN, Kemenkes, ICF International.
Story, William T., and Sarah A. Burgard. 2012. “Couples’ reports of household
decision-making and the utilization of maternal health services in Bangladesh.”
Social Science & Medicine 75 (12): 2403–2411.
228 Bibliography
Strauss, John, Kathleen Beegle, Bondan Sikoki, Agus Dwiyanto, Yulia Herawati, and
Firman Witoelar. 2004. The Third Wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey
(IFLS): Overview and Field Report. WR-144/1-NIA/NICHD.
Strauss, John, Firman Witoelar, and Bondan Sikoki. 2016. The Fifth Wave of the
Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS5): Overview and Field Report. WR-1143/1-
NIA/NICHD.
Strauss, John, Firman Witoelar, Bondan Sikoki, and Anna Marie Wattie. 2009. The
Fourth Wave of the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS4): Overview and Field
Report. WR-675/1-NIA-NICHID.
Strobl, Eric. 2012. “The economic growth impact of natural disasters in develop-
ing countries: Evidence from hurricane strikes in the Central American and
Caribbean regions.” Journal of Development Economics 97 (1): 130–141.
Sulloway, Frank J. 2007. “Birth Order and Intelligence.” Science 316 (5832): 1711–
1712.
Tenikue, Michel, and Bertrand Verheyden. 2010. “Birth order and schooling: Theory
and evidence from twelve Sub-Saharan countries.” Journal of African Economies
19 (4): 459–495.
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
2014. Indonesia: Mt. Kelud Eruption. Online report. Accessed September 4,
2018. https://reliefweb.int/map/indonesia/indonesia- mt- kelud-
eruption-14-february-2014.
The World Bank Group. 2018. The World Bank In Indonesia. The World Bank.
Accessed September 4, 2018. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
indonesia/overview.
Thomas, Duncan, Elizabeth Frankenberg, and James P. Smith. 2001. “Lost but Not
Forgotten: Attrition and Follow-up in the Indonesia Family Life Survey.” The
Journal of Human Resources 36 (3): 556–592.
Twyman, Jennifer, Pilar Useche, and Carmen Diana Deere. 2015. “Gendered Per-
ceptions of Land Ownership and Agricultural Decision-making in Ecuador: Who
Are the Farm Managers?” Land Economics 91 (3): 479–500.
Uddin, Jalal, Mohammad Habibullah, and Md Nasim-Us Sabah. 2016. “Correlates
of unmet need for contraception in Bangladesh: does couples ’ concordance in
household decision making matter?” Contraception 94 (1): 18–26.
Bibliography 229
UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of
Women). 2011. Violence against Women Prevalence Data: Surveys by Country.
Online report. Accessed September 4, 2018. http://www.endvawnow.org/
uploads/browser/files/vaw%7B%5C_%7Dprevalence%7B%5C_%7Dmatrix%7B%
5C_%7D15april%7B%5C_%7D2011.pdf.
Usano, Robert J., Carol S. Fullerton, Lars Weisaeth, and Beverley Raphael. 2017.
Textbook of disaster psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Aalst, Maarten K. 2006. “The impacts of climate change on the risk of natural
disasters.” Disasters 30 (1): 5–18.
Wahlstrom, Margareta, and Debarati Guha-Sapir. 2015. The human cost of weather-
related disasters 1995-2015. Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR.
Wang, Shing-yi. 2014. “Property Rights and Intra-Household Bargaining.” Journal of
Development Economics 107:192–201.
Warsini, Sri, Petra Buettner, Jane Mills, Caryn West, and Kim Usher. 2014. “The
Psychosocial Impact of the Environmental Damage Caused by the MT Merapi
Eruption on Survivors in Indonesia.” EcoHealth 11 (4): 491–501.
Watson, Robert T., and Daniel L. Albritton, eds. 2001. Climate change 2001: Synthe-
sis report: Third assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Westoff, Charles F. 2010. “Desired Number of Children: 2000–2008.” DHS Comparative
Reports 25.
Wichman, Aaron L., Joseph Lee Rodgers, and Robert C. Maccallum. 2006. “A Mul-
tilevel Approach to the Relationship Between Birth Order and Intelligence.”
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 32 (1): 117–127.
World Health Organization (WHO). 2002. Gender and Health in Disasters. Infor-
mation Sheet. Accessed September 4, 2018. http://www.who.int/gender/
gwhgendernd2.pdf.
. 2008. Country policies and strategies for combating GBV. Factsheet. Accessed
September 4, 2018. www.searo.who.int/entity/gender/data/indonesia.
pdf?ua=1.
Wunderman, Richard, ed. 2014a. “Global Volcanism Program, 2014. Report on Kelut
(Indonesia).” In Bulletin of the Global Volcanism Network, 39:02. Washington,
DC: Smithsonian Institution.
230 Bibliography
Wunderman, Richard, ed. 2014b. “Global Volcanism Program, 2014. Report on Merapi
(Indonesia).” In Bulletin of the Global Volcanism Network, 39:10. Washington,
DC: Smithsonian Institution.
York, Travis T., Charles Gibson, and Susan Rankin. 2015. “Defining and Measuring
Academic Success.” Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation 20 (5): 1–20.
Zajonc, Robert B. 1976. “Family configuration and intelligence.” Science 192 (4236):
227–236.
. 2001. “The family Dynamics of Intellectual Development.” American Psychol-
ogist 56 (6/7): 490–496.
Zajonc, Robert B., and Gregory B. Markus. 1975. “Birth order and intellectual
development.” Psychological Review 82 (1): 74–88.
Zajonc, Robert B., Hazel Markus, and Gregory B. Markus. 1979. “The Birth Order
Puzzle.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (8): 1325–1341.
Zajonc, Robert B., and Patricia R. Mullally. 1997. “Birth order: Reconciling conflicting
effects.” American Psychologist 52 (7): 685–699.
Zajonc, Robert B., and Frank J. Sulloway. 2007. “The confluence model: birth order
as a within-family or between-family dynamic?” Personality & Social Psychology
Bulletin 33 (9): 1187–94.
